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Making Nations: The Northeastern Borderlands in an Age of Revolution, 1760-
1820 examines migration within northeastern North America, and the gradual formation 
of a meaningful border between the District of Maine and the Province of New 
Brunswick. The American Revolution, though it divided the northeast between New 
England and British North America, did not fundamentally change attitudes toward the 
borderland. For decades, the region had been a special sort of frontier – a more connected 
frontier, offering migrants from southern New England better access to Atlantic trade. 
The post-revolutionary era rapidly reverted to pre-war patterns, as settlers crossed a 
largely meaningless border looking for fertile land and economic connectivity. These 
settlers, I argue, were not late loyalists, choosing British territory, or early republicans, 
choosing the U.S. This was one migration, to the borderland and the similar opportunities 
on both sides.  
So how did migration within a shared borderland become immigration across a 
meaningful border? Post-revolution, both Congregationalists and Catholics began to build 
networks in Maine that stopped at the border. A Congregational missionary society, the 
Society for Propagating the Gospel Among the Indians and Others in North America, 
realized it could secure state funding from Massachusetts by advertising itself as a tool 
	
for managing the growing settlements in Maine. State money helped the society grow 
rapidly, and as similar groups formed they chose to join the pioneer society as partners 
rather than compete with it. Meanwhile, Congregational women created institutions 
called “ladies cent societies,” which provided a massive infusion of funding into the 
system. The resulting Congregational network grew to encompass almost the entire 
American half of the borderland. At the same time, a Catholic network also grew in 
Maine, connecting the Catholic Passamaquoddy and Penobscot people to Boston, as well 
as to Irish Catholics along Maine’s coast. As these networks grew they changed eastern 
Maine from a place that was attractive because of its connections with British North 
America, to a place that was attractive because of its connections with New England. 
These networks made the border meaningful – and immovable. Though politicians on 
both sides persisted for years in believing they could still adjust the border, they were 
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 I built this dissertation over a long period of time, with the assistance of a great many 
kind and thoughtful people. First, I was incredibly fortunate in my committee. When Owen 
Stanwood agreed to serve as my advisor on my arrival at Boston College, I had an idea about 
exploring the northeastern borderland and the people who lived there, but not much else. Prof. 
Stanwood has been of great assistance over the years, both in shaping the broad arc of the study 
and in providing detailed feedback as I finally began producing chapter drafts. He also came up 
with the title, for which I am very grateful. Penelope Ismay went above and beyond the call of 
the second reader, inviting me to send drafts whenever they were available, and responding with 
thorough analysis of my work. She also made time for several long one-on-one meetings, which 
gave us a chance to get into the big ideas of the dissertation. I came out of those meetings with 
much clearer ideas about what I wanted to say, and how I could say it more clearly. Kevin Kenny 
similarly went beyond the typical contribution for a third reader, as he taught the dissertation 
seminar that led to this particular project. Prof. Kenny was relentless in the seminar, guiding my 
cohort as we honed our arguments and mapped out our research plans. My project has evolved 
over time, but it is not too distant from the proposal that I crafted that semester. When I have 
needed to clear my thinking and get back to basics, the comments I received and drafts I 
produced in Prof. Kenny’s seminar have been invaluable.  
 I have also enjoyed thoughtful feedback at several workshops and conferences both in the 
U.S. and Canada over the years. One of the most important was a workshop at Boston College’s 
Clough Center for the Study of Constitutional Democracy, at which I presented an early version 
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of chapter three. This was a real turning point for me, as I began to think of my early republic 
ministers as the builders of actual, rather than imagined, communities. The Religion and Politics 
in Early America conference in St. Louis in 2018 also stands out. There was a great deal of 
stimulating scholarship at that conference – many people working on related topics, with some 
fantastic panels and discussions. It provided an excellent start to my final year of writing. 
Audiences at Concordia University in Montreal, York University in Toronto, Duke University, 
the Colonial Society of Massachusetts, and the University of Massachusetts, Amherst also helped 
me along with probing questions and constructive criticism.  
 I owe enormous thanks to the librarians and archivists across New England and eastern 
Canada who helped me uncover the pieces of my borderlands story. The staff at the Maine 
Historical Society, the Congregational Library, the Phillips Library of the Peabody Essex 
Museum, and the Provincial Archives of New Brunswick stand out in particular. Most of what I 
found in these places, especially New Brunswick, I found because the archivists took the time to 
listen to me and then identified collections I did not even know I needed. I would not have been 
able to write this without their help. The Boston College History Department, the Graduate 
School of Arts and Sciences, and the Clough Center provided much needed funding to get me to 
some of those archives, allowing me intensive research weeks in Ottawa, Fredericton, and 
Halifax. And I cannot forget the efforts of the interlibrary loan department at the Boston College 
library. They have secured dozens of rare volumes for me over the years, as well as unpublished 
theses and microfilm reels from far-flung libraries across North America. They cannot get 
absolutely everything, but they come amazingly close. I am in their debt. 
 Beyond my committee, the Boston College History Department has been an extremely 
supportive place to work over the years. Important ideas in this study were first developed in 
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excellent seminars taught by Alan Rogers and Heather Cox Richardson. James O’Toole not only 
provided feedback on my work, but also helped me navigate the Archdiocese of Boston 
Archives. Sarah Ross’s course on gender history was very helpful, especially with chapter four, 
and Prof. Ross also organized the weekly writing workshops that helped me focus on what is 
really most important: producing the words. My PhD cohort – Michael Franczak, Joanna Kelly, 
and Allison Vander Broek – improved my dissertation proposal with their comments, and my 
fellow Early Americanists, Craig Gallagher and Jared Hardesty, were always available to offer 
guidance. And of course there were many others, faculty, staff, and fellow students, who offered 
advice or just a sympathetic ear. I never felt abandoned during this process. I always knew that if 
I asked, someone in the department would help me out.  
 Finally, none of this work would have been possible without the support of my family. 
My parents and mother-in-law made it clear that I could call on them whenever necessary, 
mostly for the all-important task of helping with the kids while I drove off (once again) for some 
archive or other. But no one’s contribution matches that of my wife, Kate, who has been teaching 
full-time since I started graduate school. Not only has she provided most of our income and dealt 
with our lovely but very energetic children when I was researching and writing, she has also had 
to listen to quite a bit of talk about late-18th century church networks and land grants, in addition 
to applying her proofreading and editing skills to many pages of material. She has always been 
right there, ready to help, even when it seemed like this project would go on forever. I am 









 In the years after the American Revolution, Simeon Perkins and the other residents of 
Liverpool, Nova Scotia, found themselves living in a borderland. This was a new development. 
Nova Scotia had not been a borderland in the 1760s, when Perkins moved there from 
Connecticut. Before the revolution, it was as if the Liverpool settlers were simply relocating 
from one part of New England to another. Most of them came from small farming and fishing 
villages around southeastern Massachusetts, and Liverpool also was a small fishing village, 
located about ninety miles southwest of Halifax. After settling there, many remained connected 
with their former homes. Ships crisscrossed the Gulf of Maine, bringing trade goods and 
newspapers, as well as letters from family and friends spread over the colonies. Perkins was a 
merchant and trader, dealing in fish and lumber. He had friends and business connections in 
Boston. When New England ships arrived in Liverpool, Perkins socialized with mariners he 
knew, and they often provided him with Connecticut newspapers so he could keep up with 
events at home.1 
 After the war, things should have been different. There was now a political boundary in 
place, dividing Nova Scotia, which the British retained, from New England, which they lost. 
Perkins and his fellow Liverpool residents were still British subjects, while their friends and 
family to the west were American citizens. In reality, however, life hardly changed at all. 
Communication and trade appear to have continued on in the same manner as in the pre-war 
years. Perkins’ diary of the mid 1780s is filled with references to New England ships. Mariners 
                                                
1 The history of Liverpool, Nova Scotia and Simeon Perkins can be found in the many volumes of his diary: Simeon 
Perkins, The Diary of Simeon Perkins ed. D.C. Harvey (Toronto: Champlain Society, 1948); also Elizabeth Mancke, 




from Connecticut still brought him letters and newspapers, he maintained his business 
connections in Boston and Penobscot Bay, and friends and family frequently traveled back and 
forth between the two countries.2 
 In some ways, there were even more contacts between Nova Scotia and New England 
after the war. The peace saw an exodus of loyalist refugees from the newly independent colonies 
to Nova Scotia. Tens of thousands of new settlers flooded into the region; there were so many 
that the northern part of Nova Scotia was set off as its own separate colony of New Brunswick. 
British authorities knew that the only way to feed all of these people was with food from the 
United States, so they issued a proclamation allowing “all…species of live Stock, and…species 
of Grain” to be imported, so long as they were carried on British-owned ships. It would have 
been obvious to anyone reading newspapers in New Brunswick or Nova Scotia in those years 
that the result was constant contact with the northeastern states. Papers advertised pork from 
Connecticut, and flour from New York and Philadelphia. The shipping news listed ship after ship 
from New York and New England: in Shelburne, just down the coast from Liverpool, almost half 
of the shipping traffic was coming from or going to the states. Even the news itself came from 
Americans. Almost all the ships entering the harbor of Saint John, New Brunswick, for example 
– even those originally from Britain – arrived by way of Boston or New York. The most recent 
newspapers they carried, therefore, were U.S. papers. As a result, the Saint John Royal Gazette 
tended to reprint news from the republic.3 
 Though goods were supposed to travel only on British ships, many people carried on 
trading just as they had in the pre-Revolution days. Simeon Perkins was one of these people, 
                                                
2 Simeon Perkins, The Diary of Simeon Perkins 1780-1789, ed. D.C. Harvey (Toronto: Champlain Society, 1948), 
28 May 1785; 28 April, 3 May, 22 June, 28 June, 9 October, 12 October 1786.  
3 The Nova Scotia Packet and General Advertiser, 27 July 1786; Port Roseway Gazetteer and Shelburne Advertiser, 
9 June 1785; 19 May 1785; 21 July 1785; Nova Scotia Packet and General Advertiser, 6 July 1786; 17 August 
1786; 24 August 1786; St. John Royal Gazette, 11 October 1785. 
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which led to a bit of trouble. In summer and early fall of 1789, officials from Halifax began to 
make surprise visits to Liverpool harbor in an attempt to catch locals who were skirting the trade 
restrictions. They witnessed the arrival of several New England ships, and in September 
discovered some smuggled American manufactures. Perkins described in his diary a 
confrontation between himself and a Captain Browell over these goods, during which Browell 
“made indecent expressions to me, signifying that I was a rebel.” This whole series of events 
resulted in the confiscation of several ships, followed by a trial in Halifax during which Perkins 
and other men attempted to reclaim their property. Even after this, though, little changed. Perkins 
does not appear to have cared about being accused of rebel sympathies. He continued his 
business dealings with New England even after the trial.4 
 The newly created border in this borderland, in short, did not seem to matter all that much 
to many people in New England and British North America. But there was one area in which it 
did matter. Congregational churches had expanded into Nova Scotia with the New England 
settlers of the 1760s. For twenty years, the church was just another way in which the colony 
seemed part of a greater New England. After the revolution, though, that particular connection 
disappeared. Though they were still connected to New England in many ways, Simeon Perkins 
and his fellow Nova Scotians found themselves abruptly cut off from their fellow 
Congregationalists.  
 The Liverpool settlers had established a Congregational Church when they founded their 
community. The Reverend Israel Cheever, a Harvard graduate from New England, became the 
settled minister. Many other communities around Nova Scotia did the same; by 1770 there were 
                                                
4 Perkins, Diary 1780-1789, 4 July through 22 September 1789.  
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at least seven settled Congregational ministers from New England in the colony.5 During the war 
years, however, people in Liverpool became dissatisfied with Cheever. He apparently had a 
drinking problem, and he lost the support of many of his congregants and was dismissed in 1782. 
This dismissal happened to coincide with a time of religious fervor in the colony. Independent 
itinerant preachers, who called themselves “New Lights,” as well as a number of Methodists, 
were travelling throughout Nova Scotia preaching any place they could find an audience. Simeon 
Perkins and others in Liverpool were dismayed by all these competing voices, and they wanted a 
new, trained minister to be sent from New England.  
 And so Perkins, and a few other locals, began sending letters to Massachusetts asking for 
a new preacher. The letters went out for years. The people of Liverpool felt strongly enough that 
at one point they paid a local man, Deacon Samuel Hunt, to hand deliver a letter to Plymouth, 
Massachusetts, to ensure that their request was heard.6 And yet it took seven years before a 
candidate arrived. John Turner, a twenty-one year old newly minted minister, arrived in Nova 
Scotia in November of 1789. Turner received a pleasant welcome from many of the 
Congregationalists in town, including Perkins, and seemed content with his new appointment. 
And then he left, just six months later and apparently without warning. Simeon Perkins was 
caught entirely off guard, and wrote immediately to Massachusetts demanding an explanation. 
There is no indication that he received one, or that another minister was ever sent. The church in 
Liverpool would receive no more help from their Congregational brethren in New England. In 
the following years, they would receive a plethora of visiting ministers – by one count, twenty-
six different itinerant preachers. Eight were New Lights, fifteen were Methodists, two were 
                                                
5 W. Stewart MacNutt, New Brunswick: A History, 1784-1867 (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1984), 106; another 
source claims ten Congregational Churches, but does not specify the number of ministers: Robert Handy, A History 
of the Churches in the United States and Canada (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), 126.  
6 Mancke, Fault Lines, 127.  
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Quakers, and one was Presbyterian. Not one was Congregationalist. By 1795, the “former 
Congregationalists” of Liverpool “had nearly all gone over to the New Lights and Methodists.”7  
 Congregationalists in Massachusetts were well aware of what was happening to their 
sister churches in the British provinces. Liverpool was not alone in asking for help. In Sheffield, 
New Brunswick, the mainline Congregational Church also attempted to resist New Lights and 
other itinerants. Most local people, even among the loyalist refugees who arrived in the 1780s, 
supported it. But by the 1790s that church too lost its regular preacher, and like Liverpool could 
not secure a replacement. Gradually, the Sheffield Church faded away.8 In 1792, 
Congregationalists received news of another loss, this time from Yarmouth, Nova Scotia. The 
Reverend Jonathan Scott reported that after twenty years, he had been dismissed from his 
position as the minister of Yarmouth. The New Lights were ascendant in that community, Scott 
wrote, and he needed guidance: “I am now waiting the call of Divine Providence, and looking for 
a door to open in some other place; and I pray you to give me word …of any place, where I 
might be useful in the ministry.”9 
 These appeals from Nova Scotia and New Brunswick were arriving in Massachusetts at a 
time when it would seem the Congregational Church was perfectly positioned to address them. 
The church had just embarked on what would evolve into a massive program of missionary 
outreach, specifically designed to serve the needs of settlers in the northeastern borderland. 
Congregationalists from Massachusetts prioritized the most distant Maine settlements, investing 
a great deal of money in reaching communities that bordered on British territory. The letter from 
                                                
7 Diary of Simeon Perkins 1780-1789, 508-509; Diary of Simeon Perkins 1790-1796, 34-35. Mancke, Fault Lines of 
Empire, 122; Diary of Simeon Perkins 1780-1789, lvi; Diary of Simeon Perkins 1790-1796, xviii.  
8 The Newlight Baptist Journals of James Manning and James Innis ed. D.G. Bell (Hantsport, NS: Lancelot Press, 
1984), 173.  
9 James Lyon to Peter Thatcher, 31 May 1792, MSS 48, Box 3, Folder 6, Society For Propagating the Gospel 
Among the Indians and Others in North America papers (hereafter SPGNA), Philips Library (hereafter PL), Rowley, 
Massachusetts.   
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Jonathan Scott, for example, reached Boston through missionary James Lyon, who spent months 
ministering to the Passamaquoddy Bay area in 1791. Other itinerants followed, part of an effort 
to build a network that could reach every corner of Maine.  
 The work of these first Maine missionaries led to greater fundraising efforts in Boston, 
and the rapid growth of the Congregational network. Soon multiple missionary societies, all 
linked together, were raising thousands of dollars. Much of the money came from an innovative 
institution: the ladies cent society.10 Women around Boston began giving a penny a week for 
missionary work, and the idea quickly spread to the rest of Massachusetts and beyond. Finding 
themselves with more than enough money to pay itinerant ministers, missionary societies 
invested in books and other printed material, and worked to open schools in the newest 
settlements. Working together, they funneled thousands of books and pamphlets into Maine – not 
just religious books like Bibles, testaments, and hymn books, but also secular books like primers 
and spelling books for children. Missionary society funding allowed schools to reach small 
villages in remote parts of central and eastern Maine that could never have afforded them 
independently.  
 All of these developments in the American section of the borderland were happening just 
as the Congregational Church was in steep decline in the British section. New England 
Congregationalists, through their missionary societies, had the resources to stop that decline. 
Their brethren in the British provinces were asking for help. And as noted, the region was still 
knit together in many ways. There was constant communication and trade. Even political 
officials, as we will see, tended to keep the border permeable as a way of building settlements 
and developing the region. Practically everybody, in short, was ignoring the boundary. And yet 
                                                
10 These were sometimes referred to as female cent institutions as well, but ladies cent society was the more popular 
and widespread term.  
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the missionaries paid attention to it. When ministers in Boston received Jonathan Scott’s letter 
from Yarmouth, asking what he might do to be useful, they did not choose to do anything for 
Liverpool, Nova Scotia or Sheffield, New Brunswick. Scott ended up relocating to the Maine 
frontier, becoming the pastor of the tiny community of Bakersfield. Congregationalists had 
decided their mission was now limited to their fellow citizens, and they used their resources to 
build a network circumscribed by where they understood the border to be.  
 
This study considers the area shared by northern New England and the British North 
American colonies, during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, as a borderland. My 
definition of what, exactly, constitutes a “borderland” is drawn primarily from two different 
sources: one a broad exploration of borderlands and how they can be distinguished from 
frontiers, and the other a more narrow study of the evolution of the U.S./Canada boundary. In the 
former study, Jeremy Adelman and Stephen Aron identify borderlands as “the contested 
boundaries between colonial domains,” in which competition between rival states allows the 
inhabitants “room to maneuver and preserve some element of autonomy.”11 In the latter study, 
Lauren McKinsey and Victor Konrad define a borderland as a shared region that “houses people 
with common social characteristics in spite of the political boundary between them.” These 
characteristics set the area in question apart, as residents have “more in common with each other 
than with members of their respective dominant cultures.”12  
Applying a borderlands perspective to the post-revolutionary northeast is essential to a 
better understanding of the region’s history. First, it offers a new interpretation of expansion in 
                                                
11 Jeremy Adelman and Stephen Aron, “From Borderlands to Borders: Empires, Nation-States, and the Peoples in 
Between in North American History,” The American Historical Review 104:3 (1999): 814-841. 
12 Lauren McKinsey and Victor Konrad, Borderlands Reflections: The United States and Canada, (Orono, ME: 
Borderlands Project, Canadian-American Center, 1989). 
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both the early United States and the colonies that would become Canada. The processes of 
expansion in these two areas are usually treated as distinct, and sometimes even as totally 
divergent. We are told that, on a grand scale, after the revolution the American Empire looked to 
expand west, while the British Empire looked to the east.13 Even on a smaller, North American 
scale, we still receive two stories – one of republican citizens moving west, and one of “late 
loyalists” moving north.14 A borderlands perspective demonstrates that those two streams of 
expansion were remarkably similar, and in many ways early American and British North 
American expansion should be seen one unified phenomenon.  
Second, this study illuminates one of the ways a borderland can become a “bordered 
land.” In the case of part of the northeast – the zone shared by Maine and New Brunswick – the 
border became meaningful not through political negotiations, but through the work of church 
networks.15 Congregationalists and Catholics serving the District of Maine from Boston decided 
to impose border restrictions on themselves. Though they were not prohibited from crossing the 
border, and there was even some justification for doing so, these networks chose to limit their 
reach to U.S. territory. This was less a top-down “shift from inter-imperial struggle to 
international coexistence,” and more a bottom-up process of distributing resources and linking 
                                                
13 This is stated explicitly in the closing pages of Stephen Hornsby, British Atlantic, American Frontier: Spaces of 
Power in Early Modern British America (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 2005), 237-238.  
14 For late loyalists as a category of people, see Alan Taylor, “The Late Loyalists: Northern Reflections of the Early 
American Republic,” Journal of the Early Republic 27:1 (2007): 1-34; Alan Taylor, The Civil War of 1812:	
American Citizens, British Subjects, Irish Rebels, & Indian Allies (New York: Vintage Books, 2010); and John 
Garcia, “He Hath Ceased to Be a Citizen: Stephen Burroughs, Late Loyalists, Lower Canada,” Early American 
Literature 52:3 (2017): 591-618. There are a few studies that see early American and Canadian expansion in much 
the same way I do: one new, Lawrence Hatter, Citizens of Convenience: The Imperial Origins of American 
Nationhood on the U.S.-Canadian Border (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 2017); and one old, 
Marcus Hansen, The Mingling of the Canadian and American Peoples (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1940).  
15 The easternmost counties of Massachusetts were known as the District of Maine until 1820, when they became 
the State of Maine. I alternate between the terms Maine and District of Maine, but it should be noted that the region 
was a part of Massachusetts throughout the era under study.  
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communities together.16 Networks on the ground gradually made the two sides of the borderland 
distinct, and gave substance to what had been an inconsequential border. In the case of this 
particular corner of North America, when the two sides of the “imperial struggle” finally 
attempted to use politics and war to fix the boundary, they discovered it had already been fixed.  
Though borderland studies have proliferated in recent decades, New England and the 
easternmost colonies of British North America have been largely ignored. Much of the work on 
American borderlands has dealt with the southwest, and the few studies of British/American 
borderlands have tended to focus on the Great Lakes region or beyond. The border in the west is 
regarded as having been contingent and contested in the early national period, while the border in 
the east is dismissed as basically settled by the American Revolution.17 In general, the literature 
has promoted the idea that border formation was, like the frontier, a westward moving 
phenomenon – northern New England became a “bordered land” first, then later New York, and 
the rest of the Great Lakes country followed suit.18  
I argue that the development of a meaningful border in the northeast was a longer 
process, which stretched into the early nineteenth century. For the first few decades of American 
independence, northern New England, Lower Canada (Quebec), and New Brunswick continued 
to be a borderland. Moreover, though they would not have used the term, the people living in the 
                                                
16 The idea that borderlands become bordered lands through this kind of shift from imperial struggle to coexistence 
comes from Adelman and Aron, “From Borderlands to Borders.” 
17 One study covering four centuries of Maritime-New England interaction sums up this position neatly: “the 
Maritime-New England area after the era of the American Revolution can properly be viewed as increasingly a 
bordered land rather than a borderland.” Stephen Hornsby and John Reid, ed., New England and the Maritime 
Provinces: Connections and Comparisons (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005), 9.  
18 Adelman and Aron promote this idea in “From Borderlands to Borders.” Their study examines three North 
American borderlands, moving east to west: first the Great Lakes, then the Missouri Valley, then the Rio Grande. 
Other borderland studies of the lakes and points west are Alan Taylor, The Civil War of 1812: American Citizens, 
British Subjects, Irish Rebels, & Indian Allies (New York: Vintage Books, 2010); Alan Taylor, The Divided 
Ground: Indians, Settlers, and the Northern Borderland of the American Revolution (New York: Vintage Books, 
2007); Lawrence Hatter, Citizens of Convenience; Michel Hogue, Metis and the Medicine Line: Creating a Border 
and Dividing a People (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2015); Kornel Chang, Pacific 
Connections: The Making of the U.S.-Canadian Borderlands (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2012).  
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region at the time understood it to be a borderland. It clearly had characteristics that set it apart 
as a distinct place, and contained people with much in common in spite of the political boundary 
that ostensibly divided them.19 Both American and British landowners highlighted those distinct 
characteristics and downplayed political differences in soliciting settlers for the region. It also 
remained a zone where contested boundaries allowed both indigenous people and white settlers 
room to maneuver, “play off rivalries,” and otherwise take advantage of weak state controls.20 
Until at least 1815, for example, the Passamaquoddy and Penobscot people in Maine were able 
to take advantage of contested boundaries in the borderland. White settlers in eastern Maine took 
advantage too, as did the Allen family in Vermont, John Jacob Astor in Lower Canada, and 
many others. 
The few studies that do exist on the northeasternmost section of the borderland tend to 
offer a different interpretation of border formation than my own. In general, they conform to a 
common theme in borderlands literature: the creation of an artificial line of division, followed by 
the efforts of people on the ground to adapt to it.21 The result is a conception of the border as a 
structure imposed from above on a resistant populace. One study of Maine and Nova Scotia 
traces the imposition of this structure to political changes within the British Empire as far back as 
the seventeenth century.22 Others argue that after the American Revolution both British and 
                                                
19 McKinsey and Konrad, Borderlands Reflections, 4. McKinsey and Conrad take a much broader view of 
borderlands than Adelman and Aron. Their study examines several discrete borderland regions across the entire 
continent-wide U.S./Canadian border. They also differentiate between a “border region” and a “borderland,” with a 
border region simply being a zone of exchange between two neighboring states with a stable boundary. A 
borderland, by contrast, is a shared zone, containing people that have characteristics in common.   
20 Adelman and Aron, “Borderlands to Borders,” 816.  
21 In one of the best studies in this vein, Rachel St. John explores how the US/Mexico border became a magnet, 
drawing people like the Apache, who learned to use the boundary as a refuge. Similarly, Michel Hogue argues that 
the Metis people in the upper plains adapted to take advantage of the 49th parallel. Rachel St. John, Line in the Sand: 
A History of the Western U.S.-Mexico Border (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011); Michel Hogue, Metis 
and the Medicine Line.   
22 Elizabeth Mancke, The Fault Lines of Empire: Political Differentiation in Massachusetts and Nova Scotia, 1760-
1830 (New York: Routledge, 2005). 
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American authorities attempted to create and enforce a meaningful border in the northeast, while 
non-state actors like privateers and smugglers pushed back and maintained the borderland quality 
of the region.23 My study proposes the inverse. In Maine and New Brunswick, I argue, it was the 
non-state actors – Congregational missionaries, with some assistance from Catholic priests – 
who built a meaningful border, as the dueling states collaborated to preserve the open 
borderland.  
Examining how Congregational missionaries ended up as border builders provides insight 
into both the religious history of early republic New England, and the history of the American 
Protestant missionary movement. Surprisingly, politics appears to have played little role in the 
Congregational effort in Maine. Though the revolution was barely over, few missionary societies 
or individual ministers found in this study appear to have been motivated by revolutionary 
patriotism or incipient religious nationalism. Surely at least a few saw their missions as a way to 
build the republic and counter the empire. But for the most part, the Congregationalist mission in 
the borderland was independent of revolutionary ideology.24 Before the war, New Englanders 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
23 Edward J. Martin, “The Prize Game in the Borderlands: Privateering in New England and the Maritime 
Provinces, 1775-1815,” (PhD diss., University of Maine, 2014); Joshua Smith, Borderland Smuggling: Patriots, 
Loyalists, and Illicit Trade in the Northeast, 1783-1820 (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2006). Smith’s 
study is closest to my own in that he focuses on the Passamaquoddy Bay region between Maine and New 
Brunswick, and he argues that the boundary was still quite flexible in the early national period. We differ in that 
Smith’s non-state actors, smugglers, were working to maintain the borderland, while my non-state actors, ministers, 
were dividing it.  
24 This represents a break from a number of studies that claim a strong connection between New England 
Congregationalism and revolutionary ideology. In Religion and the American Mind, Alan Heimert argued that the 
New Light Congregationalists born in the First Great Awakening were the immediate precursors to the 
revolutionaries: Heimert, Religion and the American Mind: From the Great Awakening to the Revolution 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1966). Nathan Hatch goes even further, arguing that New England 
Congregationalists achieved a pro-revolution consensus. They combined millennialism with republicanism, and 
“projected a common vision of a Christian republic.” The New England ministers who made up the membership of 
missionary societies should, according to Hatch, have been intent on using these societies to promote and spread 
republican liberty: Hatch, The Sacred Cause of Liberty (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977). Sam Haselby 
similarly argues that the New England elite created a missionary movement built around a religious nationalism that 
sacralized the revolution: Sam Haselby, The Origins of American Religious Nationalism (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2015). My interpretation is closer to those of Jon Butler and Carly Pestana, who see important 
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spoke of sending missionaries to any and all new settlements where they might find 
“brethren…emigrants from this colony.”25 After the war most of the first missionary societies 
similarly set broad goals, to serve destitute settlements wherever they might be, in North 
America or beyond. Early in the period, many missionaries in Maine were willing to cross the 
border; some did choose to cross briefly, while others chose not to. This crossing faded as time 
went on, but relations across the border remained friendly. In large part, New England 
Congregationalists seem to have regarded Anglicans and Methodists in British North America 
less as rivals and more as friendly cousins, engaged in a similar struggle to civilize the 
wilderness.26  
The decision to limit the Congregational mission field in northern New England – 
particularly in Maine – was an adaptation to the postwar borderland rather than a continuation of 
the revolution. After the war, New England Congregationalists were ready to project their power 
into the new settlements.27 An Anglican organization, the Society for the Propagation of the 
                                                                                                                                                       
continuities in the revival spirit before and after the war, with the revolution itself as a mostly secular phenomenon: 
Jon Butler, Awash in a Sea of Faith (London: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Carla Pestana, Protestant Empire: 
Religion and the Making of the British Atlantic World (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009). 
A few studies of more radical, evangelical movements in early Maine do make a connection between religious 
enthusiasm and revolutionary ideology. The churches and settlers in question, however, saw the opponents of liberty 
as wealthy landowners and federalists, rather than the British. The border does not figure into these studies. See 
Alan Taylor, “Nathan Barlow’s Journey: Mysticism and Popular Protest on the Northeastern Frontier,” and Stephen 
Marini, “Religious Revolution in the District of Maine, 1780-1820,” both in Maine in the Early Republic: From 
Revolution to Statehood, ed., Charles Clark et al (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1988).   
25 Colin Goodykoontz, Home Missions on the American Frontier (New York: Octagon Books, 1971), 82. 
Goodykoontz focuses primarily on the Connecticut Missionary Society and its work in New York and points further 
west.  
26 This is more or less in line with Emily Conroy-Krutz, who argues that early 19th century Americans built their 
foreign missionary network by maintaining connections with British missionaries, rather than distancing themselves 
from them. See Emily Conroy-Krutz, Christian Imperialism: Converting the World in the Early American Republic 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015).  
27 This study proposes that the Congregational establishment in early republic New England was actually quite 
strong and assertive in building its network and moving resources into the borderland. Shelby Balik makes a similar 
argument, noting that the Congregationalists enthusiastically adopted itinerancy and competed strongly against 
Baptists and Methodists in northern New England. She does not examine the implications for the border, however: 
Shelby Balik, Rally the Scattered Believers: Northern New England's Religious Geography (Bloomington, IN: 
Indiana University Press, 2014). Previous studies tended to portray the established Congregationalists as weak and 
ineffectual in this period. See Stephen Marini, Radical Sects of Revolutionary New England (Cambridge, MA: 
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Gospel in Foreign Parts, ceded the field after American independence and was limited to the 
remaining British North American colonies. The American half of the borderland now belonged 
to the Congregationalists, and people were flooding into it. The District of Maine became a 
natural focal point. It was the largest part of northern New England, it was receiving the most 
settlers, and it was technically still part of Massachusetts. That state was looking for a partner 
that might help it bring “good order and…civil government” to the Maine frontier.28 The first 
Congregational missionary society, the Society for Propagating the Gospel Among the Indians 
and Others in North America (SPGNA), realized it could secure state funding by advertising 
itself as a tool for managing the Maine settlements. State money helped the SPGNA grow 
rapidly, and as new missionary societies formed, they chose to join the pioneer society as 
partners rather than try to compete with it. The resulting Congregational network grew to 
encompass almost the entire American half of the borderland. As it did so, it fundamentally 
changed eastern Maine – from a place that was attractive because of its connections with British 
North America, to a place that was attractive because of its connections with New England. 
Though it had not been their explicit design, the Congregationalists helped create this 
reorientation, and thus a meaningful border in one part of the borderland.29  
                                                                                                                                                       
Harvard University Press, 1982) and Nathan Hatch, The Democratization of American Christianity (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1989). One factor in this could be that these authors omit the SPGNA entirely from their 
studies. Marini, for example, identifies the Connecticut Missionary Society as the first Congregational missionary 
effort, when actually the SPGNA was established almost a decade earlier.  
28 Commonwealth of Massachusetts, A CONSTITUTION OR FRAME OF GOVERNMENT, Agreed upon by the 
Delegates of the People of the STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS-BAY, 1779, The Founders Constitution, University of 
Chicago Press, accessed June 18, 2019, http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/print_documents/v1ch1s6.html. 
29 Though I argue in this study that the entire region east of the Great Lakes – including parts of New York, Upper 
and Lower Canada, northern New England, and the Maritimes – should be examined as a borderland, my analysis of 
church networks and their influence on border formation is limited to the part of that borderland shared by Maine 
and New Brunswick. This focus is mainly due to the wealth of sources on Congregationalists and Catholics in early 
Maine. Catholics in Massachusetts directed their efforts almost entirely toward the northeast. Similarly, four 
Congregational missionary societies focused on settlers in Maine: the SPGNA, Massachusetts Missionary Society, 
Evangelical Missionary Society, and Maine Missionary Society. Others spent at least some resources there. Only the 
Connecticut Missionary Society appears to have focused exclusively on Vermont and points west. There is some 
evidence that the Connecticut society shared the same attitude toward the border that took hold in Maine: that the 
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Studying the interaction between missionaries and the border also brings to light under-
examined elements of the Protestant missionary movement in the early republic United States. 
Much of the recent work on missionaries examines the foreign missions, in the early nineteenth 
century, which served the American west and places further afield like Hawaii and India.30 These 
studies skip over the earlier period, from 1790 to 1810, when missionary societies first began to 
appear all around the northeast. These early organizations focused their efforts domestically, on 
the borderland of northern New England and the settler families who were rapidly filling it. The 
work that does exist on these domestic missions tends to examine each society individually, 
while largely ignoring the fact that they worked together.31 The role of women in these societies 
is also ignored, even though they became the most important donors and drove the expansion of 
the network.32 And finally, these studies typically ignore the border and religious life in the 
British colonies completely. This is a reflection of the larger historiography of religion in the 
                                                                                                                                                       
British were responsible for Canada and Congregational missionaries should focus on American settlements. See 
Goodykoontz, Home Missions, 130; Conroy-Krutz, Christian Imperialism, 21.  
30 For example, Conroy-Krutz, Christian Imperialism; John Demos, The Heathen School: A Story of Hope and 
Betrayal in the Age of the Early Republic (New York: Knopf, 2014).    
31 Two excellent sources on the Connecticut Missionary Society are James Rohrer, Keepers of the Covenant: 
Frontier Missions and the Decline of Congregationalism, 1774-1818 (New York: Oxford, 1995), and Colin 
Brummitt Goodykoontz, Home Missions on the American Frontier (New York: Octagon Books, 1971). Both 
studies, however, deal almost exclusively with the western and northwestern frontier, as that was the focus of the 
Connecticut society. One source on Maine is Michael Carter, Converting the Wasteplaces of Zion: The Maine 
Missionary Society, 1807-1862 (Wolfeboro, NH: Longwood Academic, 1990).  
32 The aforementioned books on the individual missionary societies barely mention the contribution of ladies cent 
societies at all. Meanwhile, histories of women’s activism tend to focus on the groups that were unambiguously 
controlled by women. This means they too ignore the cent societies. The result is an odd gap in the record: one study 
leaps from the Female Society for Missionary Purposes, formed in Boston in 1800, directly to the Female Auxiliary 
Bible Society more than a decade later. There appears to have been a decade-long lull in organizing, but in reality, 
women all over New England were assembling themselves into cent societies. See Ann Boylan, The Origin of 
Women’s Activism: New York and Boston, 1797-1840 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2002); 
also R. Pierce Beaver, All Loves Excelling: American Protestant Women in World Mission (Grand Rapids, MI: 
William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1968).  
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northeast, which almost always examines developments in either New England or British North 
America, rather than the region as a whole.33  
It is clear from the records of the early Congregational missionary societies that these 
groups understood themselves to be a collective. As each new group formed, it advertised its 
desire to join forces with its fellow societies to grow the missionary network together. The 
increasing importance of women to the network is also well recorded in year after year of 
treasurer’s reports. And there is no doubt that the missionary societies understood their field of 
operations to be a borderland. One way they promoted themselves, in fact, was by calling 
attention to the proximity of British North America. Missionary services, they pledged, would 
draw settlers to Maine who might otherwise choose to settle across the border.  
 
 My study consists of two parts. I first explain how the booming borderland drew people 
north, and then I trace the way those people attracted the church networks that changed the 
borderland. I begin, in chapter one, by exploring the evolution of the region that would become 
northern New England and Eastern Canada, from the early eighteenth century to the American 
Revolution. New Englanders, I argue, came to understand the region as special sort of frontier. 
They saw it, in the first place, as a natural extension of New England, and the nearest and easiest 
possibility for relocation. But even more importantly, the northeastern frontier offered more 
connectivity, not less – this was not simply cheap and abundant land, as might be found in the 
west, but cheap and abundant land in close proximity to urban markets and Atlantic trade. 
                                                
33 See George Rawlyk and Gordon Stewart, A People Highly Favored of God: The Nova Scotia Yankees and the 
American Revolution (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1972); George Rawlyk, Wrapped Up in God: A Study of Several 
Canadian Revivals and Revivalists (Burlington, ON: Welch Publishing, 1988); George Rawlyk, The Canada Fire: 
Radical Evangelicalism in British North America (Kingston, ON: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1994); Stephen 
A Marini, Radical Sects of Revolutionary New England (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982.) Shelby 
Balik, Rally the Scattered Believers: Northern New England's Religious Geography (Bloomington, IN: Indiana 
University Press, 2014); J.I. Little, Borderland Religion: The Emergence of an English-Canadian Identity, 1792-
1852 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004). 
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Beginning in the 1760s, New England families began to move northeast. Many simply moved a 
short distance up the coast, building new settlements in the region that would eventually be split 
between Maine and New Brunswick, and maintaining connections with their former homes. 
When war broke out in 1775, both British and Americans attempted to assume control over the 
entire northeast, only to end up dividing it in two. Developments during the war years, however 
– including a warming of relations between Protestant New Englanders and the Catholic French, 
and efforts to placate northeastern Indians by providing them with priests – would impact the 
region for many years to come. 
At the end of the war, the Treaty of Paris divided the northeast in two. The creation of a 
boundary, though, did not fundamentally change the dynamics of settlement. Chapter two 
explains how both the British and the Americans kept the boundary permeable, and encouraged 
trade and migration across it. Both sides wanted to fill their settlements, regardless of political 
distinctions, and so the marketing of the borderland to New Englanders and other Americans 
actually increased. The connectivity of the borderland increased as well. The end of the war 
resulted in a great deal of British investment in what remained of British North America. Cities 
like Saint John, New Brunswick, arose almost overnight. Montreal became even more of a 
metropolis, as settlements grew around the St Lawrence River and Lake Ontario. Americans who 
wished to move over the border did so easily, receiving land grants in Upper or Lower Canada or 
New Brunswick in exchange for a quick oath of allegiance.34 British trade networks spilled over 
the unenforced border, and some Americans found they did not need to leave the new republic to 
take advantage. Promoters of Vermont and New York land began to advertise access to Montreal 
using the same language as promoters of Canadian land. The people who responded to these 
                                                
34 Upper Canada is today Ontario, Lower Canada is Quebec.  
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advertisements did not comprise two distinct groups: early republicans who moved to American 
territory, and “late loyalists” who moved to British territory. They were one group of borderland 
opportunists, who chose the borderland because it promised both cheap land and greater 
connectivity. 
 After examining the ways the border was permeable in the post-revolution decades, I then 
explain how one part of that boundary – between Maine and New Brunswick – began to solidify. 
This particular corner of the borderland was unusual in a few ways. In the first place, even 
though there was a great deal of Christian missionary activity everywhere in northern New 
England, the District of Maine was exceptional. Congregational missionary societies poured 
more resources into Maine than anywhere else, targeting eastern Maine in particular. At the same 
time, the Catholic Church in Boston adopted a similar focus because of the Catholic Penobscot 
and Passamaquoddy communities of eastern Maine. Maine was also one of the few places where 
the solidity of the border would be directly tested. Between 1814 and 1818, the British attempted 
to shift the border westward and annex part of Maine, only to find that such a shift was no longer 
feasible. The northeasternmost corner of the borderland turns out to be an excellent case study in 
how church networks can gradually give weight and stability to a politically and economically 
porous boundary.  
Chapters three and four describe this process of border formation, beginning with the 
birth of what quickly became an extensive Congregational missionary movement in northern 
New England. First, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, anxious to develop its Maine 
settlements, decided to provide state funding to its pioneer Congregational missionary society, 
the SPGNA. This stimulated a fateful shift in strategy. Finding itself with more than enough 
money to pay its ministers, the SPGNA decided to devote more resources to distributing books 
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and opening schools. These changes led to increased success on the ground. Communities and 
families that had been cold to the preaching of Congregational missionaries warmed up quickly 
once they were offered a more secular package of books and schools. At the same time, the state 
sponsorship encouraged the SPGNA to ignore existing Congregational communities located in 
British North America. In his address in support of the funding, Governor John Hancock 
specifically mentioned the need to “disseminate the principles of religion and morality amongst 
our fellow Citizens” in the District of Maine.35 Providing services to British subjects, even 
Congregationalists who were specifically requesting those services, would now mean spending 
state money outside the bounds of the state. Moreover, as time went on, and the SPGNA sought 
the regular renewal of its grant, it began to make an argument based explicitly on state building. 
Maine settlers, the society noted, were uncomfortably close to people of a “foreign province.” 
They might be tempted to relocate to British North America, unless Massachusetts, through the 
SPGNA, provided them with the books and schools to make their communities respectable. This 
was not even two decades after independence, and already people living in British territory – 
even if they were originally from New England and fellow Congregationalists – were being 
dismissed as “foreign.”36 
In 1798 the Commonwealth of Massachusetts embarked on an unlikely expansion of its 
strategy in Maine, by extending a grant to the Catholic Church as well.37 The Congregational 
                                                
35 Acts and Resolves of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts 1791-1792 (Boston: Wright & Potter, 1897), 563. 
36 Petition, 30 January 1804, Secretary’s Incoming Correspondence, MSS 48, Box 6, Folder 1, SPGNA, PL.  
37 This may seem surprising, as the conventional wisdom is that Massachusetts was strongly anti-Catholic from the 
colonial period through the revolutionary era and into the early 19th century. I argue in chapter one that this was 
actually not the case, and there was change in popular sentiment toward French-Canadian Catholics during the 
American Revolution. Along similar lines, Francis Cogliano has argued that anti-Catholic feeling in Massachusetts 
faded during and after the war, partly because of the wartime alliance with France: Francis Cogliano, No King, No 
Popery: Anti-Catholicism in Revolutionary New England (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1995). There seems to 
have been a resurgence of anti-Catholicism in the 1820s and beyond. See Jenny Franchot, Roads to Rome: The 
Antebellum Protestant Encounter with Catholicism (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1994); and Scott 
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network, though extensive, was not reaching one group of Maine people: Indians. Those 
communities, most notably the Penobscot and Passamaquoddy, were Catholic, and had flatly 
rejected all outreach from Protestant missionaries for generations. Furthermore, these two 
communities were located almost directly on the border. Massachusetts did not want these 
communities looking to British North America for religious assistance. It wanted the Penobscot 
and Passamaquoddy to be served by Boston-based priests. And so in 1798, the state approved an 
annual salary for a priest, Father James Romagne, who served Maine for the following two 
decades. Romagne’s placement in Maine clarified the boundary between “British” Indians and 
“American” Indians. It also allowed Boston-based priests the freedom to cover more ground, 
visiting not just Indian communities but Irish Catholic communities in Maine as well.38  
Meanwhile, the growing success of the SPGNA led to the founding of more missionary 
societies: the Massachusetts, Maine, and Evangelical Missionary Societies. These groups aimed 
to help, rather than compete – the goal was to share costs and resources, and broaden the reach of 
the SPGNA’s existing missionary network. The key factor driving this expansion was the 
increasing participation of women, both as donors to the network and workers within it. Women 
had not been able to fully participate in the network when its focus was preaching. But women 
could both purchase and receive books, and they could serve as teachers. Women began to 
accept missionary-sponsored teaching jobs throughout northern and eastern Maine, while back in 
Boston other women organized cent societies to funnel cash and books into the missionary 
network. The proliferation of these cent societies created a kind of positive feedback loop within 
the Congregational network: more cent societies led to more money, which led to the founding of 
                                                                                                                                                       
See, “Variations on a Borderlands Theme: Nativism and Collective Violence in Northeastern North America in the 
Mid-Nineteenth Century,” in Hornsby and Reid, New England and the Maritime Provinces, 125-143.  
38 Acts and Resolves of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts 1798-1799, 217-218; William Leahy, “The 
Archdiocese of Boston,” History of the Catholic Church in the New England States (Boston: Hurd & Everts Co., 
1899), 24, 39. 
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more missionary societies, which stimulated still more organized giving. Within just a few years, 
thanks in large part to the cent society feedback loop, practically all the settlements in Maine 
were brought within the reach of a well-funded and organized Congregational network that 
stopped at the border.  
These church networks – primarily the Congregational missionary network, with some 
contribution from Catholics – were crucial to the creation of a meaningful border in the 
northeast. In the 1780s and 1790s, the boundary between New England and British North 
America was porous. Its exact location was still a point of contention, and migrants and money 
crossed and re-crossed it. Many on the American side of the line were able to participate in 
British economic networks as if there was no border at all. But as the church networks 
developed, state sponsorship and the resulting focus on books and schools led them to respect the 
de facto border. It is not as though ministers never crossed the border. Some occasionally did. 
But these were spontaneous decisions, made on the ground. Missionary societies never asked 
ministers to cross the border. Books and pamphlets were only distributed in Maine communities. 
Schools stopped at the border as well. Most of the teachers staffing these schools were women, 
and they did not cross into British territory either. Gradually, the de facto border became 
meaningful. Maine communities were increasingly connected to Boston by money and books 
and schools, and even if legally the border was flexible, shifting it became increasingly 
untenable.  
It took some time for American and British authorities to understand this. Chapter five 
details how both sides dealt with what they suddenly realized was a fixed boundary. In the first 
decades of the nineteenth century, diplomats were still engaged in negotiations designed to adjust 
the de facto border between Maine and New Brunswick. Both sides continued to present 
 
 21 
arguments for why certain islands, and settler populations, should be handed over from one side 
to the other. The British then tried to shift the border by force. During the War of 1812, British 
forces invaded and occupied eastern Maine, temporarily moving the border about ninety miles 
west, to the Penobscot River. None of the attempts to move the border worked, however. They 
failed, in part, because networks built by Congregationalists and Catholics in the years since 
1783 had changed the situation on the ground. Those networks adopted the de facto border, and 
gave it a weight that made it less flexible than the diplomats believed it to be. The post-War of 
1812 years saw a reckoning with the permanence of the border, particularly on the British side. 
People born in the United States, for the first time, were seen as foreigners. Though earlier they 
found it easy to receive land grants, now obstacles were placed in their way. The open 
borderland was finally bordered.   
My study concludes with an epilogue examining the impact of Maine’s 1820 separation 
from Massachusetts on the increasingly inflexible northeastern border. Some of the first affected 
were the Penobscot and Passamaquoddy. Their church network, built over two decades by the 
Diocese of Boston, had helped create the solid border between Maine and New Brunswick. It 
was this strong connection to Boston that helped maintain the territorial integrity of Maine 
during the war. After the war, however, the British were no longer seen as a threat. What had 
been borderland was now integral to the state; and so, after separation from Massachusetts, 
Maine eliminated support for the Indians’ resident priest. The two communities found 
themselves cut off from Catholic assistance on both sides – trapped between a newly inflexible 
border in the east, and another separating them from Boston in the west. Meanwhile, Maine’s 
new government, and newly emboldened Congregationalists, saw an opportunity to step in. The 
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Penobscot and Passamaquoddy, though they lived directly on the border, no longer lived in a 












































Figure 1- A Map of New England and Nova Scotia, Thomas Kitchin, 1758.1 
Chapter I: 
 
The Lords of all These Coasts: New Englanders and the Eighteenth Century Northeast 
 
  
In 1763 the British won the French and Indian War, and with it the entire eastern half of 
North America. Suddenly, a swath of territory north of New England that had been a war zone 
for over a century was open for settlement. The Canada Company was one of several 
organizations that arose to seize this moment. It was founded by a group of British officers 
                                                
1 Thomas Kitchin, "A map of New England, and Nova Scotia," 1758, Norman B. Leventhal Map & Education 
Center, accessed June 1, 2019, https://collections.leventhalmap.org/search/commonwealth:w9505s66r. 
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stationed in Montreal after the war: some from the British Isles, some from the colonies. These 
men had partnered in conquering Quebec, and now they would partner in developing the empire. 
The men of the Canada Company aimed to identify the most promising location in the 
new British possessions, request a large land grant, and then find settlers. They considered both 
Ile Saint Jean (soon to be renamed Prince Edward Island) and the Cape Sable area of Nova 
Scotia, before finally choosing the Saint John River in today’s New Brunswick. The company 
made a formal request to the government in Halifax, which quickly granted 400,000 acres, 
including both land in the river valley and several “fishing island(s)” in the Bay of Fundy. The 
Canada Company then renamed itself the Saint John River Society. One of its founders, Captain 
Beamsley Glasier of Newbury, Massachusetts, departed for the grant to conduct a survey.2  
The Society anticipated recruiting settlers in Britain and Ireland. So Captain Glasier was 
a bit shocked to find, upon his arrival in the valley, that there were already people living on his 
grant. These were families from the “eastward part of New England,” likely Essex County, 
Massachusetts or the District of Maine. Their understanding was that a few years earlier, a 
different group from Essex County had been able to relocate to the Saint John relatively easily. 
There, they built a settlement called Maugerville, which is close to today’s Fredericton, New 
Brunswick. Now, these new families presumed “they could settle themselves as [the Maugerville 
families] had done,” anywhere in the valley, “without having a grant, or any lawful authority for 
so doing.”3  
 Captain Glasier announced that the settlers were actually squatting on lands that had been 
granted to the Saint John River Society. But, he confessed in a letter to his fellow proprietors, he 
                                                
2 D. Murray Young, “Planter Settlements in the St. John Valley,” in They Planted Well: New England Planters in 
Maritime Canada, ed. Margaret Conrad (Fredericton, NB: Acadiensis Press, 1988), 32.  
3 Letter, Capt. Glasier to Saint John River Society, 13 Feb 1766, MS Can 75, Folder 10, New Brunswick and Nova 
Scotia Papers concerning settlements on the St. John River, 1766-1786, Houghton Library, Harvard University, 
Cambridge, MA.  
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“prevailed upon [the settlers] to stay by giving them leave.” There was no reason to miss a 
golden opportunity by putting any obstacles in the way of these New England families. Their 
misperception of settlement possibilities was an unexpected blessing. If these people returned to 
their homes they would tell their neighbors of their disappointment, and prospective settlers 
would avoid the valley. And these were perfect candidates for settlement – clearly preferable to 
families from overseas. They lived only a couple hundred miles west of the grant, and “with a 
good wind can [make the trip] in two days.” They were already transporting themselves, at their 
own expense, and bringing cattle along too. The proprietors would barely have to supply them at 
all.4  
 Glasier further informed the society that he visited several coastal towns and villages on 
his way back to Boston, and what he learned answered his “most sanguine expectations.” There 
were many positive reports circulating about the Saint John River country. The possibilities for 
the settlement seemed bright, which was a good thing, for there was no time to waste. There was 
a wealth of lumber in the valley, just waiting to be milled. Now here were people arriving to 
provide the labor. It was time to get iron from Boston, build the mills, and get to lumbering. 
Considering the money the society would save by not having to find and transport settlers, the 
whole operation could quickly begin to pay for itself.5  
 
Captain Glasier, in 1765, participated in one small part of what was becoming a major 
phenomenon. Beginning around 1760, thousands of people from southern New England began to 
move north and east. For a hundred and fifty years, what is today northern New England and 
eastern Canada had been split between dueling powers: French to the north and English to the 
                                                
4 Ibid.  
5 Ibid.  
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south. A neutral zone lay in the middle, occupied mainly by Native Americans and unsafe for 
basically everyone. Even settlements that simply touched the edge of this neutral zone – 
Deerfield in western Massachusetts, York in Maine, and Passamaquoddy Bay in Acadia – had 
been attacked and destroyed. Though trade crossed the boundary, and warfare occasionally 
shifted it, colonists knew they would be unwise to settle the borderland. It was too dangerous.  
In the eighteenth century, however, this began to change. In 1714, after the War of 
Spanish Succession, Britain took control of the French Acadian settlements in what is today 
Nova Scotia.6 The political boundary between New England and Nova Scotia vanished. Then 
British victories in the French and Indian War caused the boundary to disappear in today’s New 
Brunswick, Maine, and further west. Finally the border between New England and New France 
dissolved completely. French power was gone, and the British North American Empire 
encompassed the whole region. The region, no longer a borderland, was suddenly thrown wide 
open.  
Though the border was gone and the area nominally unified, the new British North 
American Empire still contained two distinct parts. The first consisted of the original English 
colonies of the Atlantic seaboard, stretching from the settlements along the southern coast of 
Maine all the way to Georgia. The second consisted of the former French possessions: 
settlements around the St. Lawrence River, its feeder rivers, the Great Lakes, and the colonies 
surrounding the Gulf of St. Lawrence. This former French empire also included some of what 
would become northern New England, including much of northern Vermont and eastern Maine.  
                                                
6 A comprehensive study of the entire history of French Acadia is N.E.S. Griffiths, From Migrant to Acadian: A 
North American Border People, 1604-1775 (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005). Two studies that 
provide brief overviews of the Acadian colony, and more in-depth analysis of the 1755 expulsion and resulting 
diaspora, are Christopher Hodson, The Acadian Diaspora: An Eighteenth Century History (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2012); John Mack Faragher, A Great and Noble Scheme: The Tragic Story of the Explusion of the 
French Acadians from their American Homeland (New York: W.W. Norton, 2005). 
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 This new part of the empire needed settlers. The perpetual problem with French America, 
and one of the reasons the British were able to take it, was lack of population. There were, of 
course, Native Americans living there, but their numbers were relatively small. The 
Passamaquoddy and Penobscot communities in today’s Maine, for example, probably totaled no 
more than a few thousand people. There were more French settlers, but that population was still 
tiny compared to New England. By the 1750s, there were only around 70,000 colonists in New 
France, and no more than 15,000 in the Acadian settlements of Nova Scotia. Massachusetts 
alone, by contrast, had almost 200,000 people. Population pressure had been building for 
decades in southern New England, and hundreds of families were ready to find new homes. 
These people were already quite familiar with the potential of the northeast. News of this 
potential had been printed in New England newspapers for decades. Soldiers from New England 
had visited on military expeditions. Merchants built trade networks, both licit and illicit, that 
brought the region into New England’s economic sphere. Many southern New England families 
had been waiting for years for just this moment – the opening of the former borderland.  
 So what Britain had in mid-eighteenth century North America was territory that needed 
settlers, and a large supply of colonists who were eager to relocate. The obvious solution was to 
open the door and step out of the way. Still, for a while British authorities resisted. They wanted 
to maintain a boundary in the northeast. The New England colonies had always been difficult to 
control, and Britain wanted more influence over its new possessions. It seemed like a bad idea to 
let New England simply expand into Nova Scotia and Canada, and also unwise to drain one part 
of the empire to fill another. The pressure from New England, however, was inexorable. As 
Captain Glazier discovered in 1765, people would move on their own whether they had official 
sanction or not. It was easy and economical to simply facilitate this movement. And so for about 
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a generation, until the outbreak of the American Revolution, settlement of the northeast became a 
collaborative effort between Britain and her New England colonies. It was a partnership mirrored 
on a small scale by the proprietors of the Saint John River Society: Crown and colonies 
conquered northeastern North America together, now together they would fill and supply it. And 
so the boundary vanished as New Englanders moved north and east.7  
 The most well documented participants in this movement, who have come to serve as 
exemplars for the event, are the New England Planters.8 These were settlers from Connecticut, 
Rhode Island, and southeastern Massachusetts who moved to Nova Scotia in the 1760s. In 1755, 
a combined force of British and colonial troops evicted most of the French Acadian settlers 
living in Nova Scotia. The Acadians were distributed throughout the other colonies, leaving 
empty settlements around the Bay of Fundy. Governor of Nova Scotia Charles Lawrence then 
published a proclamation in New England newspapers, inviting families north “for the peopling 
and cultivating…[of] the lands vacated by the French.”9 Thousands of men and women 
responded, traveling northeast in a parade of ships across the Gulf of Maine to found settlements 
throughout peninsular Nova Scotia. These people were the original Anglo Protestant population 
                                                
7 For a detailed history of the French and Indian War and its repercussions for the British North American empire, 
see Fred Anderson, Crucible of War: The Seven Years' War and the Fate of Empire in British North America, 1754-
1766 (New York: Vintage Books, 2001). Stephen Hornsby discusses the tensions between Britain’s new St. 
Lawrence empire and its old American colonies in Hornsby, British Atlantic, American Frontier: Spaces of Power 
in Early Modern British America (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 2005). For British efforts to 
create a more controlled and regulated system of colonization in their new possessions, see S. Max Edelson, The 
New Map of Empire: How Britain Imagined America Before Independence (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2017). Bernard Bailyn’s Voyagers to the West provides quite a bit of detail on Nova Scotia settlement, but 
focuses primarily on migration from England in the 1770s, rather than from New England in the 1760s: Bailyn and 
Barbara DeWolfe, Voyagers to the West: A Passage in the Peopling of America on the Eve of the Revolution (New 
York: Knopf, 1986). 
8 Two relatively recent volumes on the planter experience in Nova Scotia were both edited by Margaret Conrad: 
They Planted Well: New England Planters in Maritime Canada (Fredericton, New Brunswick: Acadiensis Press, 
1988), and Making Adjustments: Change and Continuity in Planter Nova Scotia, 1759-1800, (Fredericton, New 
Brunswick: Acadiensis Press, 1991). The classic studies of the planters are two books by John Brebner: New 
England’s Outpost: Acadia Before the Conquest of Canada (New York: Columbia University Press, 1927), and The 
Neutral Yankees of Nova Scotia (New York: Columbia University Press, 1937).  
9 Charles Lawrence, “A Proclamation,” Boston Evening Post, 6 November 1758.  
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of what would become the Maritime Provinces, until they found themselves swamped by yet 
another migration in 1783 – loyalist refugees fleeing the newly independent United States.  
 Historians have tended to rely on the New England Planters to tell the story of pre-
revolutionary northeastern migration. Their story is seductive because the planter migration had 
a clear beginning and end. It began with an unambiguous call for settlers, resulted in a dozen or 
so permanent communities, and ended a decade later. Nova Scotia then distinguished itself by 
failing to join its fellow colonies in rebellion. The planters chose neutrality, which alienated them 
from their cousins in New England and gave them the beginning of a distinct identity. Then the 
thirteen rebel colonies won their independence, tens of thousands of loyalist refugees arrived in 
the remaining British colonies, and the northeast became a borderland once more. Migration 
from southern New England directly to peninsular Nova Scotia stopped. The planters seem to 
demonstrate that the revolution re-created the northeastern border.  
 This study takes a step back, examining the planter migration as just one element of a 
larger and more complicated borderland story. Viewed broadly, the northeastern migration of 
New Englanders was multifaceted. Most of it was not an organized response to a particular call 
for settlers, but rather a decentralized, improvisational movement of people toward perceived 
opportunities. While some planters were relocating from southern New England directly to 
peninsular Nova Scotia, another, less structured migration was taking place along the coastline 
north of Boston. These people were inspired less by the specific call from Governor Lawrence, 
and more by a general sense of the possibilities in the eastern river valleys. They wanted fertile, 
accessible land that would allow them to stay connected to their old homes and to the broader 
Atlantic trade. They read optimistic reports in their newspapers, and spoke to friends and 
neighbors with firsthand experience in the borderland. These are the people who Captain Glasier 
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discovered on the Saint John River Society’s grant, and who he spoke with on the way back to 
Boston. They were transporting themselves, a few at a time, based on information from 
neighbors and friends, and with the reassurance that they would not be traveling far. Their 
economic networks followed them north – for example, when merchants from Newburyport set 
up a trading post to move goods between Massachusetts and the mouth of the Saint John River. 
Settlers also maintained connections with family members who remained behind, allowing them 
to essentially hedge their bets on relocation. If the new settlements failed to prosper, their former 
lives were only two days sail away.  
 The broader view complicates the story of the American Revolution, because after the 
war much of the northeast continued to see exactly this same sort of migration.10 Peninsular 
Nova Scotia, it turns out, was a bit of an outlier. There, the British maintained firm control 
throughout the war, so settlers were forced into a choice. They could try to push the colony into 
the rebellion, or remain loyal by essentially doing nothing. They chose the latter. In the rest of 
the northeast, settlers did not face the same decision. No one knew where the exact boundary 
between New England and British North America would fall. The British hoped to push it as far 
west as possible, the Americans to push it to the east. Therefore, both sides attempted to woo the 
people of the region, without applying enforcement to any particular boundary line. Settlers and 
Indians within the borderland collaborated in an attack on a British fort, hoping to move the 
border east; when this attack failed, most of the attackers were able to return to their home 
communities without repercussions. The British responded by installing a Catholic priest on the 
                                                
10 My argument here aligns partially with S. Max Edelson’s in A New Map of Empire. Edelson argues that the 
British tried to more closely centralize and monitor the Nova Scotia colony, because they wanted to avoid the 
“volatile trial and error method” of previous colonies, and protect Nova Scotia from “self-interested New 
Englanders who undermined its long term settlement.” I agree that they attempted this in peninsular Nova Scotia. 
However, I argue that they failed to extend this strategy to the northern part of Nova Scotia – the region that would 
become New Brunswick. This hands-off strategy allowed the region to be settled like the older English colonies, and 
kept boundaries there blurry.  
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Saint John River, knowing that would attract Catholic Indians from Maine and perhaps move the 
border west. Americans, in turn, made overtures to Catholic French Canadians, hoping to bring 
them into the rebellion and do away with the northern border entirely. And ordinary New 
Englanders continued to filter north and east, even at war’s end, migrating as if there was no 
boundary at all.  
And so, for the most part, the American Revolution failed to create a meaningful division 
in the northeastern borderland. Because both British and Americans invested in the northeast, 
because both sides built alliances within it and directed resources to it, what resulted was a 
paradoxical integration of the region. Even the arrival of the loyalist refugees would contribute to 
this integration, as their booming communities stimulated the economy of the whole area, which 
drew still more migrants. The larger story of the northeast before and after the revolution 
becomes a story of continuity, rather than change. Political distinctions of patriot and loyalist 
failed to outlast the war, and in many ways the development of the renewed borderland remained 
collaborative. After the war, both British and Americans maintained similar incentives designed 
to keep people moving north and east. They still wanted the region settled, and each side 
remained optimistic that it would eventually get the border it wanted. New England families 
continued to respond to these incentives, moving to the borderland with little regard for politics. 
What mattered was the quality of the land, the terms on which it was offered, and its connectivity 
to markets. Whether, at that present moment, it was technically within the Empire or the 
Republic was not a concern. 
 
The groundwork for the northeastern migration of the 1760s had been laid generations 
earlier. Colonial New Englanders never really recognized a firm border to their northeast. From a 
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very early period New Englanders understood the future Maritime Provinces of Canada as less of 
a frontier and more an extension of New England. French weakness contributed to this 
understanding. The French maintained political control over the region for most of a century, but 
had a very difficult time resisting the growing economic and demographic strength of the New 
England colonies. The British, as they took over the region in the eighteenth century, found that 
they had the same problem. They were never comfortable with New England’s influence in the 
northeast, and tried repeatedly to create a boundary that would protect Nova Scotia and its 
surrounding areas from becoming a “new” New England. This proved difficult and expensive, 
however, and by the 1760s British authorities basically gave up, allowing their migrating 
colonists to negate the border they had always ignored anyway.11 
The spread of New England’s influence over the region – which really amounted to 
Massachusetts’s influence over the region – began almost as soon as the French founded their 
settlements in the early seventeenth century. This was in 1604, when an expedition guided by 
Samuel Champlain wintered on an island in the St. Croix River off Passamaquoddy Bay. After 
suffering horrible mortality that first winter, the remnants of the group moved across the Bay of 
Fundy to what is now the north shore of Nova Scotia. The settlement they founded lasted less 
than a decade before being destroyed by a privateer dispatched by the governor of the new 
English colony at Jamestown. After a few decades of neglect, the French reestablished the 
settlement in the 1630s. In 1636, a transport from La Rochelle brought the first migrant families 
from France to what was now known as Acadia, and the colony began to slowly grow. 
While the Acadian colony had been dormant, however, the Plymouth and Massachusetts 
Bay Colonies were born. These English colonies grew far more quickly than the French. By 
                                                
11 For a brief survey of Massachusetts’s increasing control over Acadia, see Mark Peterson, The City-State of 
Boston: The Rise and Fall of an Atlantic Power, 1630-1865 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019), 250-290.  
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1650 there were around three hundred people in Acadia, while thanks to the Puritan migrations 
of the 1620s and 1630s there were almost twenty thousand in New England.12 Those English 
colonists quickly came to see tiny French Acadia as a place they could control. In the mid-
seventeenth century, as Massachusetts militia officer Robert Sedgwick set out with a small fleet 
to attack the Dutch settlements at New Amsterdam, word came down that the Dutch and English 
were again at peace. Thinking quickly, Sedgwick attacked and seized Acadia instead, hoping to 
increase Massachusetts’s trading and fishing. England ruled Acadia for about fifteen years before 
another peace treaty returned it to France. While London, during that era, never legally gave 
Acadia to the colony of Massachusetts Bay, it may as well have. Thomas Temple, appointed 
Governor of Acadia, chose to live in Boston, where he invested in land and developed 
relationships with Boston merchants. Even after the colony was returned to French control the 
new French governor maintained these connections with Boston – by employing craftsmen from 
New England, for example.13 
Bostonians were not content with control over Acadia alone. They were always pushing 
outward, expanding New England’s sphere as far eastward as the island of Newfoundland. 
Massachusetts traded with the Newfoundland settlements as early as the 1620s, when the 
Plymouth colony was barely established. By 1651, New Englanders had “great traffique” with 
Newfoundland, consisting mainly of exchanging lumber, sugar, molasses, and tobacco for 
specie, fishing equipment, and European goods. By the end of the century, some Massachusetts 
traders were even setting up what were essentially branch offices, sending sons or nephews to 
secure a presence on the island. At the same time, New England began stealing settlers from the 
                                                
12 Griffiths, Migrant to Acadian, 65; Rebecca Brooks, “Great Puritan Migration,” History of Massachusetts Blog, 
accessed May 24, 2019, https://historyofmassachusetts.org/the-great-puritan-migration/.  
13 W.S. MacNutt, The Atlantic Provinces: The Emergence of Colonial Society, 1712-1857 (Toronto: McClelland 
and Stewart, 1965); John Bartlet Brebner, New England’s Outpost: Acadia Before the Conquest of Canada (New 
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Newfoundland colony. Massachusetts Bay offered a better chance to secure land and high wages, 
and a far better chance at marriage. According to one Newfoundland ship captain, “New England 
men constantly carry away…fishermen and seamen, who presently marry and then that is their 
home.” This kind of double-migration, from the British Isles to Newfoundland and then again to 
New England, carried on right up until the American Revolution.14 
New England’s influence over the northeast continued to grow and become entrenched as 
the seventeenth century gave way to the eighteenth, frustrating French and British alike. As one 
French administrator put it, “The English of Boston regard themselves as the lords of all these 
coasts.”15 They especially regarded themselves as the lords of Nova Scotia. France was never 
able to supply its Acadian settlers as well as Massachusetts could. French fishing was 
increasingly concentrated around Newfoundland and the northern parts of the Gulf of St. 
Lawrence. Meanwhile the French increasingly prioritized Quebec, and the Nova Scotia peninsula 
made it absurd for ships to stop in the Bay of Fundy as they came and went between Quebec and 
France, as such a stop would add hundreds of miles to any voyage. Acadian commerce, then, was 
“inevitably with Massachusetts, primarily Boston.” British forces finally took Acadia for good in 
1710, during the War of Spanish Succession, but this barely changed the dynamics of the region. 
The Acadian settlers, though French and Catholic, stayed put, and continued to be firmly within 
Massachusetts’s sphere.16 
The attachment of Massachusetts’s traders to their northeastern empire even went so far 
as to work directly against British imperial strategy. After losing peninsular Nova Scotia to the 
British, the French began to build a fortress at Louisbourg, on Ile Royale (today Cape Breton 
                                                
14 Peter Pope, Fish into Wine: The Newfoundland Plantation in the Seventeenth Century (Chapel Hill, NC: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 155, 240-241, 244, 253.  
15 Jacques de Meulles, 1686, quoted in Faragher, Great and Noble Scheme, 78.  
16 Griffiths, Migrant to Acadian, 119-120.  
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Island). New England merchants enriched themselves by supplying that fortress, even as the 
British attempted to prevent Acadian settlers from doing the same.17 The British plan was to 
place a blockade between the Acadians and Louisbourg, hoping the French fortress would have 
to rely on the tiny number of settlers willing to relocate to Ile Royale itself. It would seem like a 
relatively simple operation, since the British controlled traffic in the Bay of Fundy. But New 
England traders found a way around it. Acadians began to move goods across the isthmus of 
Chignecto to the shore of the Gulf of St. Lawrence, where New England traders picked up the 
goods and transported them to the ostensible enemy at Louisbourg for French manufactures, 
wine, and West Indian molasses.18 Then, during King George’s War, the first attempt to take 
Louisbourg from the French also became a Massachusetts project. Planning for the attack was 
based in part on intelligence gathered from fisherman in the District of Maine. Governor Shirley 
and the Massachusetts General Court authorized the operation, and Massachusetts provided most 
of the necessary ships and over three quarters of the soldiers. When the fortress was returned to 
the French at the end of the war, in exchange for land in India, New England colonists were 
frustrated. A move that should have confirmed their power in the region had been thrown out on 
what seemed to be an imperial whim.19  
In 1748, after the return of Louisbourg to the French, the British decided the time had 
come to build up their Nova Scotia colony. The French had their fortress, so the British would 
create a competing stronghold centered on the harbor at Halifax. They would then fill their 
stronghold with Protestant settlers, who would counter Louisbourg and eventually outnumber 
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and eclipse the Acadian French. The question was where would these loyal Protestant settlers 
come from?  
Considering the long history detailed above, the settlers would obviously come from New 
England. British authorities, however, were determined to resist that solution. They did not 
particularly want settlers from Massachusetts in their new Nova Scotia colony. In the first place, 
there was frequent concern in the eighteenth century over the problem of losing Protestants in 
one part of the empire in order to gain Protestants in another. Before the French and Indian War 
the French still had firm control of Quebec, and there was a feeling that draining the New 
England colonies of population was unsafe.20 There was a similar attitude toward Protestant 
populations in Ireland. When an attempt was made in the 1760s to recruit Nova Scotia settlers 
there, the government in London shut it down, noting: “however desirable an object the settling 
of Nova Scotia may be yet the migration from Ireland of such great numbers of His Majesty’s 
subjects must be attended with dangerous consequences to that Kingdom.”21  
The British also had a long standing, if informal, preference not to allow Nova Scotia to 
become a “new” New England. The New England colonies, particularly Massachusetts, had 
always been problematically independent. This was partially due to their being founded in the 
early seventeenth century, before the Glorious Revolution of 1688 gave Parliament the power to 
manage the empire. Older colonies also had strong colonial assemblies that often challenged 
appointed governors. They assumed control of, and took credit for, much of their own foreign 
policy – as evidenced by Massachusetts’s attack on Louisbourg. Britain wanted to keep tighter 
control over its newer colonies like Nova Scotia. Officials tried for years to govern that colony 
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with only a governor and an executive council, attempting to avoid calling a legislative assembly 
that might then grow too powerful. They also knew that the absence of a legislative assembly 
would be a deterrent to New England families looking to migrate. After all, the best way to 
prevent Nova Scotia from becoming another New England was to avoid importing New 
Englanders.22  
And so, initially, the British tried to maintain a boundary in the northeast by settling 
Nova Scotia with disbanded soldiers and German migrants. A proclamation published in London 
in the spring of 1749 and reprinted in the Boston News-Letter in May offered Nova Scotia land to 
“officers and private men lately dismissed…[from] his Majesty’s Land and Sea service.” These 
men were wanted “with or without families.” Each private soldier or seaman could expect fifty 
acres, plus an additional ten for any family member brought along, and the land grant would 
increase with one’s rank. Ex-soldiers were asked to respond with their regiment or company, or 
the name of the ship on which they served. The problem inherent in this extremely limited call 
for settlers seems to have occurred to the authorities almost immediately: a fledgling colony 
requires skilled labor, not just recently discharged soldiers. The second-to-last paragraph 
expanded the call, inviting “carpenters, shipwrights, smiths, masons” and several other 
categories of artisans to apply on the same basis as common soldiers. 23 A few months later, 
perhaps due to a lack of applicants, another notice extended the invitation to former soldiers 
currently living in the colonies.24  
                                                
22 As Edelson argues in A New Map of Empire, London wanted a new, more regulated system of colonization in 
Nova Scotia that “sought to displace settlers as meaningful agents.” New Englanders were exactly the independent, 
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23 Boston News-Letter, 4 May 1749.  
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  Still avoiding an open invitation to New England families, the authorities next directed 
their attention to German-speaking migrants: the “Palatines.” For decades, there had been a 
steady flow of settlers departing from Rotterdam, at the mouth of the Rhine, destined for the 
British colonies. These people were known in Britain as Palatines, which became a shorthand 
term for German-speaking Protestants from the territory around the upper reaches of the Rhine.25 
Most of these migrants settled in Pennsylvania or the Chesapeake area. From the 1720s through 
the 1740s Philadelphia averaged around five ships of Palatines each year, and that number was 
rising just as Nova Scotia began looking for settlers.26 Redirecting a few ships to Halifax was 
seen as an effective and cheap way of filling the region with Protestant families, while keeping 
New England families in New England. And so, from about 1750 to 1752, almost three thousand 
mostly German immigrants arrived in Nova Scotia. Some stayed around Halifax, while others 
began a new community at Lunenburg just to the southwest.27  
The settlement of Palatine families in and around Halifax worked reasonably well. But 
the idea that New Englanders could be kept out of the Nova Scotia colony was never very 
logical. It was unlikely that the residents of eastern Massachusetts would forget about 
opportunities in the northeast, because their newspapers frequently reminded them. As the 
Palatines were arriving, New Englanders received updates on the growing colony, and on the 
Boston money invested in the settlement project. In January of 1754, the Boston Evening Post 
included in its news from London a brief notice that ships were en route from that city to Holland 
                                                
25 Many of these migrants were not actually from the Palatinate, which is a specific region in Germany. But British 
newspaper readers of the early 18th Century understood the Palatinate to be a war-torn region from which there 
would be refugees, so they came to refer to a broad variety of German-speaking refugees as ‘Palatines.” For a recent 
study of the Palatine refugees, see Philip Otterness, Becoming German: The 1709 Palatine Migration to New York 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004).  
26 Bell, Foreign Protestants, 86 




to pick up “Protestant Families from the Swiss Cantons, who are going to settle in Nova 
Scotia.”28 A few months later, the Boston Gazette reported on several promising settlements in 
the colony. One, at Jeddore Harbour to the east of Halifax, had the backing of twenty prominent 
Bostonians. Another, at Mahone Bay along the south shore, was also being built by Boston 
investors and would soon have a sawmill. Though Nova Scotia wanted to avoid Boston settlers, 
it was apparently having a hard time avoiding Boston money.29  
This concern over costs had the effect of maintaining ties between Nova Scotia and New 
England. It was impossible to avoid the aforementioned Boston investors, because Parliament 
wished to settle Nova Scotia with as small a financial commitment as possible. Concern over 
costs came up repeatedly in communications between Halifax and London. In a March 1750 
letter to Governor Cornwallis in Halifax, the Board of Trade returned several times to the issue 
of costs. Parliament, the board wrote, was at that moment in favor of the Nova Scotia project. 
But this could and would change, if expenses were to exceed what had been estimated. The letter 
writer attempted to make this point diplomatically. Cornwallis had organized some public works 
projects, which were not particularly extravagant. Some were as basic as land clearing, as the 
settlement had only been founded a year or so earlier. But after praising Cornwallis’s initiative, 
the board made its position clear; it would be preferable to “postpone even the most necessary 
works, than exceed the estimate.” There were more migrants on the way, including hundreds of 
laboring men, who would hopefully depress the cost of labor and allow projects to be completed 
more cheaply.30  
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  In a previous letter Cornwallis must have complained about his New England neighbors, 
because the Board of Trade addressed his concerns. There was, unfortunately, no way to avoid 
Boston merchants. Realistically, needed supplies could only come from New England. So it was 
true but irrelevant that, as Cornwallis had noted, they “take advantage of the Province upon 
every occasion” and “demand exorbitant profit upon every contract.”31 They would continue to 
behave this way until Nova Scotia’s credit could be established, which would not happen unless 
Cornwallis took the board’s advice in regard to saving money. Cornwallis and the Board found 
themselves in an ironic quandary: attempting to avoid New England settlers resulted in an 
unavoidable engagement with other New Englanders.  
 There was simply no way to create a meaningful boundary between Nova Scotia and the 
New England colonies when those colonies were the only logical source of supplies. This was 
particularly important in the case of livestock. The Board of Trade and Halifax officials were 
trapped by geographic reality. The only way for Nova Scotia settlers to become self-sufficient 
was to provide them with livestock, but the livestock had to come from New England.32 This was 
made abundantly clear in the first years of the 1750s, when the Nova Scotia settlements were 
desperate for animals. Settlers at Lunenburg repeatedly requested livestock with no results, until 
finally, in 1754, the colonial officials secured a budgetary provision for a shipment. The animals 
were purchased in New England and arrived in September of that year: 847 sheep, 188 goats, 
125 pigs, and 74 cows. Families then drew lots. A lucky seventy-four families received a cow 
and a sheep. Less fortunate families had to make do with a half-dozen sheep, a pig, and a goat.33   
                                                
31 Ibid. 
32 Letter, Board of Trade to Hopson, 9 July 1753, quoted in Bell, Foreign Protestants, 447-8.  
33 Bell, Foreign Protestants, 477-478.  
 
 41 
 If Nova Scotia were opened to New England settlers, these settlers would bring their own 
livestock. There would be no need for budgetary provisions, mass purchases, or the drawing of 
lots. The actual settlers would be more likely to survive as well. Voyages to Halifax were not 
more dangerous than average, but transatlantic travel in general was risky. The British were 
transporting settlers free of charge with the caveat that they pay off the debt with public works, 
but some did not survive long enough to do so. The Ann, for example, in the summer of 1750, 
took twelve weeks to travel from Rotterdam to Halifax. Out of a little over three hundred 
passengers, seventeen people died during the voyage. This was apparently one of the lowest 
mortality rates for the foreign Protestant transports.34 And once these people arrived, it was 
British funding that would have to keep them alive. By contrast, ten years later the sloop Sally 
carried nine families from Rhode Island to Nova Scotia, together with their livestock and 
household goods, in less than half the time, and without any lives lost in the process.35  
 The move to finally open Nova Scotia to New England migrants was stimulated in part 
by the decision to round up and deport the entire French Acadian population. The Acadians had 
proclaimed their neutrality ever since the British takeover in 1710, but when war with the French 
began yet again in 1754, British and colonial officials decided they were too much of a risk. The 
only way to permanently secure Nova Scotia was to get rid of them. Massachusetts was 
intimately involved in the operation, just as it had been in every other aspect of Acadian life. The 
new Governor of Nova Scotia, Charles Lawrence, worked with Massachusetts Governor William 
Shirley and other New England officials to plan the removal. Two thousand Massachusetts 
militiamen made up the brunt of the force, accompanied by three hundred regular British 
soldiers. In the fall of 1755, they began rounding up Acadian settlers and burning their homes. 
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Of the fifteen thousand Acadians, only a few thousand escaped to Quebec and the northern parts 
of today’s New Brunswick. The vast majority were scattered throughout the British Atlantic 
colonies.36  
 In addition to being horrifically cruel, the expulsion of the Acadians turned out to be a 
terrible self-inflicted blow to the health of the Nova Scotia colony. Hundreds of productive farms 
were left in ruins. Now there was an even more dire need for settlers, to fill the empty 
settlements and make the colony productive again. Meanwhile, the government in Halifax had 
gradually become friendlier toward New England. Men from Great Britain had dominated the 
executive council under Governor Cornwallis. But a decade later, half of Governor Lawrence’s 
council was New England-born. So it is not too surprising that in 1758, Lawrence decided to 
issue a general invitation to New England families. There was still some resistance from the 
Board of Trade, which had apparently not abandoned the idea of settling the colony with 
disbanded soldiers. Lawrence pushed back by reminding the Board of how expensive it had been 
to supply Nova Scotia settlements to that point. Disbanded soldiers were like Palatine settlers: 
they would have to be provided with everything. New Englanders were ready to move, with 
livestock, building materials, and all their worldly goods. It was time to welcome them.37  
 The Governor’s proclamation began appearing in New England newspapers in November 
1758. It was a broad invitation. Lawrence did not limit himself to describing the empty Acadian 
towns around the Bay of Fundy, but rather created a more sweeping image of a pacified and open 
northeastern borderland. The British, he wrote, had demolished French power not only in the 
former Acadia, but also in the “Gaspee, Meremichi…on the Gulf of Lawrence, and on St. John’s 
River.” All the French had been forced to “take refuge in Canada,” and now New Englanders 
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were free to settle and cultivate basically the entire region. Furthermore, the expulsion of the 
Acadians had created an opportunity that might never arise again. A hundred thousand acres of 
“interval plow-land” was available, which had been “cultivated for more than a hundred years 
past.” There was a hundred thousand acres of upland as well, fully stocked with “English Grass,” 
as well as orchards and gardens. Finally, all of this land was located on navigable rivers, which 
would connect settlers easily to Atlantic trade. It was the best possible scenario for New 
Englanders looking to resettle.38  
 The migration began at once. Within just a few months groups in Rhode Island and 
southeastern Connecticut sent five agents to Halifax to negotiate for settlements. Other agents 
from Massachusetts and New Hampshire quickly followed. One of the Rhode Islanders 
represented one hundred families, who were willing to depart more or less immediately. The 
agents must have felt quite at home in Halifax, as three of the five men who met them to conduct 
the negotiations were from Massachusetts themselves. Governor Lawrence was thrilled. In April 
1759 he wrote the Board of Trade, bragging that “hundreds of associated substantial families” 
were engaged in choosing land for their townships. By the end of the year, Lawrence reported 
that thirteen new townships were in the works, and that he expected at least five thousand settlers 
in the following three years.39  
 The great appeal of the northeastern borderland for New England families was that it was 
not a distant, disconnected frontier. This was true whether one was interested in peninsular Nova 
Scotia, the Saint John River area in today’s New Brunswick, or the far reaches of the District of 
Maine. Prospective settlers did not have to worry about building new institutions or new 
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connections with trade networks. They were barely leaving home. Agents could make multiple 
trips to evaluate the land and ensure that families knew what to expect on arrival. And perhaps 
most importantly, migrants to the borderland knew that if things did not go well, their relocation 
was not necessarily permanent. If they were smart, and perhaps speculated a bit with their land 
grants, a temporary migration northeast might even enrich their family.  
 Henry Evans was the agent for a group of families from Sudbury, Massachusetts, who all 
chose to settle in the Annapolis Valley of Nova Scotia. His journal, together with studies of other 
planter communities in the same area, provides an excellent illustration of how the northeastern 
migration worked. Communication from one side of the region to the other was constant. The 
northeastern borderland really was like an extension of New England. And a substantial 
percentage of settlers attempted to leverage their grants and maintain their connections to home, 
essentially hedging their bets on migration.  
Evans made arrangements to travel from Boston to Halifax with a Captain Watts, in early 
April of 1760. On April 3rd, however, the appointed day, Evans arrived at the dock to find he’d 
been left behind. He decided to head overland to Marblehead, hoping to overtake Captain Watts, 
but missed him there too. There were many opportunities for passage east, however. In 
Marblehead he found a fishing boat headed to the coast of Nova Scotia, the captain of which 
offered to take Evans and a companion to Halifax for fifteen dollars and four gallons of rum. 
They were at sea by April 5th.40   
 It took about six days to reach Lunenburg, just south of Halifax, where the boat was hung 
up in a storm. Evans was in Halifax by April 14th, and met the governor on the 16th. He made 
arrangements for the appropriate vessels to transport emigrants, and wrote letters to people 
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already in the Annapolis Valley, preparing them for the arrival of his Sudbury settlers. By 
Sunday the 20th of April, Evans had all his papers signed and was ready to head home. The very 
first captain he checked in with was going to Boston, but not directly, so Evans asked around and 
quickly found a better option. After a day’s delay for bad weather, Evans was en route back to 
Boston on Tuesday the 22nd – not even three weeks since he had arrived at the dock in Boston for 
the start of his journey.41  
 By the first week of May Evans was back in Sudbury, Massachusetts, meeting with the 
settlers and chartering the boats that would take them east. Captain Grow and the Charming 
Molly were enlisted as the primary transportation. Captain Grow made at least two round trips. 
He left for Annapolis with settlers in late May, was back in Boston in early June, and left again 
June 19th. The several voyages of the Charming Molly brought at least forty-five settlers to Nova 
Scotia. Most were men, though there were three women and at least eleven children. Another 
dozen or so people arrived later in the summer. And just as Governor Lawrence envisioned, they 
brought cattle and supplies. On the Charming Molly were sixteen oxen, eleven cows, ten sheep, 
two horses, a pig, and a dog, plus a handful of lambs, calves, and piglets. The settlers brought 
their own carts and plows and wheels. By early July, the Annapolis proprietors were having their 
meetings in Nova Scotia. Surveyors laid out the first lots in August, and were able to begin on 
the second set of lots by early October. Henry Evans was building his own house in Annapolis 
before winter set in.42  
  At that point, the Annapolis settlers likely turned to land speculation. According to a 
study of nearby Horton, also on the north shore of Nova Scotia, eighty percent of settlers 
participated in the land market in the 1760s. The intention was not necessarily to sell one’s grant 





and then flee back to Massachusetts. Many used their land to raise capital. There were some 
settlers looking to amass very large holdings, so others could sell off part of their grant for cash 
and still keep enough land to settle on. In those first few years tens of thousands of acres were 
exchanged. And of course, there were some who came to test the possibilities in Nova Scotia, 
and found them lacking. Around two dozen of the families who arrived in Annapolis in the early 
1760s were no longer there by 1770. These sorts of returns happened throughout the region. 
Among hundreds of settlers from southern New England who settled the town of Sackville was 
an entire Baptist church from Swansea, Massachusetts. They left Massachusetts as a group, with 
their pastor, and then most of them turned around and headed back a few years later.43 The 
northeastern frontier provided a unique opportunity for this kind of experimental migration. 
Families could try their luck and then return, or some family members could stay and others 
could pursue another land grant somewhere else.  
 As one part of this migration took place between southeastern New England and 
peninsular Nova Scotia, another part was taking shape north of Boston. Families from Essex 
County and points east were filtering further north and east into Passamaquoddy Bay, the Saint 
John River valley, and other areas on the northern side of the Bay of Fundy. In the 1760s all of 
this territory was still part of Nova Scotia; in 1783 it would be set off as the separate colony of 
New Brunswick. Governor Lawrence’s proclamation had implied that this land was equally as 
pacified and ready for settlement as the rest of the colony. And that proclamation was not the 
only report colonists had of the region. There had been other stories in the newspapers over the 
years, which though not explicit calls for settlers, still tended to paint a picture of promising 
opportunities. In 1755, a dispatch from Boston printed in the Pennsylvania Gazette made 
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unsubtle overtures to families looking to relocate. An anonymous correspondent in Nova Scotia 
wrote that “the French being entirely dispossessed of Nova Scotia…we have a prospect of 
bringing the St. John’s Indians entirely over to our interest.” Everyone on the river, he claimed, 
had been disarmed. All that was needed for a flourishing settlement was “good New England 
Husbandmen, who would improve the lands hereabouts.”44 A few years later the Boston Evening 
Post assured readers that a strong English fort guarded the Saint John River, and “the French and 
Indians continue to retire further up” into the backcountry.45 All the necessities for prospective 
colonists were in place.  
 Settlement of the northern reaches of the borderland involved a little more independent 
spirit than settlement further south. All the New England planter towns, even in peninsular Nova 
Scotia, could be described as “do-it-yourself” settlements. As described above, they were 
planned and executed by the colonists themselves through their agents, who went to Halifax, 
made the appropriate arrangements, and then organized the necessary ships. The governor and 
his council, however, still exerted a certain amount of control over the new townships on the 
peninsula. Those settlements had more ongoing communication with Halifax, and once a 
colonial assembly was created, those towns were more likely to send representatives. Settlement 
in the other part of the borderland – the vast area that would eventually be split between Maine 
and New Brunswick – was very different. This was true do-it-yourself migration. Most of the 
time, authorities in Halifax do not seem to have known what was going on in the region at all, 
and they did not make much of an effort to change that. Settlers found the land, moved 
themselves onto it, and only later sought official approval for what they had already done. 
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Already in the 1760s, a policy was taking shape that would continue on through the revolution 
and into the post-war period. It was unclear exactly where borders were in the region, and 
development was what really mattered, so British authorities were content to allow settlers to 
arrive and build communities with little oversight.  
 The town of Maugerville was the first major New England settlement project in the Saint 
John River valley. Israel Perley and a dozen other men from the northeast shore of Massachusetts 
began scouting the area in 1761. They first explored the backcountry via the Machias River, and 
then the following year traveled up the Saint John and chose a spot a few miles downstream of 
St. Anne’s point, where the city of Fredericton is today. Perley quickly found two hundred 
settlers from around his old hometown of Boxford, and the whole group was building the new 
town by 1763. The Maugerville community did not even make an official request for a grant 
until 1764, when they had already been settled for a year. Halifax happily signed off on the 
request, and only intervened by appointing a few of the settlers as justices of the peace. The 
migrants were basically free to build a brand-new town, just like the ones they had left in 
Massachusetts. They held town meetings and organized a Congregational Church. Starting in 
1765, the Maugerville settlers did elect representatives for the colonial assembly, but those men 
hardly ever made the journey to Halifax.46  
 The Maugerville settlement was more connected to Essex County, Massachusetts than it 
was to Halifax. One of the men who scouted the settlement alongside Perley was a merchant 
James Simonds. As the first settlers were arriving in Maugerville, Simonds set up a trading post 
at the mouth of the river and began to put together a firm that would connect his new and former 
homes. Simonds partnered with merchants in Newburyport and Boston, and within a few years 
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the firm of Simonds, Hazen and White was maintaining a constant flow of goods and people 
between Newburyport and the Saint John River.47 It is therefore no surprise that when Captain 
Glasier showed up on the river in 1765 to evaluate his grant, he found settlers already there. The 
Maugerville community and the possibilities on the Saint John were common knowledge in the 
towns north of Boston. The families who left had not vanished into a distant frontier. They were 
still connected to their old networks.  
 In fact, some of the families were not just in contact with Massachusetts, they were 
actively maintaining family networks that bridged the borderland. The Bubars were one of these 
families. They had lived on the Kennebec River in Maine for over a decade when, in 1760, 
Joseph Bubar began to get involved in settlement projects. First he purchased part of Parker’s 
Island in the Kennebec from the Plymouth Proprietors, and then within a year had decided to 
pursue land in the Maugerville settlement as well. Bubar and his wife had at least seven children, 
and the various land schemes may have been an attempt to spread family landholdings around. 
Most of the Bubars appear to have stayed in Maugerville until the start of the Revolution, at 
which point Joseph and some of his children moved back to the Kennebec River. Another son 
moved to Bangor, on the Penobscot River, and four more Bubar children remained on the Saint 
John. By the end of the war, the family as a group controlled land in all three major borderland 
river valleys.48  
 The pre-Revolutionary period saw the founding of a number of settlements like 
Maugerville. The stories were similar on both sides of what would soon be the border between 
the District of Maine and the colony of New Brunswick. Just like the Maugerville families, the 
                                                
47 Young, “Planter Settlements,” 30-31.  
48 John Bubar, “A Planter Family: The Bubars of New England and New Brunswick,” in Making Adjustments: 




people of Machias, Maine took the land they wanted and sought official approval later. Settlers 
began to arrive on the Machias River around 1763, and the town grew over the next few years. It 
was 1767 before the Machias settlers appointed a representative to pursue a grant in Boston. At 
the same time, just as Captain Glasier had hoped, other New England families chose to move 
themselves onto the Saint John River Society’s grant. The townships of Gagetown and Burton 
soon arose near Maugerville. Some earlier Maugerville settlers relocated to those towns too, in 
search of better land. Through all this, the governments in Halifax and Boston were barely 
involved. It was clear to New England families that the northeast was open and plenty of land 
was available. This idea would have a great deal of staying power. Even war, and the re-creation 
of a border, did little to alter it. After the war was over and the borderland was reborn, New 
England families would continue to pursue opportunities in the northeast and politicians would 
continue their laissez faire policies. It was as if nothing had changed.49  
 
 The Revolutionary War had a paradoxical effect on much of the borderland. Instead of 
leading to division, estrangement, and a solid border, it led to a further integration of the region, 
and after the peace, a blurry border. At the start of the war both British and Americans realized 
the region was up for grabs, and so both sides solicited support throughout the northeast. Then 
after the war both sides accepted that a boundary had been drawn, while continuing to believe 
that its final placement was negotiable. That led them to maintain the remarkably open 
borderland that is the subject of the next chapter. 
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 When fighting began in 1775, most of the borderland was still controlled by Indians. The 
people of the region were, from west to east, the Penobscot, Passamaquoddy, and Maliseet.50 
These were the communities living in the crucial zone between the Penobscot and the Saint John 
Rivers, a zone that is today divided between the state of Maine and the province of New 
Brunswick. In the 1770s there were very few European settlers anywhere within this region, with 
the exception of Machias and the new Saint John River settlements mentioned above. What 
transpired over the following two decades was a back and forth negotiation – between the 
British, the Americans, and the three Indian communities – that prevented the formation of a 
solid northeastern border. The rebel Americans made several attempts to use military alliances 
with the Indians to win control over the entire northeast. They were unable or unwilling to 
reliably supply their Indian allies with priests, however, which was the only thing those allies 
really wanted. The British, for their part, responded to this failure by providing priests to the 
Maliseet, knowing that this would draw the Penobscot and Passamaquoddy eastward and 
estrange them from the Americans. These tensions were not resolved until the late 1790s, when 
the state of Massachusetts finally chose to counter the British by paying a French priest to 
permanently settle in Maine. At that point, a border finally began to take shape in what had been 
a borderless zone.   
                                                
50 There have been several recent studies of these groups that primarily analyze their political interactions with 
European powers in the Colonial and Early Republic periods. For colonial-era land negotiations between Wabanaki 
and English, see Ian Saxine, Properties of Empire: Indians, Colonists, and Land Speculators on the New England 
Frontier (New York: New York University Press, 2019). For Penobscot and Passamaquoddy treaties and petitions in 
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, and some analysis of their relationship with the border, see Micah 
Pawling, “Petitions and the Reconfiguration of Homeland: Persistance and Tradition Among Wabanaki Peoples in 
the Nineteenth Century,” PhD diss., (University of Maine, 2010); and William Wicken, “Passamaquoddy Identity 
and the Marshall Decision,” in New England and the Maritime Provinces, 50-58. For negotiations between the 
British and the Indians of New Brunswick, see John Reid, “Empire, the Maritime Colonies, and the Supplanting of 
Mi’kma’ki/Wulstukwik,” Acadiensis 18:2 (2009): 78-97. Though the term “Maliseet” is found in the sources used in 
this study, and is still common, it is gradually being replaced by the term “Wulstukwiuk.” The Micmac people also 
have a presence in the eastern part of this zone, but most of the Micmac population is located further east in Nova 
Scotia. They speak a distinctly different language from the three tribes of the border zone, and mixed with them 
infrequently. The Micmac were also not particularly interested in negotiating with the rebel Americans, and for all 
these reasons do not figure into this analysis.  
 
 52 
 Before, during, and after the war, the three major Indian communities of what became 
Maine and New Brunswick were on good terms. All three are considered Eastern Abenaki 
people, part of the larger Wabanaki Confederacy; in the eighteenth century they spoke mutually 
intelligible languages, frequented each other’s villages, and intermarried. There was a slight 
divergence between the western and eastern side of the region, however. The Penobscot claim to 
have been somewhat recent arrivals in central Maine. They seem to have absorbed many people 
from points south who fled the encroaching English settlements during the colonial period. This 
made the Penobscot similar to another Abenaki village at the St. Francis River in Quebec, which 
also consisted of a conglomeration of refugees from around the northeast. By the mid-1700s 
there was apparently “constant communication” between the Penobscot and the St. Francis 
groups, and to this day their dialects are virtually identical. The Passamaquoddy and Maliseet, 
for their part, were basically one people until relatively late in the eighteenth century. The former 
group lived on the Saint Croix River, and the latter on the Saint John, but the portage between 
the rivers is only about two miles, and the two communities were constantly mixing. The 
Passamaquoddy may have simply been the westernmost village of the larger nation – they did 
not sign treaties as a separate people until the mid-eighteenth century, and in 1764 the English 
referred to them as “belonging” to the Maliseet.51 
Slight differences aside, these three communities were generally aligned both politically 
and culturally. Their unity was, in part, a product of religion. All three groups converted to 
Catholicism in the mid-seventeenth century thanks to outreach from the French in Quebec. Then, 
for the following century, all three were forced to collaborate to secure the services of priests. 
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Soldiers from the English colonies focused their attacks not just on Indians themselves, but also 
on their churches. The English burned Indian chapels at least three times in the early eighteenth 
century, and murdered one priest, Father Sebastian Rale. The Penobscot, Passamaquoddy, and 
Maliseet were forced to move around for their religious needs – visiting each other whenever one 
group had a priest in residence, and occasionally travelling to Quebec City. This kept boundaries 
in the region blurry, and once the war began it was those blurry boundaries that encouraged both 
the Americans and British to try and claim as much of the region as they could by cultivating 
native support.  
By the 1760s, both sides knew the most effective way to cultivate that support. After the 
defeat of the French in Quebec, the three native communities began asking authorities in both 
Boston and Halifax to supply them with priests. The initial response from Boston was 
equivocation; the Governor made vague promises to “endeavor” to send “a minister.”52 Halifax 
was a bit more receptive. Probably because of concerns for the safety of the burgeoning Saint 
John River settlements, officials decided to find a priest for the Maliseet in 1767. A request was 
made to the Bishop of Quebec, who dispatched a Father Bailly to the Saint John River that fall. 
Providing an official salary to a Catholic priest was still apparently a bridge too far, so Bailly 
was not officially placed on the colonial payroll. Instead, he was compensated in the form of 
gifts. His pay was described as a “present of fifty pounds,” and he was informed that he could 
expect such presents regularly. Bailly almost immediately began to draw Indians eastward from 
the Penobscot and Passamaquoddy communities. A group of Penobscots visited the Saint John 
soon after Bailly arrived, and asked him if he would be willing to travel to them in return. Bailly 
demurred – he was not sure what to do, writing to Quebec that he was “approved only by Nova 
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Scotia.” The Penobscot wrote to Massachusetts complaining that it was “very hard that other 
Indian Nations in our neighborhood can have a Priest…and we are debarred.” It was difficult, 
they wrote, to transport their entire families all the way to the Saint John River for baptisms and 
other rites. At this point, however, Massachusetts was not particularly concerned. The idea that 
the Penobscot might be served by a priest on the Saint John raised no alarms.53  
 That attitude changed eight years later. In the summer of 1775 revolution began, George 
Washington and Benedict Arnold started to plan an attack on Quebec, and the government of 
Massachusetts reached out to the Penobscot. The tribe was supplied with twenty-five pounds of 
gunpowder, and three hundred pounds worth of clothes and other goods. Then, when they made 
the predictable request for a priest, the Americans were ready with a reply. The Penobscot should 
join the Continental Army. General Arnold would lead them through Maine to Quebec, where 
they would attack and surely capture the city. Canada would then join the revolution, and there 
would be a permanent supply of French priests. The tribe agreed, informally, to an alliance, and a 
handful of Penobscot men joined Arnold’s invasion force.54  
 After the attack on Quebec failed, the Penobscot were almost as disappointed as the 
Americans. They were still determined, however, to secure a priest. In the summer of 1776, two 
representatives, Orono and Ausong, traveled to Boston to negotiate. Their proposal was simple. 
If the Americans gave their approval, Orono and Ausong would go to Quebec City and find a 
priest themselves. This would benefit everyone: not only would the Penobscot get their priest, 
they would be able to spy on the British in Quebec and provide updates to Boston. Orono and 
Ausong also tried to explain that this might reverse the religious dynamics of the region in 
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Massachusetts’s favor. Father Bailly was no longer on the Saint John. If the Americans allowed a 
priest to be procured in Quebec, “many of our neighboring tribes…will come to us and pray with 
us.” On the other hand, with no priest, Penobscot “young people will go to Canada and they 
might be brought over to act against the Colonies.” Benedict Arnold’s invasion of the northeast 
may have failed, but here was another, cheaper opportunity for the Americans to assert 
themselves in the borderland.55 
 The Massachusetts representatives, however, refused to commit to anything in their 
negotiations with Orono and Ausong. They made vague promises to pay the Penobscot for their 
service to General Arnold, and to place the request for a priest before the Massachusetts 
Legislature. The rebel colonists, it turned out, had not completely abandoned the idea of taking 
the borderland by force. Soon they tried again, this time on a smaller scale. Two Nova Scotia 
settlers, Jonathan Eddy and John Allen, had been attempting to organize an attack on Fort 
Cumberland in that province. General Washington and the Continental Congress decided not to 
provide official support for the operation, but Massachusetts gave Eddy and Allen guns and 
ammunition and tacit approval. Eddy and Allen hoped to recruit the entire force from the 
disputed borderland. To that end, negotiations with the Passamaquoddy and Maliseet proceeded 
in much the same manner as had negotiations with the Penobscot. In late 1775, representatives of 
the Maliseet wrote to Massachusetts offering to “heartily join with our brethren the Penobscot 
Indians…to stand together and oppose the People of Old England.” What they required, though, 
was first “a Priest that he may pray with us,” and second “Ammunition, Provisions & Goods.”56  
 The government of Massachusetts appears to have responded to the second part of this 
request while ignoring the first. Within a few months, they received word that Nova Scotia might 
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offer the Maliseet and Passamaquoddy ammunition and supplies to reverse their allegiance and 
take up arms against the Americans. The Americans quickly set up a trading post in Machias, 
and made plans for another on the Saint John. General Washington also sent a letter to both 
communities entreating them to maintain their connection to the rebel colonies.57 These steps 
seem to have worked. Around twenty-five men from the Maliseet and Passamaquoddy 
communities joined Eddy and Allen. Meanwhile, a number of settlers at Maugerville held a 
meeting in which they pledged allegiance to Massachusetts Bay as well. Around thirty or forty 
white soldiers from Machias and the Saint John River settlements signed on to the expedition. 
Eddy and Allen found another one to two hundred men in the Nova Scotia towns closer to Fort 
Cumberland, and the whole force attacked in November 1776. Like the previous winter’s attempt 
on Quebec, the operation was a failure; the British were able to send reinforcements before the 
fort fell. Most of the attackers, however – especially the Maliseet, Passamaquoddy, and white 
settlers from the Saint John River and further west – fled home safely. 
 Again, American attempts to take the borderland by force had failed. But again, there 
remained an opportunity to counter the British by providing a resident priest. Once the rebel 
colonies were officially allied with the French, there was some effort to accomplish this.58 When 
the French fleet arrived in Newport, Rhode Island in the summer of 1780, the Massachusetts 
government managed to locate a volunteer priest. Father Frederic, a chaplain in the fleet, made 
his way north and spent the winter with the Passamaquoddy. This was not a permanent solution, 
however. Father Frederic was not prepared to stay permanently in North America, and 
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Massachusetts was not yet willing to pay him to do so. He returned to Newport by the end of 
summer 1781.59 The British, meanwhile, had a ready supply of French priests thanks to their 
retention of Quebec, and they were ready to take bolder steps than the Americans. To prevent 
any further attacks like the one on Fort Cumberland, officials in Halifax decided the time had 
come to simply hire a permanent priest. They secured a Father Bourg from Quebec, and allotted 
him an annual salary of one hundred pounds. Bourg was sent to the Saint John River, where he 
told the Maliseet to remain neutral or be excommunicated. John Allen, who had become 
essentially an American ambassador to the northeastern Indians, reported on what happened 
next. The Maliseet dropped their support for the Americans. The Penobscot and Passamaquoddy, 
for their part, “resented much that a priest had not been sent” from Boston. Despite Allen’s pleas, 
they began to cross the border to visit Father Bourg, claiming that they still had “zeal for 
America” and “friendship & affection,” but “only meant to see the Priest, their souls being heavy 
& loaded with burthens of sins.”60 The British had outmaneuvered the Americans in the 
borderland again.  
 By then end of the war in 1783 the situation among the Indians of the northeastern 
borderland was still unsettled. The Penobscot and Passamaquoddy remained generally aligned 
with the Americans, and the Maliseet with the British, but in the backcountry there was still 
frequent movement and intermixing among the three groups. And though a northeastern 
boundary was negotiated between the British and the Americans at Paris, it was more or less 
theoretical. The treaty called for the boundary to start in the east at the River Saint Croix, and 
then north of that river’s source, to fall along the “highlands which divide the rivers that fall into 
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the Atlantic Ocean from those which fall into the river Saint Lawrence.”61 The trouble was that 
no one had ever mapped the backcountry. Neither of the negotiating powers agreed on which 
river flowing into Passamaquoddy Bay was the Saint Croix, and neither had any idea where these 
all-important “highlands” were. Both sides assumed the line would generally run through the 
middle of the borderland zone, which was still populated almost exclusively by the Penobscot, 
Passamaquoddy, and Maliseet. Thus, both British and Americans recognized that the ultimate 
boundary was still flexible and could be adjusted to their advantage. The British continued into 
the postwar years their strategy of drawing Maine Indian communities toward their orbit by 
installing priests on the Saint John River. Massachusetts continued to eye the borderland warily, 
while holding back from mirroring the British strategy.  
 There was a feeling in New England, during the first years after the revolution, that such 
machinations in the borderland might not be necessary anyway. Canada might still join the 
thirteen colonies in their fledgling republic, negating the northern border entirely. There was 
even an official invitation included in the Articles of Confederation: according to the eleventh 
article, Canadians were pre-approved for entry. The proposed admission of any other colony to 
the union would be subject to a vote, with the agreement of nine states necessary, but for Canada 
that vote had apparently already taken place: “Canada acceding to this confederation, and 
adjoining in the measures of the United States, shall be admitted into, and entitled to all the 
advantages of this Union.”62 This was a development with important repercussions for the 
postwar borderland. The war made the boundary between New England and Canada – battled 
over for generations – seem less distinct. The real enemy was now Great Britain. Canadians 
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could potentially become fellow republican citizens. It became reasonable to imagine a Catholic 
French state taking its place in the new United States. And it became similarly reasonable to 
imagine citizens of the United States moving to Canada.63  
 The first evidence that attitudes were changing came just before the war, as New England 
newspapers began to report on Canadian responses to the 1774 Quebec Act. New Englanders 
were already furious about the act, but its architects expected French Canadians to embrace it. It 
was designed, after all, to placate them. The act expanded the boundaries of the Province of 
Quebec, and allowed Canadians “to have, hold, and enjoy, the free Exercise” of the Catholic 
faith.64 It also, however, created a distinctly different system to govern the Quebecois than that 
which governed their English colonial neighbors. The French civil law system would be retained, 
and there would be no elected assembly or trial by jury. This is what bothered people in New 
England, where resentment toward the British had been simmering for years. The Quebec Act 
looked like more tyranny – how could the King or Parliament declare that one British colony 
would have an entirely different legal system from its sister colonies? If one group of British 
subjects was denied an assembly, could not the same principle be extended to anyone? Quebec 
began to look less like the enemy, and more like another oppressed colony.  
 Accordingly, as New England newspapers published denunciations of the Quebec Act, 
they began to report that French Canadians disliked it too. In the autumn of 1774, the Essex 
Gazette published an excerpt of a letter supposedly sent from Montreal to New York the month 
prior. According to the letter, the Canadians were “greatly alarmed” to find themselves placed 
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under their former French laws. This was partially because the “French noblesse and 
gentry…expect to lord it over the industrious Farmer and Trader, and live upon their Spoils, as 
they did before the Conquest.” The only reason the farmers were not openly complaining, the 
letter claimed, was fear of their priests, “who rule and govern this whole Country as they 
please.”65 The common people of Canada were showing signs of independence and industrious 
virtue, even if they were not yet completely out from under the thumb of their priests.  
 Within days of the publication of the letter in the Essex Gazette, another letter began to 
appear in colonial newspapers. It was published first in New England, and within a week was in 
New York papers as well. This letter was supposedly sent from Canadians themselves to 
London. It provided the perfect illustration for American colonists that the French Canadians 
were just like them. “The Canadian Farmers,” the letter began, were “greatly alarmed” about the 
Quebec Act reintroducing “the ancient Laws of this Country.” Life had been difficult under the 
French laws, and Canadians were “entirely satisfied” with the imposition of English laws.66 
Quebec could not prosper unless the Quebec Act was repealed. Anyone reading a newspaper in 
late 1774 could see that the Quebecois, though Catholic, were standing up for their rights like 
other British subjects.  
When war actually broke out in the spring of 1775, newspapers described Canadians as 
sympathetic to the American cause. An article published all over New England just before the 
fighting claimed that Canadians had already been asked to “arm themselves against the 
Colonies,” and yet “they rejected the Proposal with Indignation, and declared that if any one 
Canadian should be deluded so far as to go against their Sister Colonies, they would send ten to 
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their Relief.”67 A piece in a Massachusetts paper in June noted that the British were attempting to 
raise an army in Quebec, but were having a hard time, as “the common people are by no means 
fond of the service.”68 A letter published in August in the New Hampshire Gazette claimed that 
Canadians “can’t bear to have the old French laws take place again amongst them, as they will be 
thereby plunged into enormous taxes.” Therefore, they were “determined not to fight against us 
unless forced by a formidable army.”69 The letter went on to claim that a British officer who had 
tried to raise recruits had been chased away by an uprising of angry Quebecois. The only people 
who would willingly fight for the British, according to the American papers, were the wealthy 
elites who hoped to use the Quebec Act to oppress the poor farmers. By October of 1775, the 
Massachusetts Spy was crowing about the “brave and enlightened Canadians” who would 
undoubtedly soon join the rebel cause. An intercepted letter from a British official claimed that 
in the event of an American invasion of Canada, the Catholic French would “lay down their 
arms, and not fire a shot,” as lately they all “talk of that damn’d abused word liberty.”70  
 These newspaper reports, as well as intelligence from emissaries and spies, convinced 
George Washington to authorize the invasion of Canada in the fall of 1775. It was a two-part 
operation. One army travelled north via Lake Champlain to take Montreal, then continued 
northeast. The other group was Benedict Arnold’s, which received the aforementioned support 
from the Penobscot as it traveled through Maine to Quebec City. The two armies were supposed 
to join forces, attack the city, and thereby win control of the St. Lawrence River and with it the 
vast interior of North America. As mentioned above, however, the attack was a failure, and the 
Americans were forced to retreat.  
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This invasion, though ultimately unsuccessful, brought a literal blurring of the border. 
This was the first time that ordinary Americans experienced sustained contact with ordinary 
Canadians, and the impressions recorded in soldiers’ journals and letters were overwhelmingly 
positive. It is easy to see a transformation taking shape in these accounts, which paralleled the 
changes occurring in contemporary newspapers. French Canadians were surprisingly similar to 
Protestant Americans. They may have been Catholic, but they ran self-sufficient, orderly 
households. They were generous and civilized. Canada, it turned out, was a lot like New 
England. These cheery reports of Canada are still more striking considering that most accounts 
of the invasion were assembled and published after the war. The Quebecois did not, in the end, 
send representatives to Philadelphia, and very few of them took up arms against the British. 
Nevertheless, positive perceptions of Canada appear to have had some staying power in the early 
American republic. This, again, had an impact on postwar attitudes toward the borderland.  
 John Henry, who served under Benedict Arnold, was particularly effusive in his 
descriptions of Catholic Quebec. Recounting the invasion years after the fact, Henry repeatedly 
mentioned the kindness and civility of Canadians. When he and his fellow soldiers arrived, 
Henry wrote, they expected nothing but “barbarity.” Instead, they “found civilized men, in a 
comfortable state, enjoying all the benefits…of civil society.”71 Henry describes the country as 
rich, the homes as cozy, and the people as contented. After developing a fever during the march 
toward Quebec City, Henry was taken in for several days by a local family, and in his account he 
takes time to emphasize their comfortable situation. The family of seven had plenty to eat, and 
were “neatly and warmly clothed in woolen, apparently of their own manufactory.”72 They 
possessed a house, barn and stables. Their neighbors appeared similarly situated. They were 
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honest, too – Henry claims to have offered two dollars in payment to the father of the family, 
only to be turned down. All in all, Henry writes, “Canadians…lived as comfortably…[as] 
Pennsylvanians did, at that time.”73  
 Henry provided more detail than most of his fellow soldiers, but the portrayal of the 
French Canadians in all accounts was overwhelmingly positive. Arnold and his men counted on 
the residents of the villages around Quebec City for support, and were willing to pay for food 
and supplies. The Canadians were very accommodating. George Morison writes of being 
“received…very hospitably…[they] administered to our necessities, and loaded us with 
favors.”74 Another man wrote of his “joy” at the “politeness and civility” of the Canadians, who 
provided him butter and freshly baked bread. A day or so later, this soldier and his companions 
bought eggs, rum, sugar and meat from an old woman, who gave an impromptu performance of 
“Yankee Doodle” for the men.75 An American officer reported not only that the Canadians were 
“very hospitable,” but also that at the encampment outside Quebec they were “constantly coming 
in to express their satisfaction at our coming into the country.”76 
The only complaint that American soldiers made about Canadians was that they 
sometimes drove a hard bargain for supplies. This, though, was just another way Canadians 
proved identical to Americans. The same soldiers had previously complained about the high 
prices charged by settlers in Maine. Captain Simeon Thayer wrote a journal entry on September 
30, 1775, in which he complained that the inhabitants of a settlement in Maine, though they were 
friendly and welcoming, offered only “salted Moose and Deer” which “they sell at an exorbitant 
price.” A little over a month later, Captain Thayer wrote of the first village in Quebec: “the 
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people were civil, but mighty extravagant with what they have to sell.”77 Catholic Canadians 
were akin to Protestant Americans not only in their comfortable lives and hospitality, but also in 
their bargaining skills.  
 The warming of relations between French Canadians and Protestant Americans during 
the Revolutionary War years might be dismissed as not, in the end, all that important. For all the 
talk of republican potential north of the border, Canada chose not to join the United States. Anti-
Catholic prejudice was not permanently eliminated in New England either, and would flare up 
repeatedly in the early nineteenth century. The wartime changes, however, did have important 
consequences. They kept the northeastern border blurry, which made the postwar borderland a 
more comfortable place for all prospective migrants. In Vermont, for example, a series of state 
constitutions adopted between 1777 and 1793 progressively eliminated restrictions on Catholic 
citizens.78 This made Vermont more appealing for French Canadians, and by 1815 there was a 
sizeable enough Catholic community in the city of Burlington to merit a visit from the leader of 
the church in Boston.79 Massachusetts, for its part, finally decided in the 1790s that it was willing 
to pay for a priest to serve Maine’s Indian communities – an act of great import for Boston 
Catholics and the borderland in general (and a major topic of chapter three of this study).  
 Meanwhile, New Englanders no longer saw Canada as foreign, enemy territory. There 
had been positive reports about French Canadian people in New England papers for years. 
Accounts of the Arnold expedition described friendly people with republican sympathies. 
Anyone who read the Articles of Confederation knew that Canada might be welcomed into the 
union at any time. Who knew where borders would ultimately fall? And so New Englanders 
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began to regard relocating to Canada as uncontroversial. Like Nova Scotia, it was near enough to 
be scouted, and would allow settlers to remain reasonably close to their former homes. And like 
Nova Scotia, it was a connected frontier. Migrants north would stay connected to same Atlantic 
networks they were used to – in fact, they might even be better connected, since Montreal and 
the St. Lawrence River had now become the primary artery of British North American trade. 
And so, as soon as the war ended with a re-creation of the northern border, New England 
families began to move across it. Ironically, the very war that created the border convinced the 
people of the borderland that it did not matter.  
 
 In peninsular Nova Scotia in the years after the American Revolution, there was at least 
some effort to enforce the new border produced by the war. In the port of Liverpool, Simeon 
Perkins was able to recapture most of his prewar trade. But authorities did catch him bending the 
rules a bit, and there were consequences. In other parts of the borderland, however – like the area 
split between Maine and New Brunswick – it is remarkable how little the war seems to have 
mattered. In Maugerville, David Burpee and his brother Edward had likely been involved in the 
1775 pledge of support for Massachusetts. Edward Burpee signed on with Jonathan Eddy’s 
invasion force and attacked Fort Cumberland. But later, like many others similarly situated, the 
brothers were allowed to carry on with their lives in New Brunswick. Exact numbers are unclear, 
but it seems that almost half of the men from the Saint John River who took up arms against the 
British simply stayed in their homes with no consequences. Hugh Quinton had been a captain in 
Eddy’s army; he not only stayed but also managed, within a year or so, to become a captain in 
the loyal militia. In 1787, David Burpee was appointed Justice of the Peace for the newly formed 
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Sunbury County, giving him – with his decidedly non-loyal history – a position of authority over 
newly arrived loyalist refugees.80  
 Even settlement projects from New England were allowed to continue. Soon after the 
Treaty of Paris, as loyalist refugees were being resettled in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, a 
group called the Cape Ann Association tried to secure a grant of land on the British side of 
Passamaquoddy Bay. These people were remarkably similar to the groups of two decades earlier, 
like the Maugerville families, or the settlers who moved themselves to Captain Glasier’s grant. 
They were from New Hampshire and northeastern Massachusetts, and they wanted to organize a 
settlement somewhere in the borderland, close enough to maintain connections with home. These 
people had no history of loyalty during the war, and some of them had even served in the 
Continental Army. And yet the governor of Nova Scotia went ahead and gave them a grant.81 
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A Place of Future Grandeur: Opportunities in the Open Borderland, 1783-1812 
 
 
 John Jacob Astor is popularly known as the United States’ first multi-millionaire. His 
story was the classic rags-to-riches tale. Stepping ashore in New York City in 1783, a twenty-
year-old from Germany with big dreams, Astor took advantage of the boundless opportunities 
afforded by the young, expanding republic. He became a fur-trader, businessman, and real-estate 
speculator – and by the time he died, he was the richest man in America. It is the prototypical 
American immigrant success story, something that was only possible in the new United States.  
 Except John Jacob Astor’s success was not limited to the United States. His story was a 
borderlands success story. From his first years in North America, he split his time between New 
York and Lower Canada. He was simultaneously American and British North American – a 
borderlands citizen. He was constantly on the move. Astor traded furs on both sides of the 
border. He speculated in land on both sides of the border. He and his family became prominent 
members of social scene in both New York City and Montreal. For his first three decades in 
America, Astor lived a transnational life. It took the War of 1812 to finally force Astor to limit 
his business interests in British North America.1 
 John Jacob Astor’s story is not often treated as transnational, in part because the history 
of migration and economic expansion in the northeast has been divided along national lines. 
Historians have acted as if there were two distinct stories to tell. One involved the people from 
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New England and New York who moved north into Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont, and 
west into Upstate New York and the Ohio country. This is treated as the normative American 
stream of expansion – a movement that filled in the unsettled backcountry of the republic. The 
other story is that of the people who moved north to today’s Canada: to Upper Canada (present-
day Ontario), Lower Canada (Quebec), and the Maritimes. This is seen as the normative 
Canadian expansion, and the migrants are often referred to as loyalists – or after the 1780s, as 
“late loyalists.” This second group, we are told, faced a choice of republic or empire and chose 
empire. Because it is hard to classify a twenty-year-old German immigrant as any kind of 
loyalist, and because his businesses ended up concentrated on the US side of the border, John 
Jacob Astor is seen as an American.2  
 It is easier to understand people like Astor, and the era in which he operated, if the 
supposed two streams of expansion are instead treated as one unified phenomenon. People in this 
era were not really choosing between British North America and the United States. It was too 
early to make this decision in any meaningful way. No one could predict how the U.S. or British 
North America would grow and change, and no one knew exactly where the permanent border 
would fall, or even if there would be a permanent border. What they were doing was moving to a 
shared borderland, because that was the avenue of greatest opportunity. The region had already 
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become a destination in the 1760s, after the British victory in the French and Indian War. Then, 
ironically, the loss of the thirteen colonies had some positive repercussions for the rest of the 
British Empire. Britain won key battles during the American Revolution, and at its end it 
retained a huge swath of northern territory that would become Canada. British resources flooded 
northward, most importantly people – the original loyalist refugees. Two of the colonies that 
were preserved – Quebec and Nova Scotia –were quickly subdivided into still more – Upper 
Canada, Lower Canada, New Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island.  
 These developments resulted in a special kind of frontier – one that was actually better 
connected to urban centers and Atlantic trade than many of the long-settled areas migrants were 
departing from. This was a different sort of frontier than the one cemented in the American 
imagination over a century ago by Frederick Jackson Turner, a frontier detached from the east 
and the Atlantic seaboard. Turner’s frontier required the building of new institutions and new 
networks.3 The borderland frontier, however, was already connected to the old institutions and 
networks. Available land around the Great Lakes, the St. Lawrence and its tributaries, and the 
Bay of Fundy was well connected to Montreal, Quebec City, Saint John, and Halifax: cities that 
remained part of the most powerful empire in the world. The borderland frontier was not a place 
to start anew, but rather a place to reposition oneself economically. The migrants choosing this 
frontier were well aware of this, because the borderland was marketed to them that way.  
This marketing, mostly in newspapers of the 1790s, pulled settlers toward a unified 
borderland – a region technically split between republic and empire, but with an economic 
sphere centered on the British Atlantic. Before railroads or canals, everyone was at the mercy of 
geography. Americans could choose American land on the southern side of the Great Lakes, but 
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they had no choice but to ship their goods downriver to Montreal and on out the St. Lawrence. 
Northern Vermont was in the same position, as Lake Champlain too flows north, into the 
Richelieu River and on towards Montreal. The eastern half of the District of Maine was closer to 
the British cities of Halifax and Saint John than it was to Boston. Some Maine settlements lacked 
any connection with the rest of the District, and could only be reached by traveling through 
British territory. So regardless of whether settlers were moving to the British or American part of 
the borderland, they were all relying on the same networks. They would all benefit from the 
development of the whole region.  
The political powers on both sides, British and American, had a strong motivation to 
promote the idea of a unified borderland. Both sides believed that the actual boundary was not 
yet set in stone. There was still the possibility of shifting it in the future; either more of British 
North America would join the United States, or parts of some states would be absorbed into 
British North America. The U.S., obviously, believed the former was more probable, while 
Britain was counting on the latter scenario. There was a kind of unlikely partisan optimism 
shared by both sides in these postwar years. The U.S. believed its growth was inevitable. 
Thirteen British colonies had joined the union, and soon others would follow suit. For their part, 
the British believed the breakup of the U.S. was inevitable. The union would fall apart, and the 
empire would pick up the pieces. In the meantime, however, each side needed to strengthen its 
settlements by filling them with people, and to do this it was not wise to overemphasize the 
distinction between subject and citizen. American landowners in the borderland highlighted the 
proximity of British markets and trade networks. British landowners emphasized these markets 
too, and also the ease of relocation to their territory. Authorities on both sides worked to keep the 
border porous when it came to trade, knowing that any restrictions threatened the economic 
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growth of the whole region. Remarkably, after just fighting a war for control of the continent, 
republic and empire quickly reverted to the same kind of partnership that had been the rule 
before the revolution. Development of the region was of paramount importance. Questions of 
identity and boundary placement would be settled later.4  
 All of these developments – the partisan optimism, the unlikely collaboration, and the 
resulting marketing of the borderland – created an enormous zone of opportunity. From the 
Niagara River in the West to the St. Croix River in the East, the borderland shared by the 
American Republic and the British Empire threw open its doors to the free mobility of white 
settlers. White families, especially Protestant white families, became free agents of a sort – 
courted by newspaper ads and would-be land proprietors, eager to find a place for themselves in 
the bustling trade networks of the border zone. Political ideology likely played a role for some 
migrants, and cannot be discounted entirely. But politics is conspicuously absent from the 
sources. Solicitous proprietors barely mentioned politics in their appeals. Settlers, even 
Revolutionary War veterans, crossed the border without offering political explanations, or 
raising many alarm bells. It was opportunity that mattered to them, not the as yet ill-defined 
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choice between subjecthood and citizenship. They were not late loyalists or patriotic republicans 
– they were borderland opportunists. 
 
In the post-revolution period, from the mid 1780s to the 1810s, the border was porous, 
there was available land on both sides, and word of these opportunities was spreading. Both 
American and British authorities took steps to stimulate migration. Both sides made it clear that 
the border was open and migrants welcome, whatever their politics or religion. The result was a 
constant stream of immigrants and emigrants. Political identities were adopted and abandoned at 
will. It did not matter if one was a new arrival from Europe, a Continental Army veteran, or an 
exiled loyalist. The war between the thirteen colonies and Britain had not resulted in a solid 
boundary or a permanent political divide, but rather in an expansion of freedom of movement 
and opportunity. 
Americans in this era learned about land opportunities in the newspapers. There were 
newspapers everywhere, in all major and minor cities, especially in the northern half of the 
United States. An examination of the land advertisements in these papers makes several things 
clear. First, though American papers were advertising a lot of American land, what they tended 
to publicize about it was its access to the British Empire. People in the eighteenth century did not 
use the modern term “borderland,” but the fact that the land was, in fact, on or near the border 
was crucial to its marketing. Land promoters wanted settlers to know that moving to this land 
meant they would be connected to the British Atlantic system. Second, American newspapers 
were not shy about promoting British territory as well. British land promoters bought 
advertisements in U.S. newspapers just as Americans did, and so American citizens often saw 
articles about the prime settlement opportunities available in Upper and Lower Canada.  
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Within only a few years of independence, promoters of land in the United States, 
particularly land in upstate New York, were touting access to the St. Lawrence River system. It 
was this connection that made settlement there so appealing. This land is not just good land, the 
message went, it is borderland; settlers will not disappear off into the wilderness, they will stay 
connected. In February 1789, the New Haven Gazette and Connecticut Magazine opened one 
issue with a lengthy essay on settlement prospects in the Finger Lakes region of upstate New 
York. This land, a vast tract south of Lake Ontario, had been recently opened to settlement. 
According to the essay, the land around the Genesee River was “incomparably fine…as fertile as 
any on the globe…in no way inferior to the lands upon the river Ohio.” It was, in fact, “much 
better accommodated than any new country opened for settlement between the Allegany 
Mountains and the Mississippi River.” And what made it so well accommodated? The Genesee 
River drained north into Lake Ontario, which led to the St. Lawrence River: “Thus from the 
[territory] is a communication to Niagara, Montreal and Quebec.” The appeal of the settlement 
came from its connection to British North America:5  
 Other advertisements were even more explicit about the shared nature of the borderland. 
The benefit of investing in land along the St. Lawrence, in far northern New York, was not only 
the easy ability to get goods to market, but also the fact that one could draw on prospective 
settlers from both the United States and British North America. They might even compete with 
each other to drive prices up. In a February 1790 issue of the Albany Register, a notice advertised 
the impending sale, at a coffee house in New York City, of ten square miles of land bordering on 
the St. Lawrence River. An attached letter touted the timber on the tract, which could be easily 
conveyed to Montreal or Quebec City, either as building material or firewood. Firewood, the 
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author claimed, “always commands a high price in Montreal.” Perhaps as a way of motivating 
buyers in New York, he then wrote about how appealing the tract would be for Canadian settlers. 
As soon as the sale was made public, he asserted, “you cannot fail of obtaining a good price…its 
vicinity to the old parishes above Montreal will doubtless induce many of the old…farmers to 
provide…for their numerous offspring.” New Yorkers would have to move fast to take 
advantage of land in their own state.6  
 Even when newspapers were not explicitly advertising tracts of land, they tended to 
present a rosy picture of the borderland. A 1791 issue of the United States Chronicle from 
Providence, Rhode Island, contains an extended digression into the merits of Upper Canada. The 
editor reported word that the new capital in Canada would be Kingston, on the St. Lawrence. The 
people settling on the north shore of the river and Lake Ontario, according to the paper, “are an 
industrious hardy race – excellent farmers.” The whole swath of land was ideal for settlers: “the 
climate…is better than that of Quebec, and the rivers and lakes abound with fish, particularly 
trout.” In an ironic juxtaposition, the same page of the newspaper carried a dispatch from another 
potential settlement zone: Kentucky. A brief report detailed the experiences of a party of nine 
who claimed to have been attacked by Shawnee and Delaware Indians while en route from 
Kentucky to Virginia. Volunteer troops had been raised to respond by attacking Indian villages. 
Prospective migrants reading the Chronicle might well think twice about the Ohio country, when 
land with a lovely climate, farms, plenty of fish, and no apparent Indian conflicts was waiting 
just north of New York.7  
 Even when American newspapers appealed to patriotism in describing these new lands, 
they still made sure readers were aware of connections to British North America. One 1793 piece 
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published in Massachusetts added a bit of nationalist flavor to its promotion of New York land. 
At the close of a long “Description of the beautiful Niagara Country,” the author included some 
poetic excitement about the future of the region:  
The progress of settlement is so rapid that you and myself will very probably see the day 
when we can apply these lines to the Genesee country. “Here happy millions their own 
lands possess, No tyrant awes them, nor no lords oppress.”8  
 
Ironically, the author of the piece had earlier mentioned the happy proximity of that tyrant and 
those lords. Writing of trade possibilities for the region, he bragged that the British were just next 
door. “Independent of our own settlements,” he claimed, “we can supply the British in the whole 
of Upper Canada.”9  
 British authorities were well aware of this marketing, and took steps to encourage it. 
They knew communities near the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence, though technically on 
American soil, would actually be a part of the Canadian economic sphere. In 1798 Robert 
Hamilton, a member of Upper Canada’s Legislative Council, laid out the situation in a 
memorandum. The demand for British and Canadian goods, he wrote, would continue to rise as 
American settlements grew along the southern shore of the river and the lakes: “the natural, we 
may indeed say the only outlet for all the produce of these settlements is by the river St. 
Lawrence.” The St. Lawrence could handle the largest rafts of lumber, and on that lumber 
(“which is itself a valuable article”) the Americans could ship their grain, potash, and other 
goods. Shipping via Canadian ports was without question more affordable for these American 
settlers than shipping to any domestic port, as even moving goods to Albany involved an 
expensive land carriage. Therefore the British should be careful not to impose any “Custom 
                                                
8 Federal Spy (Springfield, MA), 12 November 1793. Italics in original.  
9 Ibid.  
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house establishments & restrictions;” that is, they should not do anything that might make 
shipping American goods to American ports more attractive.10  
 While the British were keeping Canadian ports cheap and convenient, they also wanted to 
entice at least some of these settlers into choosing Canadian land. According to the minutes of a 
meeting of the Executive Council of Upper Canada in July of 1799, the council itself composed 
and distributed land ads to American newspapers. The final order of business for the meeting in 
York, Upper Canada, on July 3, 1799, was an order to print and distribute the following message 
to newspapers in New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania:  
Notice is hereby given that the Townships of Dereham and Norwich in the Western 
District of this Province will be sold in blocks of 4000 acres each in the month of ___ 
next. Further particulars will in due time be published...11 
 
Clearly, the men of the Executive Council were not discriminating. Not only were they willing to 
accept American immigrants, they were actively soliciting them.  
It became official policy in post-revolutionary British North America, especially in 
Lower Canada and further east, to make migration north as easy and appealing as possible.12 
Several acts effectively made the border invisible. British Authorities laid the groundwork in 
1790 with an act allowing any person from “territories or countries belonging to the United 
States of America” to move to “any of the territories belonging to his Majesty in North 
America.” Each migrant, including children, would be allowed to transport up to fifty pounds 
worth of property over the border duty free. The head of each family would need to obtain 
official approval of the move, and transport the goods in British ships if travelling by water; each 
                                                
10 Memorandum on Trade and Commerce, 24 September 1798, in The Correspondence of the Honourable Peter 
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11 Minutes of the Executive Council, 3 July 1799, Correspondence of Peter Russell, 258-259.  
12 Marcus Hansen goes into this briefly in The Mingling of the Canadian and American Peoples (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1940), 69-78.  
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family member above the age of fourteen was required to give an oath of allegiance as well. 
These requirements must have been somewhat burdensome, but the act did eliminate what had 
been a major hurdle for emigrants. In terms of transporting property, migration to Canada or the 
Atlantic Provinces was now very similar to domestic migration.13  
In 1792 authorities in the Canadas added more incentive for American emigrants by 
opening up the “waste lands” of the crown to settlement. These actions were a bit more limited. 
Unlike the 1790 act, they did not affect all of the Crown’s lands in North America, only the 
Provinces of Upper and Lower Canada (Ontario and Quebec). The Lieutenant Governors of 
those provinces issued simultaneous and nearly identical proclamations in 1792. Crown lands in 
the provinces were to be granted in whole townships, measuring ten miles square. There was no 
mention of British subjecthood or American citizenship. Any petitioner for lands would simply 
have to take “the usual Oaths,” and make one additional declaration, which was printed in the 
text: “I do promise and declare that I will maintain and defend to the utmost of my Power the 
Authority of the King in His Parliament as the supreme Legislature of this Province.”14 This was 
an open invitation to anyone, citizen or subject, who had the means to organize the settlement of 
a township. One man or a group could apply, and then they would be responsible for finding 
settlers in exchange for personal control over a large percentage of the land grant. 
                                                
13 The Statutes of the Province of Upper Canada (Kingston, Upper Canada: Francis M. Hill, 1831), 12. The act 
seems to anticipate that the only people of color who might cross the border would be enslaved – a strange 
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14 A Proclamation to such as are desirous to settle on the Lands of the Crown in the Province of Lower Canada, A 
Proclamation to such as are desirous to settle on the Lands of the Crown in the Province of Upper Canada, 7 





This development resulted in a great deal of excitement in New England and the broader 
northeast. The proclamations seem to have created two kinds of interest in the north, which 
combined into a small-scale land rush. In the first place, men of means and entrepreneurs – like 
John Jacob Astor – saw a very appealing opportunity. Amid the land investments of the time 
period this one was particularly promising, because of the proximity of the St. Lawrence and 
connections to British trade. These townships were not off in some far-off place like Kentucky or 
Ohio. The ones in Lower Canada were even closer to Atlantic trade than upstate New York. As 
these men petitioned for township grants, they then filled American newspapers with calls for 
settlers, stimulating the other half of the land rush. The various ads in combination created an 
image of the Canadas as a nearby place where the land was free and the opportunities plentiful.  
Aspiring proprietors were everywhere in New England newspapers, competing with each 
other for prospective migrants. There were no appeals to any lingering loyalist sentiments. The 
keyword in crown lands was not “crown” but “lands.” One advertisement, which ran in 1794 in 
several Vermont papers, failed to mention a potential change of political affiliation at all. “There 
is a good opportunity,” according to the ad, “for any Male Persons, above the age of fourteen, to 
become proprietors for two hundred acres of Land in…Lower Canada.” There was no better land 
anywhere in Upper or Lower Canada, the ad promised. It was the “most valuable tract of 
unlocated Land” available. All that was needed was a certificate from a Justice of the Peace, 
testifying to the applicant’s honesty and industry, for the land to be granted. “All those persons 
who wish for a chance” could apply immediately.15   
 A Massachusetts ad, which ran for weeks in 1793 in both Springfield and Stockbridge 
papers, made emigration sound simple. Seth Russell of Northampton wrote that he had been to 
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Canada, and that the Governor had assured him “each person who becomes a settler, will be 
entitled to two hundred acres of land, which is recommended by good judges to be equal to any 
in America.” Time was of the essence, however, as the ads were running in May, and Russell 
would be accompanying any would-be settlers in August.16 “Attention!” cried another ad, 
published a year later. “The names of forty well recommended settlers” had to be forwarded to 
Canada, “that they may be conveyed on to Quebec [City] immediately.” Anyone ready to take an 
oath and go directly to the lands needed to work fast, because by “the first day of August next 
said lands will be forfeited.”17  
 These appeals worked. New Englanders looking for opportunity headed for the border. 
Many appear to have been responding more to the atmosphere created by the advertisements as a 
whole than to any one ad in particular. A close look at one busy Quebec border crossing provides 
a glimpse of this movement. The lakeside village of Philipsburg is just over the border from 
Vermont, on Missisquoi Bay, the northeasternmost spot on Lake Champlain. Today, as two 
centuries ago, it is part of the larger municipality of Saint Armand, which was originally the 
seigneury of Saint Armand. Apparently this was a common disembarkation spot for travellers on 
the lake, both those who wished to settle nearby and those continuing north by land to Montreal. 
A partial document has survived which records activity on the border: a Book of Declaration of 
Aliens for the period of September 1794 to June 1795.18 
 This book appears to have served as something of a border-crossing registry, though not 
all the names listed signed at the moment of crossing. Some did, but others noted that they had 
been living in the area for months, or even years, before they showed up to record their names 
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18 Book of Declaration of Aliens, MC30 C100, George Montgomery Fonds, Library and Archives Canada (hereafter 
LAC), Ottawa, Ontario.  
 
 80 
and their business in the province. Everyone who signed, however, was an American travelling 
north, either temporarily or permanently. There are fifty-nine entries in the book over the ten-
month period, but many entries include multiple names, so the number of people listed runs to 
over a hundred. They came from all over the northeast. Most were from Vermont, but there were 
at least three from New Hampshire, seven from Massachusetts, and a few from Connecticut and 
New York. Some of the travellers were headed to Montreal to do business, like Andrew Auringer 
and Ira Peck, both twenty-three years old, from Saratoga, New York. They stated in May 1795 
that they were hoping to purchase a span of horses in Montreal. At least ten other men on the list 
were also crossing to buy horses. There were no other big purchases listed besides horses, though 
a few people noted that they were just “visiting,” or “visiting relations.”19  
 The most common reason the Americans gave for their presence was settlement. In some 
cases they had already settled in Saint Armand at some point in the recent past, and in other 
cases they noted that they were hoping to secure land and settle. Over half the entries explicitly 
list settlement as the reason for entry, and another ten do not list a reason. Some of them must 
have been settlers too. Ebenezer Rogers’s entry was typical:  
I Ebenezer Rogers do hereby declare that I am a native of America in the town of 
Shaftsbury in the County of Bennington State of Vermont my age is thirty four years and 
my trade or occupation is that of a house carpenter, that for these six months last passed I 
have resided in the signory of Saint Armand and came into this Province of Lower 
Canada by water by way of Lake Champlain on the 5th day of May 1793, as witness my 
hand at Missiskoui (Missisquoi) Bay this 22nd Day of September 1794.20 
 
Several Americans noted, like Rogers, that they had been in Lower Canada for a little while. 
John Moor of New Hampshire had been resident in the province for a period of months. Isaac 
and Joshua Gibbs had been there for a couple of years, since 1792. Other signed the book close 





to their day of arrival. Epharaim Story, a twenty-eight year old shoemaker from central Vermont, 
arrived on January 14th, 1795, and signed on the 15th. He wished “to purchase land [and] if 
permitted to become an inhabitant of this province.” James Marnier of Kittery, Maine declared 
an intent to settle too “if approved of.” Benjamin Cummings and Alexander and Isaac Magoon 
arrived from Massachusetts as a trio with the hope of purchasing land. No entry in the 
Philipsburg book included any language dealing with British subjecthood or loyalty to the crown. 
Besides the implication that settlers sometimes needed permission or approval, politics appears 
to have played little role in the migration.21  
 The proximity of land opportunities in Lower Canada must have been very appealing for 
New Englanders in the 1790s. Getting to Saint Armand meant a journey of only a few hundred 
miles from Massachusetts, and fully one hundred of those miles could be covered by boat on 
Lake Champlain. Other options were much more distant. Another ad published for weeks in 
various Massachusetts newspapers in 1795 promoted the Ohio country, which was twice as far 
away. Moreover, land opportunities there sound poor in comparison with Canada. “All males 
eighteen years old and upward” who chose to remove to the Ohio Company’s land, “would be 
entitled to one hundred acres” once the land was surveyed.22 This was a stark difference. A 
young man could travel six hundred miles for one hundred acres of Ohio land, or half that 
distance for twice as much Canadian land.  
Putting acreage aside, however, the importance of the city of Montreal to this equation 
cannot be overstated. Acreage, price, and quality of land were certainly very important to 
settlers. But none of those mattered as much as access to a market. Land opportunities in Lower 
Canada in particular promised not just a connection to British trade in general, but close 
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proximity to a major city. There were no major cities anywhere near Kentucky or the Ohio 
country. Montreal, on the other hand, was one of the most important cities in North America. Its 
population in the 1790s was around eighteen thousand people, which made it approximately the 
same size as Boston. Of Atlantic ports, only New York and Philadelphia were bigger.23 And 
there were no new land opportunities opening up in close proximity to those American cities. 
Furthermore, the aftermath of war had enhanced the city’s position. The movement of loyalist 
refugees provided a boost to the entire British zone, creating boomtowns both upstream and 
downstream from Montreal.  
 Americans had always been bullish about Montreal. Continental forces actually managed 
to seize the city in 1775, during the revolution, but were forced to relinquish it after losing the 
battle for Quebec. Later, during the War of 1812, the U.S. made several more attempts to take 
the city, all of which failed. In an early nineteenth century travel narrative, Benjamin Silliman of 
Connecticut was effusive about Montreal. It was, he wrote, “The point which connects the ocean, 
and of course, Europe, and the rest of the world” with the vast interior of the North American 
continent.  
There are few cities in the world, especially of the magnitude and importance of 
Montreal, which situated more than 580 miles from the ocean, can enjoy the benefit of a 
direct ship communication with it. Montreal is evidently one of the three great channels 
by which the trade of North America will be principally carried on. It is obvious that New 
York and New Orleans are the other two places.  
 
Silliman noted that travel was easy between the US and Canada. He took a steamboat the length 
of Lake Champlain, and crossing the border barely registered. His baggage was not even 
examined. Trade on the St. Lawrence impressed him greatly, and he noted that “a good deal” of 
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the lumber came from Vermont, while the peaches he enjoyed at dinner came from the Genesee 
country of New York. The borderland was still booming two decades into the nineteenth century, 
with Montreal its metropolis.24  
 Newspaper ads throughout the period promoted lands by touting Montreal and the 
Montreal market. In February of 1800, the Vergennes Gazette in Vermont carried an ad for land 
just over the northern border. There were lots in two different regions, one east of Montreal and 
one west. The township of Farnham was only “20 miles east of St. Johns,” where the Richelieu 
River flowed north to Montreal. The latter city was only another twenty miles away as the crow 
flies, and roads were “opening from the premises” to “the Montreal market.” Meanwhile, over 
six thousand acres were for sale in what is today Ontario, “60 miles west of Montreal, from 
whence there is water communication to the premises.”25 No matter whether one was upstream 
or downstream of Montreal, the connections to an urban market and to larger Atlantic trade 
networks were unparalleled.  
 Movement over the border and into the connected frontier became such a phenomenon, 
that it even drew the one category of settlers that would seem least likely to leave – American 
combat veterans. This seems counterintuitive. The war had been over for barely a decade, and it 
was long and bloody. Independence was hard won, and many of the emigrant families were 
prominent, active citizens in their respective states. Why would they wish to return to the British 
Empire a mere decade after leaving it? Their decision makes more sense if we see Lower Canada 
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Haven: S. Converse, 1824), 337, 363.  
25 Vergennes Gazette, 6 February 1800.   
 
 84 
the way they saw it: as a shared borderland. No one knew where the permanent boundaries 
would ultimately be drawn. The borderland was close by, safe, affordable, and connected.26  
 Its proximity meant that, unlike most other options for relocation, the borderland could be 
easily scouted. This had been the case for decades; as detailed in chapter one, it had been a factor 
in driving migration to Nova Scotia in the 1760s. A prospective migrant could go, look at the 
land, make inquiries, and return, all in a few weeks. Attempting to scout a similar relocation to 
Kentucky or Ohio would involve a much more time consuming and dangerous journey. The 
west, moreover, was plagued with Indian conflicts, as New England newspaper readers were 
constantly reminded. According to the Salem Mercury in 1789, Indians were “daily committing 
depredations in Kentucky.” A few weeks later, the Essex Journal described “constant hostilities” 
between Indians and settlers in the Ohio country. In 1792, the Salem Gazette claimed an army of 
nearly five thousand Indians was assembling in the Ohio country, ready and “waiting for the 
Americans to pay them another visit.” The stories were not simply sensationalism. These were 
years of open warfare in the Ohio country, with the Western Indian Confederacy decisively 
defeating U.S. forces twice from 1790 to 1791, and U.S. turning the tables three years later 
during the Battle of Fallen Timbers. In the northeast, conflict like this was a thing of the past. 
New Englanders knew there was virtually no chance of trouble with Indians in Lower Canada.27  
Price was also important. As noted above, American newspaper readers were frequently 
reminded that they could get two hundred acres of free land in Canada. And British authorities 
did attempt to ensure that emigrants received their free allotment. Hugh Finley, a member of the 
Legislative Council of Lower Canada, warned in 1796 that certain unscrupulous proprietors in 
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Vermont were attempting to extract fees from potential grantees. These people were arriving in 
British territory believing they had purchased land rights, but this was unacceptable: “the 200 
acres is to be a gift…without the expense of a single farthing to the grantee.” Emigrants wishing 
for more than two hundred acres could also be accommodated. In 1794, John Ruiters was able to 
arrange the purchase of six hundred and thirty seven acres in Lower Canada for around thirty-
eight British pounds. This was the equivalent of less than two hundred American dollars. At 
around the same time, one emigrant heading north, Peaslee Badger, sold his farm in New 
Hampshire for over four thousand dollars. No wonder that for many families in increasingly 
overcrowded New England, even Revolutionary War veterans, Lower Canada began to seem like 
“the best part of the world.”28 
 The story of the Badger family of New Hampshire provides a good illustration of the 
relative ease of relocation to Lower Canada. The family lived in Gilmanton, a small community 
in central New Hampshire about twenty miles north of Concord. They had deep New England 
roots: the Badgers arrived in Massachusetts in 1643. During the war for independence Peaslee 
Badger served as a major in the Continental Army, and his father Joseph was even more 
prominent. He was appointed Brigadier General in 1780, and was also a member of the New 
Hampshire Provincial Congress and the state Constitutional Convention. The whole Badger clan 
seem to have been devoted patriots.29  
 And yet by 1801, patriot or not, Peaslee Badger decided his sons required more land than 
southern New Hampshire could provide. Hearing good reports of opportunities in the north, 
Major Badger made the hundred and fifty mile trip to the head of the Connecticut River. 
Impressed, he returned, sold his land in New Hampshire, and purchased eight hundred acres near 
                                                
28 Hugh Finley to John Ruiter, 24 Feb. 1796, MC30 C100, George Montgomery Fonds, LAC; E.G. Holland, 
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Compton, Quebec. The relatively short journey was a great advantage for the family. Quebec 
was close enough for Major Badger to make several trips before the family even began to pack. 
Badger’s eldest son and several hired men stayed behind to begin clearing land after the second 
trip, and the whole family did not head north until trip number four. With eight sleighs “laden 
with provisions and furniture,” the entire clan made the journey in nineteen days. They likely 
traveled up the frozen Connecticut River, which took them within thirty miles of their final 
destination.30   
 Philemon Wright of Woburn, Massachusetts chose Lower Canada as well, although he 
and his family moved further away. Wright’s party settled the town of Hull, directly across the 
Ottawa River from what is today the capital city of Canada. Though the settlement was further to 
the northwest, the appeal was basically the same. The Ottawa River is one of the largest 
tributaries of the St. Lawrence, meeting it just above the city of Montreal. Pioneer settlements 
depended on getting lumber to market, and Hull was very well positioned for this. The Ottawa 
River was also important in the fur trade, as it was the primary route between Montreal and Lake 
Huron. This was a frontier, but it was not far removed from civilization. Settlers would be well 
connected to the British Atlantic world.   
 Wright, like Peaslee Badger, was a Continental Army veteran. He joined the 
revolutionary cause as a teenager and fought in the Battle of Bunker Hill. Twenty years later, 
however, he too was looking to relocate. And again, like Badger, Philemon Wright was able to 
make multiple trips north; he traveled to Montreal to investigate possible lands every year from 
1796-1798, before finally settling on the area that became Hull. First Wright attempted to 
purchase the land from a Vermont speculator, only to find that the man was selling a revoked 
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grant. Undaunted, Wright simply petitioned the Canadians for the same land himself. This grant 
was confirmed, and in the winter of 1800 Wright led a party of sixty-three northward from 
Massachusetts. They reached their settlement in March. Within a few years, Wright was sending 
multiple rafts of timber downriver each year, into the export trade from Montreal.31  
 
For the most part, Canadian authorities seem to have been perfectly content to provide 
land to American veterans. The one time they objected was when it was Native Americans, 
rather than the Canadian government, attempting to make the sale. In the mid-1790s, Joseph 
Brant – also known as Thayendanegea, a leader of the Mohawk – began to operate as a 
borderland entrepreneur by selling land to Americans. Brant found himself in charge of a very 
large land grant in Upper Canada after the war and decided to get in on the marketing action. Just 
like the American veterans, Brant took advantage of the fact that political identity was flexible in 
the post-war borderland. Brant had taken up arms for the King, and had fought against the very 
people to whom he was now selling land. He recognized, however, that he could use his mobility 
within the borderland to enrich himself.32   
The Mohawk supported the crown in the American Revolution. The British 
commissioned Brant as a captain, and he and his men fought alongside white loyalists in 
engagements in what would become upstate New York and northern Pennsylvania. At the end of 
the war, Governor of Quebec Frederick Haldimand granted a large tract of land to the loyalist 
Mohawks, “in consideration of the early attachment to [the King’s] cause…and of the loss of 
their settlement [in the US].” The grant was quite generous. Haldimand purchased from other 
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native groups and gave to the Mohawk basically the entire Grand River in what is today southern 
Ontario. The Grand River is one hundred and seventy miles long, and has the largest watershed 
in southern Ontario. Haldimand granted the whole valley to the Mohawk: six miles on each side 
of the entire river, all the way to Lake Erie.33  
 Governor Haldimand may not have realized exactly how generous he was being, but 
within a decade his act had put the Mohawk, and Brant in particular, in an enviable position. As 
noted above, lands along the Great Lakes and the St. Lawrence were in high demand. American 
newspapers regularly touted opportunities in the borderland, and Americans were responding by 
moving north. Brant and the Mohawks were sitting on hundreds of thousands of acres on a river 
that flowed straight into Lake Erie.  
 By 1796, Brant was beginning to sell pieces of the Grand River grant and British 
authorities were concerned. In a letter to the Lieutenant Governor, the acting administrator of 
Upper Canada, Peter Russell, laid out the issue. He did not know exactly what to do. Captain 
Brant was demanding deeds for people to whom he had sold “considerable” tracts of land. These 
were not British subjects but American citizens, and Russell understood some to be veterans of 
the American army. In the first place, Russell wrote, his understanding was that the King had 
instructed that no grant to any individual exceed 1200 acres. Apparently, some of Brant’s sales 
exceeded that figure. But further, these people were Americans, who “may throw open a wide 
door by the mouth of [the Grand River] to the introduction of their countrymen.” Russell also 
noted that he had very little power to do anything about this uncomfortable situation. He could 
                                                




“evade signing the deeds,” but if Brant just settled these people on the land anyway, Russell 
could do nothing to stop it.34  
 Brant, in response to the controversy, asserted that the plan all along had been to “make 
the most of part of that tract…by leasing or otherwise disposing of it in such way as to be able to 
raise a certain sure revenue.” What else, he asked, would the government of Upper Canada have 
him and the Mohawk do? What were the white “great men” planning on doing with their 
landholdings? It was ridiculous to be gifted a large swath of land and then later informed “you 
are not to make use of what I have now given you.” Besides, he pointed out, not only were 
Americans frequently moving across the border, Upper and Lower Canada had granted whole 
townships to Americans, including American veterans. Brant pointed to Major Thomas Ingersoll 
as an example; Ingersoll was a Patriot veteran from Massachusetts who had recently been 
granted land in Queenstown, Upper Canada.35 
 Brant attempted to walk a fine line in his dealings with Canadian authorities. He took 
pains to claim continued allegiance to the British crown, while also occasionally insinuating that 
he could receive a better land deal by crossing the border himself. These were not empty threats. 
Even though the Mohawk and many of their fellow Iroquois fought for the crown during the war, 
the Americans were openly courting their return and resettlement in what was now New York 
State. The reasoning, as laid out by General Schuyler of New York in a message to the U.S. 
Congress, was that if the Iroquois all moved north to Canada “they will add strength to those 
people,” and might easily be enlisted to fight the Americans again in the future. In New York, by 
contrast, they would slowly be swamped by thousands of white settlers moving into the region, 
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which would neutralize them as a future threat. It was clear that the Mohawk and other Iroquois 
would be settled in the borderland. Why not try and keep them on the American side of it?36  
Even though the British dominated the borderland economically, they could not afford to 
lose thousands of Iroquois allies to New York State. Brant knew this, and used it to open space 
for his borderland entrepreneurship. As he defended his land transactions, Brant claimed the 
Mohawk were “the same people in principle that we were during the American War…firm in our 
attachment to our Great Father, the King of England.” He swore that his people would “never 
think of returning to that country [New York].” But he made sure to mention that three years 
earlier he had refused an American offer of eleven thousand acres of land in exchange for a 
change of allegiance. This land, he claimed, had since quadrupled in value. If British authorities 
denied the Mohawk the freedom to control their grant, Brant warned, it would “leave a wound 
not easily healed.” Immediately after this veiled threat Brant traveled to Philadelphia, then the 
U.S. capital. There he continued his diplomatic maneuvering, taking his complaints straight to 
the British envoy, Robert Liston. According to a letter from Liston, not only did Brant make 
“earnest complaints” to him in an official capacity, he frequently and loudly denounced the 
authorities in Canada to the other guests at his inn, and threatened to ally his Mohawks with the 
French to “overturn the British government.” Liston wrote that though he was uncomfortable 
interfering in Canadian affairs, Brant was “so determined, so able, and so artful,” that Liston felt 
obliged to mollify him by sending his complaints to the King’s ministers.37  
Brant recognized that the political distinction between “patriot” and “loyalist” had lost its 
meaning. In this postwar era borders and identity were negotiable, and he could move between 
                                                
36 Taylor, Divided Ground, 118.  
37 Speech of Brant, Correspondence of Peter Russell, 94, 95, 97; Robert Liston to David Shank, 28 March 1797, 
Correspondence of Peter Russell, 157; Robert Liston to Robert Prescott, 8 April 1797, Correspondence of Peter 
Russell, 160.  
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many actors – British authorities in Canada, the British envoy in Philadelphia, the New York 
government, and the U.S. government – to create the best opportunity for himself. Though he 
might use his wartime loyalty in negotiations with the government in Canada, he was equally 
prepared to criticize the Canadians to the British envoy and anyone else who would listen in the 
U.S. capital. Brant also knew what he was doing in using a promised grant of New York land as 
a bargaining chip. British authorities were well aware that the New York side of the borderland 
was increasing in value, because they were the ones ensuring that appreciation by keeping trade 
through the St. Lawrence affordable. They were also soliciting American settlers for Upper 
Canada themselves, while simultaneously confronting Brant for doing the same. In a way, the 
governments of Upper and Lower Canada were borderland entrepreneurs no less than Joseph 
Brant.  
 Another of these entrepreneurs was John Jacob Astor. Just as Brant was nominally 
British, Astor was nominally American. In reality, however, like Brant, Astor made himself a 
citizen of the borderland. Astor arrived in New York City as a young man of twenty in 1784. 
Though originally from Germany he had been living in London, and his initial plan was to sell 
musical instruments. His brother George Astor had already established a musical instrument 
business in London, and John intended to be the American agent for that firm. He soon expanded 
his horizons. Astor had some exposure to the fur trade while in London, and apparently became 
friendly with a German-American fur merchant while sailing to the states. This, he decided, was 
a growth industry. He would need to develop connections in the backcountry as soon as 
possible.38 
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It did not take Astor long to create something of a fur trading empire in the borderland. 
Immediately upon arrival in New York he began to use money from his musical instrument 
business to purchase furs around the city and ship them to London. Soon he realized that to be a 
player in the industry he would have to have a presence in Montreal, so he chose to split his time 
between the states and Lower Canada. Within three years of Astor’s arrival he had established an 
annual routine. Each summer he would make the journey from New York City to Montreal, 
stopping in Albany and Fort Schuyler (now Utica) to check in on business associates and 
potentially make purchases. In Montreal he would arrange more purchases, storing some furs in a 
rented warehouse and arranging shipment for the rest. Then in the fall he would head back south, 
stopping again around Albany before returning to New York City.39  
Technically, British trading restrictions should have prevented Astor from combining all 
of his fur dealings into one transnational enterprise. It was illegal to ship furs directly from 
Montreal to New York City. His New York sales should have been limited to his Albany furs, 
while his Montreal furs were distributed through British shipping. In those years, however, it was 
easy to bend the rules to be a borderland entrepreneur. Astor began simultaneously operating 
through legal and illegal channels. He would ship a portion of his Montreal furs to London, 
where some were sold and others reshipped to New York. Then he would move the rest of the 
furs over the border, either by sending them as packages to contacts just over the line in New 
York, or simply carrying them himself. There was little danger of being caught, as there was 
practically no enforcement at the land border.40 This system worked well until the Jay Treaty of 
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1794 removed the trade restrictions, at which point Astor could openly ship his furs wherever he 
wanted.  
While Astor was creating his borderland fur empire, he was simultaneously creating a 
borderland real estate empire. Again, he conducted this business on both sides of the border 
simultaneously. Whether the land was in New York or Lower Canada did not matter – what 
mattered was that it was borderland, and likely to appreciate in value. Just as was the case with 
the furs, Astor began in New York City and quickly expanded north. Beginning in the late 1780s, 
he began to purchase parcels of land in lower Manhattan. Then in 1792, as he was in the midst of 
those investments, the crown lands proclamations were made in the Canadas. Astor worked fast. 
In September of that year, on his annual trip to Montreal, he filed separate petitions for two 
potential townships in Lower Canada. The townships he wanted were near the Chaudiere River, 
just south of Quebec City. Though the committee approved his applications, and it appears he 
was granted rights to at least one of the townships, Astor decided to walk away from the grant. It 
is possible that he or a representative visited the tract and decided it was not promising.41  
 Even if he was disillusioned with that particular tract, Astor continued to pursue 
Canadian land. In 1795 he and two other men signed an agreement with Hugh Finley, the 
chairman of the land committee in Lower Canada. Under this agreement, Astor would provide 
funds, the other two men would do the legwork, and Finley would shepherd their claims through 
the committee. The foursome had designs on as many as six townships, and Astor was willing to 
supply as much as £2400 to support the project. He was particularly interested in Stanbridge, a 
township just north of the Vermont border near Montreal. The deal fell apart, however, at least in 
part due to concern in Canada that Finley was inappropriately profiting from his role as 
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chairman.42 Astor’s third attempt at Canadian land finally proved successful. In 1801, he 
collected over a thousand acres just north of Sherbrooke, Quebec, as repayment on a debt. 
William and James Barnard, the latter a hatter in Montreal, owed Astor £477. William had title 
to the thousand acres, so the parties agreed to a trade. Astor sold the acreage a year or so later to 
his brother, George, for a tidy profit.43  
Throughout this whole saga, as Astor was buying up plots in New York City and 
maneuvering for whole townships in Lower Canada, he was also pursuing land in the northern 
part of New York. The most important of these deals in the U.S. side of the borderland was in 
1794, when Astor invested in thousands of acres in the Mohawk Valley. Astor held on to his 
Mohawk Valley lands for decades, through a great deal of upheaval and political battles over 
titles and squatters. This was not his only venture in upstate New York either – during the 1790s 
he gained control of an additional 22,000 acres in various parts of the region in a handful of 
different transactions, most frequently in the same kind of debt-land transaction that he managed 
in Canada in 1801. Astor saw the borderland as one enormous zone, filled with land investment 
possibilities. Both British subjects and American citizens owed him money, and so he could 
collect in both British and American land. There was opportunity everywhere.44  
 Even though John Jacob Astor’s interest in Canadian land faded after the turn of the 
nineteenth century, he still remained very much a borderland citizen. He maintained his contacts 
in Montreal, and the Astor family was a part of the social scene there, just as they were in New 
York. In an 1806 journal, a young man named Samuel Bridge recounts attending several dinner 
parties and dances around Montreal with Mr. and Mrs. Astor and their daughter Magdalena. 
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Magdalena was eighteen, and the Astors may have been hoping to find her a husband among the 
wealthy families of Lower Canada.45 A few years later, on the eve of the War of 1812, Astor 
negotiated a partnership that merged his American Fur Company with the Montreal-
Michilimackinac Company, creating a transnational “South West Company” with headquarters 
in both New York City and Montreal.46 Three decades after his arrival in North America, John 
Jacob Astor was still moving back and forth between the two great cities, taking advantage of the 
opportunities provided by the open borderland.  
  The Allen brothers were Vermont’s most famous founders, and also its most prominent 
borderland entrepreneurs.47 Recognizing the same opportunity enjoyed by Brant and Astor, the 
Allens managed to position themselves as a transnational family. Ethan Allen, the eldest, was the 
leader of the Green Mountain Boys, a Revolutionary War-era militia. Ira Allen, the youngest, 
was Vermont’s first Treasurer and Surveyor General. Levi Allen, a middle sibling, was heavily 
involved in land speculation in several places prior to the revolution, before ultimately 
concentrating his efforts on the Lake Champlain valley and Quebec. Unlike his brothers, Levi 
chose the British side in the war, though afterward he settled just a few miles over the 
Vermont/Quebec border and continued working closely with Ira. The plan was to send cattle, 
grain, potash, and especially lumber north from Vermont to Montreal, via Levi’s trading post at 
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St. John sur Richelieu in Quebec. Then they could purchase manufactured goods for Vermont in 
Canada. The Allen brothers had some success, but could not get the British to agree to permanent 
free trade, and were dependent on water levels on the Richelieu for the transport of Vermont 
lumber each spring. Ira Allen soon began pushing for a canal to address the water level problem, 
a quest that would stretch for years and eventually lead to a good deal of international intrigue.48 
 The Allens began to amass land holdings as early as 1774, before the war and the 
borderland boom. Most importantly, they managed to secure the rights to several large tracts of 
land bordering Lake Champlain in what is today northwestern Vermont. Most of these lands 
bordered on one of two rivers: the Missisquoi, which runs through both Quebec and Vermont 
before emptying into the lake near St. Albans, and the Onion (today the Winooski River) which 
enters the lake near Burlington. Levi alone controlled as many as fifty deeds in what became St. 
Albans, Vermont. Ira was more involved with the Onion River lands, and set up the Onion River 
Land Company to promote them. He would eventually donate land to found the University of 
Vermont in Burlington, in the hope of increasing the value of his holdings.49  
 The Allens first began promoting their Vermont lands in the years before the revolution. 
At that time, they did not yet use proximity to Montreal as a selling point. The first 
advertisements were brief, and focused almost entirely on the quality of the land. In a January 
1775 ad in the Hartford Courant, Levi Allen noted the “rich soil, pure healthy air, free from 
stones” and the lake and streams “abounding with…good fish.” A number of farmers were 
already on the land, he claimed, and more would be arriving in the spring. Anyone willing to 
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relocate to the north could have “500 acres or more at a very moderate lay.” The brothers were 
working together to sell these lands, and according to the ad any interested parties could contact 
Levi, in Connecticut, or Ira, on the land itself.50  
 By the mid-1780s, the Allens knew that their main selling point was proximity to the 
British. In an ironic twist, the war and resulting division of the north country made their land 
more, not less, attractive. Geopolitics had delivered the Allens into a unique position. Vermont 
was within the bounds of the United States, according to the terms of the treaty ending the war. 
But it was not yet technically a state. For years Vermont deeds had been hotly contested – some 
settlers, like the Allens, had grants from the former Governor of New Hampshire, but others had 
grants from New York. The government in Albany insisted that their grants invalidated any other 
ones, and that Vermont was rightly a part of New York. Until 1790, they blocked all attempts to 
join Vermont to the union. This allowed the Allens and other Vermont leaders to essentially act 
as an independent entity, striking whatever deals they wished with their neighbors in Lower 
Canada.  
 So even more than most northeasterners in the early republic years, the Allens could be 
explicit about their position as de facto British North Americans. A 1787 ad, from the Vermont 
Gazette in Bennington, is noticeably different from the pre-Revolution ads. The first few 
paragraphs are similar, touting the land’s affordability, the variety of trees present in the Onion 
River valley, and the soil’s great productivity in producing corn and tobacco. Then Ira Allen and 
his partners get to the primary selling point. The land is “situate on the east side of Lake 
Champlain, about seventy miles south of St. John’s [Lower Canada]…there is sufficiency of 
water to carry down all kinds of [goods]…from Onion River to Chamblee, from whence vessels 
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sail to Europe, &c.” The situation in northwest Vermont had “obvious advantages” compared to 
anything a settler might find in Western Pennsylvania, Ohio, or Kentucky. “A free trade to and 
through the province of Quebec, together with the goodness of the soil…seems to point out 
Onion River…as a place of future grandeur.”51  
 At least one Canadian proprietor decided to try and outflank Allen and the Onion River 
Company and poach some of the same settlers. The proposal was simple: why choose 
northwestern Vermont for proximity to Montreal, when you could be even more connected a 
little further north? In 1789, Leonard Chester took out several ads in New England papers 
(including Ira Allen’s favored paper, the Vermont Gazette), offering farms of more than a 
hundred and twenty acres only four miles from the St. Lawrence River itself. The land, he 
claimed, was “superior to any in Vermont, and [concerning] trade, superior to any in America.” 
Not even the “highly applauded and really excellent Onion River land” was better. Chester even 
claimed that fifteen former Onion River settlers had already abandoned Vermont for his tract. 
Mills and schools would soon be established, and more roads cut. Furthermore, he noted, the 
land was located between Quebec City and Montreal, so the St. Lawrence would provide access 
to markets in both cities.52 
 In 1791 Vermont finally joined the U.S. as the fourteenth state. Nevertheless, Ira Allen 
kept proximity to Canada as part of his sales pitch. A Vermont Gazette ad of 1793 mentions over 
a hundred thousand available acres of land, not only along the Onion River but also near Lake 
Memphremagog further east (Lake Memphremagog, like Lake Champlain, spans the border 
between Vermont and Quebec). If Lower Canada could offer mills, then so could Vermont; in 
fact, Allen claimed that mills had already been erected. A forge was promised, in addition to 
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another sawmill and gristmill. And if the Canadians could offer schools, well, Vermont could 
provide a university. One had already been established at Burlington, and Allen promised a city 
there, with work for “mechanics of every denomination.” Finally, the lake provided “water 
communication to…Quebec,” thereby connecting settlers to the St. Lawrence and the Atlantic.53 
Northern Vermont was the perfect option for families looking for borderland opportunities. It 
provided cheap land, all the amenities settlers required, and excellent connections to the British 
Atlantic world.  
   
 The borderland shared by the District of Maine and the Province of New Brunswick was 
similar, but not identical, to its counterpart in New York, Vermont, and the Canadas. New 
Brunswick land was not advertised to New Englanders as extensively as was land in Upper or 
Lower Canada. This was because that land was distributed in a different way. In this early 
period, decades before confederation and the birth of the federal government of Canada, the 
provinces of British North America were separately governed. The proclamations of 1792 that 
opened crown lands to settlement in Upper and Lower Canada, creating a rush of proprietors and 
speculators, did not apply to New Brunswick. Investors did not engage in a frenzy of competing 
solicitations, to try and lure Americans to their proposed townships. Migration over the New 
Brunswick border was more gradual, and less organized.  
 That movement did take place, however, and it took place because the official attitude 
toward the borderland was the same in the Maritime Provinces as it was in the Canadas. British 
authorities wanted settlers. The border was open, and land was available. Though there were few 
explicit calls for settlers in the newspapers of the 1790s, New Englanders had been aware of 
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northeastern opportunities for a long time. As noted in chapter one, by the 1750s reports of these 
opportunities were circulating in New England. Families in Eastern Massachusetts, Rhode 
Island, Connecticut, and the District of Maine knew of friends and neighbors who had relocated 
to the Annapolis Valley in Nova Scotia, or the Saint John River in New Brunswick. And if 
migration to Lower Canada was comparatively easy, migration to the Maritimes was even easier. 
Practically no overland travel was necessary. A few days sail across the Gulf of Maine was all it 
took.  
 The pressing question of the postwar years was political. New Brunswick had originally 
been the northern section of Nova Scotia. It was set off as a separate province in 1784 because of 
the large number of loyalist refugees who settled there. By the mid 1780s, there were substantial 
loyalist settlements all around the eastern side of Passamaquoddy Bay and throughout the Saint 
John Valley. Would British authorities keep the border open and continue to welcome migrants, 
even if those migrants had never been counted as loyalists?  
 It was soon obvious that the answer was yes. Within a year of the end of the war a group 
of New Englanders, the Cape Ann Association, attempted to organize a settlement on 
Passamaquoddy Bay in what would soon be designated New Brunswick. The Cape Ann settlers 
had not served in the British Army, nor had they suffered banishment or relocation during the 
war. It is possible that some in the association had loyalist leanings. Many of the settlers came 
from the town of New Boston, New Hampshire, which had a loyalist reputation. The most 
prominent members of the town, though, the ones known for their loyalty, did not leave. It was 
the younger generation that relocated: “their children and their children’s children.” Some 
members of the association may even have been Continental Army veterans; one man, William 
Vance, claimed to have been with Benedict Arnold at the siege of Quebec City in 1775. These 
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people were attempting, mere months after the peace treaty and the refugee migrations, to go 
back to the pre-war status quo. They wanted to gain a land grant and relocate east, just as New 
Englanders had been doing for thirty years.54  
 And they were able to do so. In one of his last acts before New Brunswick passed out of 
his jurisdiction, Governor Parr of Nova Scotia granted the Cape Ann Association a tract in a 
prime location: Oak Bay, the northernmost part of Passamaquoddy Bay near the mouth of the St. 
Croix River. Some of the actual loyalists in the area were quite dismayed. In 1785, members of 
the British 74th regiment who had asked for land in Oak Bay wrote to Fredericton to complain. 
They had served the crown faithfully, accepted relocation to New Brunswick, and sent agents to 
make arrangements in Halifax and Saint John. Now they needed to clear fields and plant, and the 
land they requested had already been granted to a number of persons “who are new and have 
been during the whole course of the war within the Rebel States.” This was unacceptable. “We 
flatter ourselves,” the loyalist veterans wrote, “that we are entitled to a choice of land prior to 
people circumstanced as they are.” The slightly chagrined response from Fredericton was that the 
claim would be “taken into consideration.” 55  
The Cape Ann Association was allowed to keep their land. Regardless of the way the 
veterans felt, persons who had been in the rebel states throughout the war were welcomed to 
British territory with no restrictions. The case of Grand Manan Island provides another example. 
Grand Manan is a sizable island in the Bay of Fundy, located almost on the international border, 
but under the control of New Brunswick. In 1806 seventeen settlers petitioned together for land 
grants on Grand Manan, and almost all of them were American citizens. Nathanial Farr was the 
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first name on the petition, and he and another petitioner, John Roney, were British subjects and 
military veterans. But the other fifteen names on the list were Americans, and they were open 
about it, listing themselves as “emigrants from the United States.” A local notable, George 
Sproule, added a brief note of support to their petition, noting that “a considerable quantity of 
land remains vacant” on the island. Apparently the New Brunswick council did not think twice 
about the application, and did not differentiate between the British veterans and the American 
immigrants. They simply gave a blanket grant: “May have 200 acres each to be allotted by the 
Surveyor General.”56 
The experiences of the Grand Manan settlers and the Cape Ann Associates seem to have 
been common in the Maine/New Brunswick border region at this time. Americans moved over 
the border, conducted their affairs, and whether they requested land before their arrival or 
afterward, they usually got the grant. This movement peaked a bit later than emigration to Lower 
Canada. While the 1790s saw the greatest migration over the Vermont border, the 1800s saw a 
burst of migration over the Maine border. One reason was political maneuvering in Europe. 
Starting in 1806, Napoleon’s Continental System blocked British ships from the lumber trade in 
the Baltic. This was an enormous boon for the British Provinces in North America. The Maritime 
lumber trade flourished, which led almost immediately to a labor shortage. Wages spiked. 
Americans began to head east for the border.57  
One New Brunswick source provides a window into this movement, and an interesting 
comparison with Philipsburg’s Book of Declaration of Aliens. In 1817, a man named Robert 
Pagan submitted a list of names to provincial officials in Fredericton. Pagan had served for seven 
years as a commissioner in charge of immigration to Charlotte County, New Brunswick, which 
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borders directly on Washington County, Maine. After years of what he believed a troublingly 
large influx, Pagan had had enough. He asked permission to resign his commission. There were 
too many Americans arriving for him to deal with, and they were causing trouble:  
The increasing emigration of persons from the United States…for the purpose of 
obtaining employ and settlement has become so great, that it bids fair to exceed the Loyal 
Population of our original settlers and their children – several serious disputes have arisen 
between Americans who came across the lines…[and] our settlers with whom this 
intrusion interferes.58  
 
Pagan attached a list of ninety-two people that had arrived since 1810. Almost everyone 
arrived with a family; only seven were alone. The rest had wives and children; on average they 
were families of five. Exactly half of the men, sixteen, listed their occupation as farmer. There 
were four traders, four joiners, three who listed “mill man,” a doctor, a baker, and a few others. 
Almost all were from Maine, or at least had been living there prior to emigrating. Their time 
resident in the Province varied widely, from but on average they had been there for between 
three and four years. It appears that quite a few Maine families made the move over the border in 
the first decade of the nineteenth century.59  
 And yet, not everyone who wanted to take advantage of the opportunities provided by the 
border zone needed to emigrate. Some realized they could accomplish the same thing while 
remaining in the United States – they could have the benefits provided by the British Empire 
without any of the costs. They were aided by the decision, made by British and American 
authorities alike, to refrain from enforcing border restrictions. To keep the borderland growing, 
the border had to be permeable.  
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 In Maine, Passamaquoddy Bay provides the best example of this opportunity.60 
Passamaquoddy Bay was akin to the Allen lands around Lake Champlain in Vermont. The 
western side of the bay was American, but it was connected economically to British markets and 
trade networks. As noted above, both British and Americans believed that eventually, they might 
create a meaningful border that favored their side. For the time being though, growth was 
paramount. A bit of a comedy of errors from the mid-1790s provides an excellent illustration of 
economic realities in the bay. Technically there was an American side and a British side, but in 
practice everyone was part of the same economy. When a low level official took action to 
enforce the border, New Brunswick authorities quickly responded by returning the border to its 
ambiguous and permeable state.  
 In late 1795, Colin Campbell reported to New Brunswick customs authorities that he had 
seized an American ship. This was the schooner Sally, captained by Daniel Joy. Campbell wrote 
that he had observed the Sally illegally unloading hundreds of bushels of American corn at a mill 
on the British side of the St. Croix River, in St. Stephen, New Brunswick. Accordingly, he 
gathered a militia and seized the ship. Captain Joy responded that this was unfair – he was 
moored in the middle of the river, and thus was not in British territory. But Campbell was not 
swayed. He took the ship. Then, because the tide had fallen, he almost immediately ran the ship 
aground in the river. Campbell ordered Captain Joy to fix the ship, which Joy did. Once the Sally 
was afloat once more, Joy attempted to escape, but Campbell re-seized the vessel and sailed it to 
St. Andrews harbor. Campbell seems to have realized that he may have gone too far in seizing 
the Sally. He offered to give back the ship if authorities in Fredericton felt that he should. He 
wrote that he felt obligated by law to take the vessel, but he was worried that his action “may 
                                                
60 Harold Davis provides a long history of both sides of the bay in An International Community on the St. Croix, 
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possibly create some uneasiness on the American Side,” in addition to injuring New Brunswick 
grist mills.61  
 Another letter quickly followed Campbell’s, elaborating on the situation. This one was 
from some local New Brunswick notables, and they just wanted the whole situation to go away. 
Campbell’s action, they wrote, would “destroy the good understanding that at present subsists 
between the inhabitants of this county and those of Washington County [in Maine].” The Sally 
was only doing what vessels from both sides of the river did all the time. Throughout the year, as 
long as the river was navigable, American ships were continually anchoring in it and loading 
goods. This practice “has never been disquieted, and is supposed to be their undoubted right 
agreeable to the treaty of peace.” Furthermore, the men wrote, any time some impediment, like 
“want of water or severity of the season,” prevented New Brunswick residents from using their 
own mills, it was common practice to simply cross to the US side and use the mills there. 
Americans did the same. All Captain Joy was doing was using the most convenient working mill. 
Finally, they claimed that even if authorities wished to crack down on this commonly accepted 
blurring of the border Joy’s ship should be sprung on a technicality. Knowing that Campbell was 
in the area that night, Joy had apparently secured two small boats owned by British subjects: a 
whale boat owned by a resident of Campobello Island, and a skiff owned by a resident of St. 
Stephen. He had used these vessels to unload the corn and reload the ground meal, so 
technically, he was transporting goods in British ships and was thus within the limits of the law.  
 Provincial authorities quickly took the side of Daniel Joy and his defenders against Colin 
Campbell. The Lieutenant Governor of New Brunswick knew that the priority was to keep 
moving goods within the border zone. The people on the west side of the Passamaquoddy may 
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have technically been on American soil. But in reality, they were operating within a British 
economic sphere. What was Daniel Joy doing, really, besides helping to keep New Brunswick 
gristmills in operation? All Campbell’s seizure did was create unnecessary hard feelings. By 
December 23rd, only ten days after Campbell’s letter, the Lieutenant Governor requested that 
customs “restore the vessel and cargo, without any reserve or stipulation, to the original 
owners.”62 
 This was not the only time that British subjects in the border region spoke up about 
keeping the border zone unified and the boundary permeable. In the first years after the loyalist 
migration and the creation of the separate provinces of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, it was 
impossible for the thousands of people crowding the new settlements to feed themselves. They 
needed to concentrate on clearing the land and building homes. So the Crown had decided to let 
those provinces import a large variety of necessities from the United States. Cattle, horses, pigs, 
poultry, grains of every sort, and lumber were all listed in a proclamation of 1785, along with the 
condition that these goods could only be imported in British ships, and by British subjects.63 The 
idea was that this would not need to be permanent; the provinces would be able to supply 
themselves shortly, as settlements expanded and economies matured.  
 Within a few years, however, the borderland region was functioning as an economic unit. 
Ignoring the border was paying dividends for both sides, and when authorities threatened to 
revoke permission to import some of the American goods, locals resisted. In the early 1790s, the 
New Brunswick government attempted to do away with permission to import lumber and 
livestock from the states. Apparently authorities changed their minds about the livestock 
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relatively quickly, but the threat caused great concern in both Passamaquoddy and Saint John. As 
noted in chapter one, New England had been providing cattle to the Maritime Provinces since the 
1750s. By this point, in 1791, there were regular cattle drives coming over the border from 
Maine to New Brunswick. Considering the possible disappearance of this trade, some residents 
of Saint John wrote to the Lt. Governor of their “anxiety and very great uneasiness.” New 
Brunswick, they asserted, simply did not have enough cattle. If imports from the states stopped, 
there would be no meat at all in the markets during some seasons of the year. Farmers in the 
province, trying to make up the deficit, would “spare too great a proportion of their stock,” 
which would eventually “retard the settlement of this country.” Furthermore, they claimed, many 
of the importers of livestock were doing so because they had “debts due in the states” and “were 
compelled to take such in payment.” Altering this system would upend several elements of the 
borderland economy. Why not simply allow trade to take its natural course? Eventually, New 
Brunswick farmers would have larger herds, and the importation from the states would fade 
away.64  
 Lumber was an even more complicated issue. Another letter, from the same group of 
people at likely the same time, explained the lumber trade to the Lt. Governor. Doing away with 
American lumber imports, they wrote, would be a crushing blow to the sawmills and shipping of 
Charlotte County. This was not a matter of competition from the Americans. American lumber 
was being constantly carried over the border, cut in New Brunswick mills and shipped abroad on 
New Brunswick ships. Business was booming, but if they were forced to rely only on their own 
lumber sources “notwithstanding their utmost exertions it will not be in their power for some 
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time to supply even the shipping belonging to this county.”65 Mills would close, shipping would 
decrease precipitously, and again, economic growth would slow unnecessarily. The economics of 
the borderland depended on goods moving freely within the zone – if the authorities altered 
anything the system would fall apart.  
 It is unclear exactly how the importation laws changed over the next few years, or if they 
ever did change in practice. There were a few more threats in the following years to do away 
with the permission to import cattle and lumber, and in 1794 it appears the Lt. Governor did 
discontinue the official sanction of that trade. But the very next year, in the case of the Sally, the 
authorities backed down immediately when faced with the possibility of interfering with the 
general good feelings and free trade in the Passamaquoddy area. There are also later accounts 
claiming that lumber, at least, continued to make its way over the border with no interference. In 
his early nineteenth century Account of the Province of New Brunswick, Thomas Baillie recorded 
that in 1819, “on the Scoodic [St. Croix] River alone…there were forty-seven” sawmills 
operating, and that they cut over seven million feet of lumber. But, Baillie noted, “this account 
includes the American side; and, indeed, business is done there with but little division of 
interests.”66 It sounds like the Passamaquoddy region continued to operate as a unified economic 
zone for many years. 
 The settlement of Houlton, Maine is another fine example of the borderland opportunity 
zone. Here again, Americans found a way to exploit the British system without technically being 
a part of it. Houlton is located on the Meduxnekeag River, very close to the border with New 
Brunswick. This river flows east, emptying into the Saint John River at Woodstock, New 
                                                
65 William Campbell et al to the Lt. Governor, 1791, RS23A, Box 1, Folder 4, Customs House Administration 
Records, PANB.   
66 Letter, 8 March 1794, RS23A, Box 2, Folder 7a, Customs House Administration Records, PANB; Thomas 
Baillie, An Account of the Province of New Brunswick (London: J, G, & F Rivington, 1832), 112-113.  
 
 109 
Brunswick, about eleven miles away. Fredericton, the capital of the province, is about fifty miles 
further downstream. There is no water connection between Houlton and the rest of Maine; the 
closest large town is Bangor, 120 miles away, but no road was built until the 1830s. Before that, 
everyone and everything coming and going from Houlton had to travel through New Brunswick. 
Houlton was a de facto part of the British Empire.  
 But, importantly, it was not a de jure part of the British Empire. The men who received 
the grant of land that became Houlton appear to have made this connection soon after the grant 
was made. The gift of land came about because of a newly established academy. In the last 
decade of the eighteenth century, Massachusetts made it a policy to support the establishment of 
colleges and academies by donating townships and half-townships of unimproved land in the 
District of Maine to these academies. Once a school was established, the trustees had to raise the 
initial funds on their own. When they had at least three thousand dollars in assets, they could 
petition the legislature in Boston for a grant of land. They would then sell the Maine land to 
settlers or speculators to raise money for the school. In the mid-1790s the legislature was busily 
handing out land grants to various academies. Some, including Gorham, Milton, and Dummer 
Academies, received land in far western Maine, near the border with New Hampshire. Others, 
including Williams College and New Salem and Groton Academies, received land in far eastern 
Maine, near New Brunswick. It is unclear how decisions were made on which academy would 
receive which tract of land.67  
 The small western Massachusetts town of New Salem received one of these grants in 
1797, and a committee of three men was appointed to sell it. Often these committees would sell 
to a speculator, who could handle the settlement of the tract himself. The trustees of Portland 
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Academy did that in 1801, when they sold their half-township to Joseph Foxcroft. Foxcroft 
appears to have been one of the men making a career of this – at around the same time he 
purchased another township that had been granted to Bowdoin College, which became the town 
of Dover-Foxcroft. Selling to a speculator was almost certainly the simplest thing for any 
academy sitting on a land grant to do.68  
But this is not what happened in New Salem. Perhaps the trustees had a hard time finding 
a buyer, or perhaps they felt the speculators were lowballing them. All we know is that sometime 
between 1797 and 1804, a group of local men decided that they themselves would settle the tract. 
Many of these men were from New Salem, and others were from neighboring towns like 
Amherst and Hadley. One of the purchasers, Varney Pearce, had himself been on the three-
person committee tasked with finding a buyer for the grant. As one local historian put it, the 
decision of a number of locals to purchase the land themselves “deprived New Salem of many 
worthy and good families, and of its most public citizens."69  
 It is difficult to say for certain why these families decided to abandon far western 
Massachusetts for far eastern Maine. However, it is possible that they took a look at where the 
grant was located and realized that they had been handed a golden opportunity. New Salem is a 
hill town west of Worcester, without easy river access to the wider world. The best one could do 
to get goods to market would be to travel north to the Millers River, which empties into the 
Connecticut River just south of Vermont. Moving to new communities either north or west 
would not have provided much improvement. Many New Englanders were emigrating to upstate 
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New York or the Ohio country at this time, but these places were even further removed from 
established economic networks.  
 But Houlton, Maine, was special. It was frontier, but connected frontier – a chance to 
build a brand new town that would be more advantageously situated than New Salem. Houlton’s 
river fed directly into the Saint John, which flowed to Fredericton and the city of Saint John, and 
the wider British Atlantic. You could travel to and from Houlton by boat rather than overland. 
There was already an established community just fourteen miles away at Woodstock, New 
Brunswick. Supplies would be relatively easy to come by, as they would not have to be shipped 
long distances overland. Women, small children, and the elderly could rest comfortably in 
Woodstock, indefinitely, while the male migrants worked to start the settlement. And incredibly, 
moving to this new settlement would not even involve leaving Massachusetts.  
 The Houlton migrants immediately took advantage of the proximity to New Brunswick. 
When the Putnam family made the journey in 1805 – overland to Boston, by boat from Boston to 
Saint John, and up the river to Woodstock – almost the entire family stayed in the latter town 
while younger men who had not yet brought families traveled on to the new settlement. A couple 
of years later, Captain Joseph Houlton and his large family arrived in the town that would later 
bear his name. The four daughters in the family settled in at Woodstock, while Joseph and his 
four sons worked at building homes a few miles away over the border.70  
The Reverend Frederic Dibblee, a Woodstock resident who kept a detailed journal in the 
early 19th century, was among the British subjects who greeted these transient Americans. 
Dibblee’s journal shows that the Maine settlers were recurrent visitors to Woodstock. Various 
members of the Houlton family are mentioned as guests of the Dibblees in 1808 – some visiting 
in November, while a larger contingent attended a New Year’s Eve party that December. The 
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socializing appears to have led to economic connections as well, as Captain Houlton’s son 
Samuel became a frequent employee of Rev. Dibblee. In November, 1810, Dibblee notes that 
Samuel Houlton was helping slaughter hogs, and a few weeks later mentions that he was doing 
carpentry work. A year later the young Mr. Houlton and a man named Warner, who also appears 
to have been a Maine settler, were employed building the Dibblees a chimney.71 
Before the settlers in Houlton built a mill of their own, they traveled downstream to 
Woodstock and used the mills there.72 Conversely, when the people of Woodstock decided to 
build a school, they contracted with the Americans for the lumber. Rev. Dibblee noted in 
November of 1816 that Amos Putnam, a Houlton settler, had delivered 1500 boards for the 
school.73 There were cross border marriages, and cross border careers. After twelve years of 
practicing in Houlton, and being frequently called over the border, Dr. Samuel Rice decided to 
relocate to Woodstock, “where his practice was greatly increased.” Some of the slack was picked 
up by Lydia Putnam, who, according to a local historian, was the only local with medical 
knowledge: “there being no physician then above Fredericton, excepting Doctor Rice.” Ms. 
Putnam, too, became a frequent border crosser.74  
 
The borderland shared by New England, New York, and British North America was a 
land of opportunity in the post-Revolutionary period. This connected frontier stretched over a 
massive area – it included Passamaquoddy Bay and the Saint John River Valley, the eastern 
townships of Lower Canada north of New Hampshire, the Lake Champlain Valley, the Ottawa 
Valley, the St. Lawrence Valley between Upper Canada and New York, and the country north 
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and south of Lake Ontario. Throughout this territory, British and American authorities 
encouraged an open border, and the free movement of migrants. Settlers chose American 
settlements or British settlements, knowing that economically, the whole zone was connected to 
British cities and British Atlantic trade. Perhaps the border would shift one day, and the 
Americans would finally assume control over all of northeastern North America. Or perhaps the 
British would manage to push the border south and west, taking land that was already within 
their economic sphere and making it legally part of the British Empire. It was impossible to 
predict the future. For now, the region offered cheap, safe, accessible, well-connected land. The 



























For the Relief and Assistance of our Countrymen: Congregationalists and Catholics Define 
the Eastern Border 
 
 
In the summer of 1798 a group of Passamaquoddy Indians from Maine traveled to Boston 
to petition the Massachusetts Legislature, known as the General Court. Together with Father 
Francis Matignon, the resident priest in Boston, the delegation requested that Massachusetts 
approve an annual salary for a Catholic priest to live with and minister to the Passamaquoddy 
and Penobscot communities in Maine. Their appeal was successful. An annual grant of two 
hundred dollars, from the public treasury, was ordered for “a teacher of religion and 
morality…of good moral and political character.” The man hired for the job, Father James 
Romagne, ended up ministering to Maine Indians in the employ of the Commonwealth for 
almost twenty years.1 
 At first glance, this was a bizarre departure from the norm for Massachusetts. For over a 
century it had been the official policy of Massachusetts to destroy Catholicism in Maine. 
Catholic Indian communities were treated as an existential threat, and soldiers from 
Massachusetts burned their churches at least three times in the eighteenth century. After 
independence, the Massachusetts constitution officially established a tax-supported 
Congregational Church, and was quite specific about the qualifications for state-sponsored 
teachers of religion and morality. Though article three declares “every denomination of 
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Christians…[equally] under the protection of the law,” it limited tax dollars to Protestants.2 Why 
then, would Massachusetts reverse itself within two decades and provide tax dollars to 
Catholics?  
In isolation, this seems like a dramatic change. In context, however, it was simply another 
step in a strategy created by Massachusetts almost ten years earlier. The decision to provide 
funding to the Catholic Church arose out of a desire to manage the chaotic, booming borderland 
that had emerged in northern New England since the revolution. Massachusetts understood that, 
although it had legal possession of Maine, it did not really have control. Most of the district, 
particularly its eastern reaches, was a shared zone. Identities in the zone were fluid, and the 
border had little weight. Opportunistic investors and settlers were flooding in, taking advantage 
of the desire of both republic and empire to develop their settlements. The de facto border, it 
seemed, could easily shift one way or the other. This situation made political leaders in 
Massachusetts uncomfortable. The settlers along the eastern coast – and even more troublingly, 
the Indians who still controlled Maine’s interior – remained in a position to play Americans and 
British off against each other. Somehow Massachusetts had to find a way to build connections 
with its side of the borderland, to begin to manage the territory and the people who lived there.3  
This seemed an impossible task. The District of Maine was potentially huge, and the 
government in Boston had limited resources with which to manage it. No one knew exactly 
where the northern border would fall, but even without its potential northernmost reaches, the 
district was the size of all three southern New England states combined. Furthermore, one of 
Maine’s fastest growing regions also happened to be the most distant from Boston: the 
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settlements around Passamaquoddy Bay and the St. Croix River, bordering on New Brunswick. 
In order to assert itself throughout the district, to build connections and meet the needs of 
settlers, the state needed partners. It did not have time to create a secular bureaucracy from 
scratch. It needed organizations with the ability to manage manpower and money and funnel 
both into the borderland immediately. It needed churches.  
Fortuitously, the churches also needed assistance from the state. New England 
Congregationalists had been eager for generations to build a domestic missionary network. 
American independence finally gave them this chance, but initially fundraising was slow. 
Partnering with Massachusetts to serve the District of Maine would provide an infusion of cash 
to help grow the operation quickly. At roughly the same time, the Catholic Church was also 
looking for help. There were only two priests in Boston, and they were attempting to serve not 
just that city, but parts of mid-coast Maine and the Penobscot and Passamaquoddy communities 
as well. If the state were willing to cover the cost of a priest for Maine, it would help 
enormously. 
 The partnership between churches and state began with the Congregationalists. In 1791, 
the Commonwealth approved annual funding for the first domestic Congregational missionary 
organization, the Society for Propagating the Gospel Among the Indians and Others in North 
America (SPGNA).4 This state grant was transformative for the SPGNA. It stepped up its efforts, 
hiring more preachers, purchasing more books, and bringing more Maine communities into its 
network. Within a few years, however, it was clear that this one missionary society could not do 
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the job alone. Most notably, it was not reaching either the Penobscot or Passamaquoddy 
communities, both of which were located uncomfortably close to the border. When British 
officials in New Brunswick chose to fund a Catholic priest for the Maliseet Indians, their 
counterparts in Massachusetts decided to do likewise. This was the context in which Father 
Matignon and the Passamaquoddy made their successful appeal for state funds. By the turn of the 
nineteenth century, both Catholic and Congregational networks were providing religious 
services, distributing books, organizing schools, and connecting even the most remote borderland 
communities to Boston.  
 Massachusetts’s investment in this church-state partnership paid off handsomely in the 
years to come. The SPGNA used its funds wisely and grew quickly. Its network became more 
complex and efficient over time, as the society divided Maine into zones and worked to reach all 
corners of the district. It distributed thousands of books and pamphlets, and began to build a 
network of schools. As itinerant ministers reached new communities, they solicited cash 
donations to support the society, which created tangible financial bonds between frontier 
communities and the center of state power in Boston. The SPGNA’s success inspired the birth of 
still more missionary societies to augment the work in Maine, and as these societies multiplied, 
they gradually shifted the financial burden from the state to private contributors. Women’s 
benevolent societies, especially in Massachusetts, eventually became the dominant contributors 
to these missionary organizations.5 Meanwhile, with its own state assistance, the Catholic 
Diocese of Boston was free to expand its outreach beyond Maine Indians, to Maine’s Irish 
Catholic communities. Like Protestants, Catholics built an extensive network, visiting families, 
distributing books, and fostering connections between rural Maine and Boston. The two church 
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networks may not have had a lot in common theologically, but their work in the District of 
Maine had remarkable parallels.   
 No one expected these networks to serve as a means of enforcing the border. They were 
supposed to help manage the borderland, meet the needs of people who lived there, and promote 
“good order and…civil government.”6 As they grew, however, they made the border meaningful 
in a way that it had not been before. Catholics in Maine, both white and Indian, had their needs 
met by an American network, and did not have to look over the border for spiritual assistance. 
Congregationalists in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, connected to New England in so many 
ways, found themselves cut off from church resources. At the same time, those resources were 
being funneled to places like eastern Maine, creating a distinction between communities like 
Calais and Eastport and their New Brunswick neighbors. As time went on, the divergence grew. 
Massachusetts had more preachers, more teachers, more books, and more cash, and it was able to 
move these into the borderland more effectively. Boston-based networks quickly succeeded in 
reaching even the furthest communities of eastern Maine. Fredericton and Halifax did not follow 
suit. Political and religious leaders in those communities were neither willing nor able to create 
networks that could service western New Brunswick. And even though the border region as a 
whole was technically closer to Halifax than to Boston, the quirky geography of the Maritimes 
made travel more difficult.  
As a result, even as licit and illicit trade continued to blur the border, state-supported 
church networks gradually created a real distinction between American citizens in Maine and 
British subjects in New Brunswick. They also began to change what was appealing about the 
borderland in the first place. Initially, Americans had been attracted to the borderland because of 
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its status as a shared zone. Migrants were able to build communities that were technically on the 
American side of the line, but were well connected to the British Atlantic. As church networks 
grew, however, even the most remote Maine communities were increasingly connected to 
Massachusetts and the rest of New England. The British persisted for years in believing that their 
economic sway over the borderland meant the boundary was still adjustable. However, they were 
ignoring the situation on the ground. Thanks to church networks and their partnership with the 
state, the de facto border had taken root.  
 
 In the mid 1780s, just after the close of the revolution, Boston’s Congregationalists began 
to organize their missionary efforts. These men had long wished for a society of their own that 
would serve the same purpose as the Anglican Church’s Society for the Propagation of the 
Gospel in Foreign Parts. That society, since 1701, had been working to grow the Church of 
England in the British colonies by distributing trained clergymen to new and needy settlements. 
Congregationalists believed they should be doing the same; northeastern North America, they 
felt, was their responsibility. A few ministers in Boston began to lay the groundwork in the 
decade or so leading up to the war, but ran into resistance from Britain.7 After independence, 
they had more freedom to maneuver, and in October 1787, the Society for Propagating the 
Gospel Among the Indians and Others in North America was incorporated officially by an act of 
the Massachusetts General Court.8 Though its name may indicate otherwise, the SPGNA’s 
primary concern was not sending missionaries among the Indians. It devoted resources to a 
couple of Indian communities in Massachusetts, but the society was well aware of the long 
history of failed missions to the north. There, the SPGNA’s immediate goal was to minister to 
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the “others”: the white settlers who were moving into Maine. The way the society operated was 
relatively simple. It contacted settled ministers in Eastern Massachusetts and Southern Maine 
and asked them to spend a few weeks attending to a needy region. If the minister accepted, he 
would be paid half the money upfront. Then after the trip, he would have to submit a journal or 
other record of his circuit – miles traveled, towns visited, sermons preached, babies baptized, etc. 
– to get the rest of his money.   
 In January 1791, Governor John Hancock delivered a message to the General Court 
requesting that it pass a funding measure for the SPGNA. Hancock’s words betray anxiety about 
the chaotic situation along the frontier. His argument was that the SPGNA should provide the 
“public protestant teachers of piety, religion and morality” that, according to Massachusetts’s 
constitution, would provide “good order and the preservation of civil government.”9 This 
missionary society was perfectly positioned to fill that constitutional role.  
It does great honor to the wisdom and humanity of our government...to assist that 
society in their laudable endeavors to disseminate the principles of Religion and 
morality amongst our fellow Citizens who are the objects of their present attention.10  
 
These citizens, Governor Hancock noted, were actively engaged in building Massachusetts. 
While they toiled on the frontier, “every tree they cut down and every acre of wild land they 
subdue, contributes to the wealth of the State.” Meanwhile “the rising generation in that part of 
the Commonwealth,” was dangerously destitute of religious instruction. The efforts of the 
SPGNA, Hancock predicted, would provide these people with the “knowledge, and information, 
which render the other parts of their Country so respectable.”11 The General Court agreed, and 
voted to provide the SPGNA with £150 annually for three years. The funding continued through 
                                                
9 Commonwealth of Massachusetts, A CONSTITUTION OR FRAME OF GOVERNMENT, Agreed upon by the 
Delegates of the People of the STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS-BAY, 1779, The Founders Constitution, University of 
Chicago Press, accessed June 18, 2019, http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/print_documents/v1ch1s6.html. 




the 1790s and into the nineteenth century, with the General Court regularly re-asserting its 
sympathy with the work of the SPGNA and approving another year or two of payments.12 
 Until this state intervention the SPNGA had relied on two sources of funding. The first 
was the Alford fund. In 1789, the SPGNA received a large donation from the estate of John 
Alford, a professor at Harvard College. The bequest came in the form of bonds, primarily, which 
produced an annual income. The bequest was given specifically to fund missionaries to Indians, 
so the SPGNA could not pool it with their other resources. They chose to use the Alford money 
to support three missions: one on Martha’s Vineyard; one at Mashpee on Cape Cod; and one near 
Oneida, New York. The second source was the general fund, consisting of private contributions 
from members of the society, as well as any other individuals or congregations who wished to 
donate. When it was officially incorporated, the society was given the right to solicit donations in 
any of the churches in the state. This general fund was the only source the society could draw on 
for missions to white settler communities. Over the course of the 1790s, funding from the two 
sources grew steadily. In 1793, the society reported the Alford fund as producing $350, which 
rose to over $400 in 1798. Meanwhile, the general fund was growing even faster, from $239 in 
1793 to $338 five years later. 13  
Even though they were growing, these sources paled in comparison to what the state 
decided to provide. The state donation was initially in British pounds, but by the mid-1790s it 
had been converted to an annual grant of $500. This was a substantial gift: by itself it was 
sufficient to pay all of the society’s missionaries. The rest of the general fund was now free to be 
used in whatever way the SPGNA saw fit, and what it decided to do was radically increase its 
                                                
12 For example, see Acts and Laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts 1796-1797, 579; Acts and Laws of the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts 1800-1801, 541.  
13 Report, Peter Thatcher, January 1798, MSS 48, Box 8, Folder 9, Society for Propagating the Gospel Among the 
Indians and Others in North America records (hereafter SPGNA), Phillips Library (hereafter PL), Rowley, 
Massachusetts.   
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book distribution. A report of January 1795 laid out the result. Over the previous four years, the 
state’s grant had covered payments to eight missionaries. In that same period, the society used its 
general fund to purchase and distribute 6299 books. This included books for children as well as 
adults: 715 spelling books and over a thousand primers, to go along with hundreds of bibles and 
testaments. Three years later, a similar report continued the same story. State funds covered the 
fifty dollars a month needed to pay the missionaries, while the general fund had produced 
another 2500 books for communities throughout the District of Maine.14  
The partnership with the state effectively allowed the SPGNA to serve multiple purposes. 
With just the general fund to draw on it would have been limited to paying the salaries of 
itinerant ministers, and only one or two at a time. Now it was free not just to employ more men, 
but also to use them as a book delivery system. Book distribution became a primary focus of the 
SPGNA, second only to preaching. Rev. Daniel Little highlighted the society’s priorities in a 
1792 letter: “The general object of the mission is vastly extensive and important, as it respects 
the public and private services of the missionary in preaching, conversation, and the distribution 
of books.” Ministers traveling for the society began mentioning the need for books in their letters 
and journals as well. A Rev. Lyon completed a month-long mission to the Passamaquoddy Bay 
settlements in September of 1793. Visiting families all along the border with New Brunswick, 
Lyon gave eight sermons and baptized almost one hundred people. The communities, he wrote, 
were developing well, “the people decent, in a thriving way.” The people had only one thing 
holding them back: Lyon reported that they had no books.15  
The SPGNA rapidly expanded this facet of its mission. Rev. Little made a visit to the 
settlements of northwestern Maine, where he noted, “Every town and plantation where we 
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officiated on the Kennebec and Sandy Rivers have had a proportion of books, and several other 
places remote from said rivers.” Little sometimes supplied Bibles and prayer books to individual 
families in need, and when he ran low he instructed whole communities to share the books: “The 
discourses on the Lord’s Day and some others I have directed to be read by every family as 
circular letters thro’ the town.” A few years later, in the same region, Rev. Levi Frisbie was even 
more meticulous in accounting for his book distribution. Frisbie drew up a chart detailing all the 
towns he visited and the number and titles of books he left in each. Frisbie averaged almost three 
dozen texts per town, with Norridgewock getting thirty-nine, Caratunk twenty-five, and Mt. 
Vernon forty-three. To give one example, the books he distributed around Strong and Avon, 
Maine, were: “4 Testaments, 2 Psalters 2 Spelling Books 6 Watts Songs, 4 Doddridge’s 
Addresses, 5 Belknaps Sermons, 5 Sayler’s Do (ditto), 2 New Years Gifts for Children, 1 
Sewall’s Sermons, 1 Doddrige’s Principles of Religion.” Frisbie left a similar mix of books and 
pamphlets in practically every settlement.16 
The level of detail Frisbie included in his report eventually became more common, as the 
SPGNA began including explicit instructions about what was expected of its missionaries in 
Maine. By 1805 the society was providing each man a pre-printed list of directives. Notably, the 
directives specified two areas where the society wanted careful records: baptisms and books. 
Most of the list consisted of general guidelines. Ministers were expected to preach or at least 
counsel at every available opportunity, without accepting personal reward. They were asked to 
avoid towns that already had a resident preacher. They were asked to avoid secular business 
while in the employ of the SPGNA. Finally, they were required to keep a daily journal, which 
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should include specifically “a list of the baptisms…and an exact account of the manner in which 
you distribute the books.”17 
The SPGNA quickly covered the district with books and pamphlets. No region was 
untouched. The Reverends Alfred Johnson and Ephraim Abbott distributed literature in far 
eastern Maine, while Paul Coffin did the same in far western Maine. Some men found it difficult 
to physically transport such a large quantity of books, but the society developed a plan to 
mitigate that problem. In his report of 1798, the secretary of the SPGNA noted that when 
itinerants could not move the books “in journeys of some hundreds of miles, the society sent 
them to gentlemen of honour, character and abilities, in different places, requesting them to take 
the trouble of furnishing their poor neighbors according to their best judgement”18 In the eastern 
Penobscot Bay region, for example, Rev. Jonathan Fisher of Blue Hill filled this role. Fisher took 
several mission trips to the settlements surrounding Blue Hill in the first years of the nineteenth 
century, and kept careful track of his efforts to fill them with books.19  
 The state’s decision to take on such a large portion of the SPGNA’s expenses essentially 
reinvented the mission of this Congregational missionary society. The funding allowed the 
society to invest in something that, unlike preaching, had a measurable outcome. This had 
several complementary effects. First, the visits of itinerant preachers to frontier communities 
now had more weight. Preaching is transitory and unquantifiable. Sometimes ministers reported 
big crowds, and sometimes they reported small crowds, but it was impossible to know exact 
numbers. In addition, no one could know the impact of preaching on any community or 
individual. People in the borderland encountered traveling preachers of various denominations 
all the time. Who could tell which messages resonated the most? Books, by contrast, represented 
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a tangible change. When Levi Frisbie left over three dozen books in the small town of Mt. 
Vernon, for example, he made a measurable impact on that community. In 1812, Ephraim Abbot 
reported that during his six-month mission to the Passamaquoddy Bay region, he managed to 
supply nearly every family and school in the communities on the American side of the border. 
He ran out of books trying to supply Eastport, one of the most populous towns.20 
The transition from a focus on preaching to a focus on books also increased the weight 
SPGNA missionaries gave to the border. In their letters, missionaries occasionally reference 
sermons delivered in New Brunswick. Though no one was sent directly to communities in 
British North America, when ministers were near the border some would occasionally cross over 
to preach. They did not, however, deliver books. Throughout the thirty-year period between the 
revolution and the War of 1812, there are no references to any SPGNA missionaries delivering 
books or pamphlets to British territory.21 Jonathan Fisher experienced both sides of the shift from 
preaching to books. Fisher took a voluntary mission trip in 1801, independent of the SPGNA but 
intending to augment its work. He was perfectly willing to preach to British subjects. After 
making his way through eastern Maine, he crossed the St. Croix River and preached in three 
different towns in New Brunswick. He was particularly proud of the size of his New Brunswick 
crowds, writing that in one town he preached to “probably more than 200 persons, of four if not 
five denominations.” When he began working directly for the SPGNA, however, and was 
entrusted with books, he stopped crossing the border. Fisher wrote of delivering a “horse load” 
of books throughout a one hundred and eighteen mile circuit of eastern Maine, between 
                                                
20 Ephraim Abbott Letters, Box 1, Folder 1, SPGNA, PL.  
21 I did find a single reference, sometime between 1818 and 1827, to Rev. Elijah Kellogg handing out a few bibles 
on Campobello Island.  
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Penobscot Bay and the border. Though he may have remembered his big New Brunswick 
audiences fondly, he did not bring them any books.22   
  As this transition from preaching to books was taking place, the SPGNA was investing 
heavily in the easternmost communities in Maine. Ephraim Abbott was not the only one 
supplying books to the American settlements in Passamaquoddy Bay. Daniel Oliver served the 
region around 1805. He gave a few sermons to British audiences, but he saved the books for the 
Americans, distributing them throughout Washington County. Stephen Chapin reported 
delivering well over a hundred pieces of literature in the same settlements in 1808. He made 
particular mention of the needs of Eastport, seeing it as a promising spot for missionary work. 
Chapin never crossed the border.23 The work of all of these missionaries, added together, 
resulted in a flood of printed material for American borderland communities. Increasingly, 
American citizens in towns like Calais, Eastport, and Robbinston had access to Bibles, prayer 
books, and primers for their children. British subjects just on the other side of the border, in St. 
Stephen and St. Andrews, did not.  
The focus on book distribution also motivated the SPGNA to become more organized. 
When the primary goal had been sermonizing, the society was content at times to send off 
missionaries with vague instructions, resulting in ill-defined, improvisational missions. Before 
one of his earliest trips, in 1792, Levi Frisbie made a plea for more guidance, writing “If the 
Society should think proper to give me any further Instructions respecting the extent and bounds 
of my circuit…I should receive them with pleasure.” Up to that point he had only been told to 
visit the “eastern settlements.”24 Once the distribution of books became a priority, however, these 
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sorts of improvisational trips were eliminated. Careful planning and documentation were 
required. During the 1790s, the records show the society becoming more methodical. As the 
SPGNA grew and systematized its work, it transitioned to a county-by-county system. Instead of 
being told to identify needy communities, itinerants were asked to limit their work to one or 
more counties. Knowing they would need to submit a report of all their activities to receive the 
second half of their pay, preachers had little incentive to spend time anywhere outside of county 
borders, regardless of how large an audience might be waiting there.  
 By 1800 the society had rationalized its network still further, by dividing Maine into 
seven missionary districts. For the most part, these districts corresponded to county lines. 
Districts one through five covered all of western Maine to the Penobscot River, using county 
lines and major rivers as boundaries. District six consisted of almost all of Hancock County, and 
seven was Washington County.25 The rationalization of the network in these years gave the 
SPGNA missionaries a lot more clarity. A missionary traveling “eastward” may not have known 
where to stop; a missionary traveling to one particular district did. By the mid to late 1790s, 
Samuel Eaton was receiving the kind of precise guidelines that Levi Frisbie had been looking for 
a few years earlier. For several years, the SPGNA asked Eaton to take a two-month mission 
covering “the vacant towns and Plantations in the Countys of Hancock and Washington.”26 Eaton 
knew how far eastward to travel. And he knew that his trip was circumscribed by Maine county 
boundaries. A trip over the international line was now explicitly outside his purview.  
 A further step the SPGNA took to refine its work was to make its itinerants census takers 
of a sort. This was perhaps the clearest example of the secularizing influence of state money on 
the Congregational missionary network in Maine. Gradually, ever since the first state grant, the 
                                                
25 “Maine Missionary Districts,” undated, Box 8, Folder 9, SPGNA, PL.  
26 Samuel Eaton Letters, Box 2, Folder 5, SPGNA, PL.   
 
 128 
emphasis had shifted from missionaries as preachers, to missionaries as book distributors. Now 
the missionaries were to serve as data gatherers. The SPGNA was invested in any information 
that could help it spend money more wisely, in part because every few years, it asked the 
Massachusetts General Court for a renewal of the state grant. And so itinerant ministers were 
asked to make certain inquiries in each community they visited, and submit all the information in 
a chart. This Congregational survey was not exactly a secular census, but neither was it 
exclusively religious. With this information the society could send missionaries to the towns 
where they were most needed, narrowing their focus from a whole county or district. It could 
also more effectively distribute books, especially schoolbooks.  
 The charts that have survived are nearly identical, though the ministers who created them 
were operating in different parts of Maine and were unlikely to have collaborated. It seems clear 
that the SPGNA gave detailed instructions. In 1804, for example, a Reverend Chadwick traveled 
through Kennebec and Lincoln counties, and produced a chart tracking the towns he visited, their 
populations, where their residents had emigrated from, what denominations were present, the 
local “religious disposition,” local ability to support schools, and the number of school houses 
and houses of public worship.27 The same year, from Hancock and Washington counties, Rev. 
Alfred Johnson sent a chart detailing the town names, the population at last census, the number 
of families, where they had emigrated from, the local denominations, how many people were 
actually church members, how much money was raised for “public religious instruction,” the 
number of school and meeting houses, and the name of the local minister, if one existed.28    
 A few questions, such as the one on emigration, seem particularly divorced from the 
SPGNA’s original, Congregational mission. This is the sort of data that would interest 
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government more than church officials. It also implies that a fair amount of detective work was 
required of the missionary. In order to get a detailed answer it would have been necessary to 
question several people in each community. Some ministers were more diligent than others. 
Alfred Johnson seemed to give up on the question for a while. He put “Casco Bay et cet” for 
eight towns in Washington County, and “Hingham et cet” for five more. Perhaps he got the 
impression that almost everyone in that particular region was from Southern Maine or Eastern 
Massachusetts and decided not to bother with details. Occasionally he went the other way, 
however, writing “Andover and Beverly and Bradford” for the town of Blue Hill and “Nova 
Scotia and Worcester” for Eddington.29  
  The limiting of itinerants to particular districts, the ongoing distribution of books, and 
the increased focus on information gathering had the biggest impact on the most rural 
communities of Maine’s borderland. Ephraim Abbott’s missions to Passamaquoddy Bay in 1811 
and 1812 illustrate how thorough SPGNA ministers became in their circuits. Like earlier 
missionaries, he preached in the larger towns, spending four Sabbaths in Robbinston, six in 
Calais, and a full three months in Eastport, providing ample opportunity for families from around 
the region to go and hear him. Yet Abbott also made several trips up the St. Croix River, to 
preach in tiny unnamed settlements to a handful of families at a time – he mentions specific trips 
to families in Townships One, Three, Six, Seven, Twelve, Seventeen, and others. Abbott could 
easily have devoted some time to the New Brunswick towns on the other side of the river. 
Indeed, it would have been much easier to do so than to travel upriver to reach extremely isolated 
families. He could also have visited Campobello Island, or Grand Manan Island, which were 
close by and had sizable settlements. The status of these islands, moreover, was still being 
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negotiated between the U.S. and Britain. Abbott, however, had his understanding of the de facto 
border, and he seems to have taken these limits very seriously.30  
 These changes tied even the most remote Maine families into the Congregational 
network. This is not to say that settlers committed to Congregational preaching exclusively. Most 
remained opportunists, willing to attend any available sermon. But their connection to the 
SPGNA was dependable and predictable. Though other ministers might show up – Methodists, 
Baptists, Quakers, or others – they tended to be independent actors. They were unpredictable, 
and not connected to a larger system. SPGNA missionaries were more reliable. They made an 
effort to cover the whole ground, and if one had been there before, another would arrive before 
too long. Knowing that, a remote family could make requests for books, pamphlets, and 
permanent settled preachers. The dependability of the SPGNA and the predictability of its 
itinerants meant that Maine families were not just listening to a message. They could speak out; 
they could communicate with the rest of Massachusetts. Congregational missionaries were 
building real connections between Boston and the most distant corner of the District of Maine.  
 And there was a further method of cultivating those connections and amplifying rural 
Maine voices: donations. Everywhere missionaries went, they asked for contributions. This was 
good for both the SPGNA and individual missionaries. An itinerant might not collect enough 
money to pay for the entire trip, but whatever he did collect he could have immediately, without 
having to wait months for his journal to be mailed to Boston, and the money to be sent in return. 
So in all these small towns and villages, the ministers asked for whatever contributions might be 
available, and noted the amounts received in their mission journals.  
 Hard currency was extremely difficult to come by in the borderland. These were young 
settlements far from urban centers. Farms were still in the process of being cleared; for the most 
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part the region only produced lumber and fish. David Owen, of Campobello Island in 
Passamaquoddy Bay, put it succinctly in a letter of 1788: “all payments are made in barter, there 
is no specie in the bay.”31 A cash donation, in such circumstances, was meaningful. It gave 
weight to the network being built by the SPGNA. All over Maine in the decades after 
independence, settlers in small communities scraped together those meaningful contributions. 
Ephriam Abbott, working in Washington County, received $10.05 from the people of 
Denneysville and the surrounding settlements. Abbott wrote, “they said they had received much 
benefit from the society, & that they hoped that they would grant them further assistance; that 
they needed preaching and books.” 32 Indeed, the SPGNA remembered them, sending the Rev. 
Daniel Lovejoy a few years later. He too, collected in the area, getting almost $17.00 in 
Denneysville and a whopping $73.00 in Robbinston, where he spent most of his Sundays. A few 
years later Lovejoy was traveling around the small mid-coast settlements between the Kennebec 
and Penobscot Rivers, collecting a few dollars here, and a few dollars there.33  
 
It was the late 1790s, just as the SPGNA was beginning to rationalize its missions and 
organize its information gathering, when Massachusetts decided to extend state funding to 
Catholics as well. This action came in response to a delegation of Maine Indians who approached 
the General Court together with Father Matignon of Boston. The new law granted two hundred 
dollars a year to Father James Romagne, who served in Maine for the next two decades. He 
returned to France in 1818, two years before Maine became an independent state.34  
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  The Massachusetts General Court provided several explanations for this generosity 
toward the Penobscot and Passamaquoddy: their service as “faithful auxiliaries” during the 
revolution, their frequent requests for priests during treaty negotiations, and the fact that 
Massachusetts was “now in possession of lands formerly their own.” The state went on, 
however, to describe the two Indian communities in almost exactly the same terms that had been 
used to describe white settlers when the SPGNA requested funds almost a decade earlier. In 
1791, the white settlers of Maine were described as “pitiable…rude, uncivilized” and too poor to 
access “knowledge human and divine.” They did not “feel as they ought the force of moral or 
political obligations.” Similarly, Maine’s Indians in 1798 were “reduced to a state of great 
poverty,” and could not afford to make the necessary “progress in virtue, morality, religion, and 
habits of industry and civilization.” Supplying them a state-sponsored priest would result in 
“great utility…both to them and to the state.”35 
 The General Court was also already committed to using Congregational church networks 
to spread morality and civilization in Maine. And it was aware that the money it was spending on 
this project was not reaching Penobscot or Passamaquoddy communities. The SPGNA was clear 
in its reports about the extent to which it was serving Native Americans. Its Alford fund was 
being used for two missions in southeastern Massachusetts and one in upstate New York. The 
society did not bother with Maine Indians because it knew that the earlier Congregational 
ministers sent there – at least five by the mid-1700s – had failed. Periodically, SPGNA 
missionaries made renewed inquiries, which were invariably followed by pessimistic reports. 
Hezekiah May, for example, worked the Penobscot River area for a few years starting around 
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1808. He told the society to continue to ignore the Penobscot Indians. They were already more 
solemn and devout than their white neighbors, and furthermore: “They think that they have a 
more authentic religion…they think that Protestantism is a mere temporary declension from the 
Catholic faith and communion, and that in more auspicious times…their heretical neighbors 
[and] the whole world will become of their religion.”36 
 The Commonwealth was therefore spending hundreds of dollars per year to “civilize” 
Maine, without reaching Indian communities. Funding a priest would expand state connections 
to all Maine communities, filling the gap. And the state had another motivating factor: it needed 
to counter a move by the British. Off and on, for the previous few decades, British authorities 
had attempted to draw the interest of Maine Indians eastward by placing priests on the Saint John 
River. They had most recently used this strategy during the war years.37 Now, a decade later, the 
British renewed their efforts by poaching the first resident priest assigned to the District of 
Maine after independence, Father Francois Rousset-Ciquard.   
Ciquard arrived in Maine in the early 1790s, part of a brief flood of missionary priests 
who fled to the United States from revolutionary France. Starting in 1791, around twenty French 
priests took refuge in the U.S., which roughly doubled the number of available priests in the new 
republic. John Carroll, the first American bishop, set to work sending these men where they were 
most needed. Many stayed in the eastern cities, but Carroll sent at least two to the Illinois 
territory, another to Indiana, and some to Kentucky. A few years earlier, a delegation from the 
Penobscot and Passamaquoddy communities had traveled to Maryland to ask Carroll for a 
resident priest for Maine. Carroll had been unable to help at the time, but he remembered the 
                                                
36 Hezekiah May Letter, Box 3, Folder 9, SPGNA, PL.  
37 These events are outlined in detail in chapter one.  
 
 134 
visit as he began to distribute the newly arrived French priests. Father Ciquard became the only 
priest sent northeast instead of west.38  
It is unclear exactly how Ciquard understood the parameters of his assignment. He had no 
real connection with the government of Massachusetts; his assignment came from Baltimore, not 
Boston, so he would have had no reason to consider the future boundaries of a Boston Diocese. 
He was certainly not collecting pay from Massachusetts. Furthermore, Carroll may not have 
mentioned the northern border as a limiting factor at all. Regardless of what he was told, it is 
clear that Father Ciquard chose to basically ignore the border. The Penobscot, Passamaquoddy, 
and Maliseet communities were all very closely related, so the priest served all three. And as 
previously noted, he was not alone. This was an early, chaotic period, when even Congregational 
ministers had no clear guidelines about the extent of their mission fields. It probably seemed 
quite natural for Father Ciquard to move back and forth across the border. For the first few years, 
however, he spent the majority of his time in the District of Maine.39  
In 1793, John Allen, the de facto Indian agent in the region, warned Massachusetts of 
troublesome developments in the borderland. Allen reported that the British might be 
“endeavoring to draw the Indians into New Brunswick,” to “secure their interest” in case of any 
conflict with the United States. Allen’s fears were well placed. When Sir Guy Carleton took up 
the role of Governor General of British North America in 1785, he was asked to try and “induce” 
Indians living within the U.S. to “remove within our territories, and to discontinue any 
intercourse” with the Americans. In New Brunswick, the result was a plan to convince Father 
Ciquard to relocate permanently to the British side of the line. “Several letters have been sent the 
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Priest,” wrote John Allen, “promising every attention, & a satisfactory compensation.” A boat 
was even sent, which anchored off St. Andrews on the borderline waiting to take Ciquard away. 
Allen claimed he did everything he could to convince the priest to stay, but to no avail. Now he 
was extremely concerned. If this worked the way the British intended, the Passamaquoddy would 
become “attached solely to [the British] government.” This would “operate very much against 
the settlement of the Eastern Country.” Though maintaining good relations with all Maine 
Indians was vital, the Passamaquoddy were particularly important. Their ancestral lands 
straddled the boundary line at Passamaquoddy Bay, so in any future border negotiation 
Massachusetts needed their support. This community could not look to New Brunswick for their 
religious needs; they had to remain oriented toward Boston. It was urgent that Massachusetts do 
something to secure the “interest and friendship” of the Passamaquoddy “as soon as possible.” 
Obviously this meant providing them with another priest – this one paid by the state to serve 
only on the American side of the border.40  
Meanwhile, the Catholic Church in Boston was growing and looking to assume 
responsibility for northern New England. After an unsettled postwar decade which saw a handful 
of priests come and go, the Massachusetts church began to stabilize. Another French exile, 
Francis Matignon, took charge in 1792. Matignon wrote to a former student, John Cheverus, and 
urged him to come to Boston to help. Cheverus arrived in 1796, and embarked on his first 
mission trip to Maine the following year. It was quickly apparent that someone would need to be 
based in Maine full time. Cheverus could not be that person, because Matignon needed his 
assistance in Boston. He could make an annual trip to Maine, but no more than that. And one 
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yearly visit would not be enough to prevent the Indian communities from looking across the 
border to Father Ciquard. Indeed, on that first trip in 1797, Cheverus found that Ciquard was 
already there, dipping back over the border on a visit with the Penobscot. The only way to keep 
Indian communities firmly oriented toward Boston was to appoint a full time resident priest who 
depended on Massachusetts for support. The Catholic Church in Boston and the Massachusetts 
General Court found that they suddenly had complementary interests. This led to the petition to 
the General Court, and its rapid approval.41 
The grant from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts had a greater impact than the state 
likely intended. It allowed the Catholic Church in Boston to expand its network in Maine, keep 
in better contact with both Indian Catholic and Irish Catholic communities, and serve more of 
their needs. Essentially, the government of Massachusetts subsidized the creation of a stable, 
effective Catholic Church in Maine during the twenty years that Father Romagne was on the 
state payroll. This while it was simultaneously subsidizing the creation of a stable 
Congregational network in the same place.  
It is unclear to what extent the General Court understood that this is what they were 
doing. Father Romagne had been hired to serve only the Passamaquoddy and Penobscot 
communities. He was even briefly considered Massachusetts’s Indian agent for those 
communities. And he was effective in that role. About a year after his arrival, Romagne aided the 
Passamaquoddy in successfully petitioning the government for a grant of ninety acres at Pleasant 
Point, near Eastport, Maine. He secured an additional three hundred dollars from the 
Commonwealth to build a permanent church on the same ninety acres, noting that it would 
“stabilize the tribe more efficiently.” He put a vaccination program in place by 1804, and 
claimed to have treated over a hundred and fifty members of both tribes. He alternated between 
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the Penobscot and Passamaquoddy communities, provided both with regular religious services, 
and made it unnecessary for them to travel to New Brunswick or invite Father Ciquard to cross 
to Maine. It seems that the government of Massachusetts did get what it paid for.42  
However, after a consultation with Father Cheverus, Father Romagne chose to withdraw 
from the official position of Indian Agent. The two men decided that Romagne would combine 
his work with Maine Indians with visits to the Irish Catholic communities of mid-coast Maine, 
exactly as Cheverus was already doing. Thanks to the state paying him to live in eastern Maine, 
Romagne was able to collaborate with Cheverus on a complementary schedule that allowed the 
two of them to cover the entire coast north of Boston throughout the year. Each summer, 
Cheverus left Boston and headed northeast, visiting Catholics in Portsmouth New Hampshire, 
Portland Maine, and the mid-coast towns around Newcastle and Damariscotta, before finally 
reaching the Penobscot and Passamaquoddy. Each winter, in turn, Romagne left the Indian 
settlements and travelled southwest, visiting the same mid-coast towns, then Portland and 
Portsmouth, and often continuing on to Boston. These dual trips allowed Catholics throughout 
the northeast to be connected year round. Romagne was able to distribute letters from Boston all 
along the coast, reassuring Maine families that they were important parts of the larger network. 
He was able to stop in multiple places, temporarily providing the services of a resident priest. At 
one point he quite explicitly integrated the Catholic network in Maine. Romagne spent the winter 
of 1805 with Irish Catholics in Newcastle, and apparently a substantial portion of the Penobscot 
community joined him, wintering there as well. The very first Catholic buried in Newcastle’s 
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newly consecrated Catholic cemetery was a Penobscot woman who passed away during that 
winter.43  
The connections fostered by the complementary travels of Cheverus and Romagne were 
vital in growing Maine’s Catholic Church. Cheverus took pains to nurture small Catholic 
communities, reassured them that they would receive regular priestly visits, and instructed them 
in how to conduct private services at home. From the start of his tenure in Boston, he purchased 
texts and spread them around the northeast. In 1797 he left “several prayer books” in Bristol, 
Newcastle, and other communities of mid-coast Maine and southern New Hampshire.44 
Cheverus provided extremely detailed instructions about the use of these prayer books. In letters 
he laid out particular chapters and pages to read on Sundays and other holy days, noting which 
were appropriate for morning and which for night. He reminded families that they should be 
ready for confession and the sacrament, because it would not be too long before he, Romagne, or 
another priest would visit. And he encouraged them to hold tightly to the church, to be tolerant 
but always faithful: “never forget that you belong to the Roman-Catholic Church…and that it is 
unlawful for you to attend the public worship of any other persuasion.”45 
By 1812, the combined efforts of Fathers Cheverus and Romagne over fourteen years 
created quite an extensive network in the northeast. The linked communities included 
Portsmouth, Portland, Newcastle, Wiscasset, Union, Bristol, Jefferson, Waldoboro, Edgecomb, 
Pittstown, Hallowell, Bangor, Gardiner, Whitefield, and of course the Penobscot and 
Passamaquoddy villages. And the whole system was facilitated by the state support that enabled 
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a priest to be based in Maine. The system would, in fact, decline once state support was 
withheld. When Maine separated from Massachusetts, the Penobscot and Passamaquoddy 
communities approached the new state government and asked it to continue the funding that 
Massachusetts had provided for two decades. Maine officials said no. For years afterward, the 
two Indian communities were left with occasional, temporary visits, but no resident priest. The 
network became unstable. It was the stability of Father Romagne, provided by two decades of 
annual state grants, that enabled Fathers Cheverus and Matignon to create a dependable network 
in which both white and Indian Catholics could depend on frequent contact and services from 
Boston. Neither group would need to look over the border to British North America for help.  
 
 
As Cheverus and Romagne began to link together Maine’s Catholic communities, the 
Congregational network continued to develop. During the first decade of the nineteenth century 
the SPGNA moved beyond simple book distribution, and began to organize schools. This move 
was partly inspired by a need to maintain the annual donation from the Commonwealth. At this 
point, there must have been some grumbling in Boston over the church-state partnership. What if 
Maine were to secede from Massachusetts? This was not a particularly far-fetched idea. 
Proponents of an independent Maine held several secession conventions in the late 1780s, and 
managed to arrange a test vote in the early 1790s.46 These efforts failed, but the issue had not 
been put to rest entirely. Why should Massachusetts continue to fund missionaries for a district 
that might break away? The SPGNA stated its case in an 1804 petition. Though separation was 
certainly possible at some point in the future, the society reminded the General Court that both 
states would always be part of the same nation.  
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The real danger lay not in a hypothetical, future state border, but in the real national one. 
Just as the Commonwealth feared losing Indian communities to the British, they feared losing 
white settlers too. Throughout the 1790s, as described in chapter two, the New England states 
steadily lost families –to Upper and Lower Canada, and also to parts of upstate New York that 
were connected to the Canadas economically. Thus far there had been less movement from 
Maine into New Brunswick or Nova Scotia, but it was happening occasionally. The government 
of Massachusetts needed to always be aware that its settlers were “situated near the people of a 
foreign province, the sovereign of which, regards the conditions of his subjects in the wilderness 
with a tender eye.” Massachusetts needed to ensure that Maine settlements were competitive, or 
people would understandably look elsewhere. The way to do this was through schools:  
The establishment of schools in those plantations is an object of great 
consequence. Could this be done, it would naturally induce people of sober life 
and conversation to remove into that part of the country, in preference to going 
into New York, the Canadas and other places without the Commonwealth.47 
 
The SPGNA missionaries were already serving the Commonwealth as public teachers of piety 
and morality. Now they would serve as schoolmasters too.  
 Appeals for more and better schools were a familiar refrain in the early republic, 
especially in the northeast. The calls for a more educated citizenry closely paralleled the kinds of 
sentiments found in the Massachusetts Constitution and in John Hancock’s call for state-
supported missionaries. The state constitution had called for Protestant ministers to promote 
“good order and the preservation of civil government.”48 Hancock believed that SPGNA 
missionaries would bring not just religion, but morality as well, as they spread the “knowledge, 
                                                
47 Petition, 30 January 1804, Box 6, Folder 1, SPGNA, PL.  
48 Commonwealth of Massachusetts, A CONSTITUTION OR FRAME OF GOVERNMENT, Agreed upon by the 
Delegates of the People of the STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS-BAY, 1779, The Founders Constitution, University of 
Chicago Press, accessed June 18, 2019, http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/print_documents/v1ch1s6.html. 
 
 141 
and information” that the District of Maine was lacking.49 Many other Americans felt the same 
way. At roughly the same time the SPGNA was incorporating in Massachusetts, Noah Webster 
of Connecticut published an essay “On the Education of the Youth of America,” in which he 
declared that in a republic, even the “yeomanry” required “an acquaintance with ethics and with 
the general principles of law, commerce, money and government.” This would soften the “rough 
manners of the wilderness” and promote the “principles of virtue and good behavior.”50 
Education was the best way to bring order to the brave new world of a free republic, and to 
create a nation of “virtuous, well-behaved citizens.”51 
 Not all of the states took on the issue of schools, and only a few invested substantial 
funds in the problem. These tended to be the states that were flush with cash from land sales. The 
borderland was booming, which gave states like New York and Connecticut the ability to be 
innovative with their schools. In the mid-1790s, New York State decided to put in place an 
experimental program with the proceeds from land sales. It allotted fifty thousand dollars per 
year for five years for a grant program: towns that required schools could receive a generous 
state grant if they pledged matching funds. This was successful in the short run, and led to a 
striking expansion in schools and enrollment. But it was expensive, and the New York legislature 
was unwilling to call for local property tax money for schools. So the program was allowed to 
lapse.52 
Connecticut put together a similar program that ended up being much more successful. 
That state retained the right to a giant tract of land called the Western Reserve, which eventually 
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became the northern part of Ohio. In 1795, Connecticut sold this tract for 1.2 million dollars, 
with which it created a school fund. Like New York, Connecticut set up a partial grant system, 
though it apparently did not require a matching grant to be pledged. Many towns used the annual 
state grant to provide a few months of free school, and then offered a supplementary program 
that charged a small tuition. By the early years of the nineteenth century, the 1.2 million dollars 
was producing over 50,000 dollars a year of interest for Connecticut’s school fund, and the state 
had perhaps the best school system in the country.53  
 Massachusetts had the oldest school laws in North America, but the Commonwealth was 
a bit slower than its neighbors in providing state funding. The General Court did pass a law in 
1789 with certain educational requirements. Towns with fifty or more families were required to 
provide at least six months of elementary school, and towns with two hundred or more families 
had to add a grammar school with instruction in classical languages. This law, however well 
intentioned, did not amount to much. Most towns in Massachusetts were already providing some 
schooling, and there was no real enforcement of the grammar school requirement, and no explicit 
state funding as in New York and Connecticut.54  
 Though the General Court may not have been willing to provide explicit state funding or 
property taxes, it did have a way of supporting schools on the Maine frontier. It had the 
partnership with the SPGNA. Those frontier counties in the District of Maine were not only the 
most needy, as new settlements, they were also the most concerning, because of the proximity of 
British North America. So the state chose to continue the annual grant to the SPGNA, with the 
understanding that the society would be active in promoting schools.  
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 In a brief memo, the society lauded the “patronage and liberality of the Legislature,” 
which would allow the society “the means of extending their usefulness…by aiding in the 
establishment and support of schools.”55 Their first attempts were a bit haphazard. Just as 
mission trips had evolved to become more meticulous and circumscribed, the SPGNA’s work in 
schools became more methodical over time. First the society asked its ministers, who were 
already collecting town data, to add inquiries about where schools were most needed, and which 
communities might be able to cover at least part of the cost. Then they started handing out 
teaching assignments. These went to men and women alike. Eunice Cushman received a contract 
for Davistown, in mid-coast Maine. Thomas Peabody was sent to Gilead. Lucy Gould took on 
duties in Caratunk, and Hannah Gilpatrick in Cornish.56  
The new focus on Maine schools proved to be a wise strategy for the SPGNA. Not only 
did it help ensure that state money kept flowing, it also stimulated more private donations. The 
SPGNA did not have a lot to brag about when it came to building exclusively Congregational 
church communities. Methodists and Baptists were not losing ground in Maine. But even as 
missionaries bemoaned their lack of success in conversions, they continued to distribute printed 
material to grateful communities. Paul Coffin, in 1797, wrote that poor preaching was luring the 
people of western Maine into “a religion of the imagination and into strange and very hurtful 
opinions.” He was only given the opportunity to perform two baptisms on his trip, both infants. 
But the people he spoke to welcomed his books.57 In 1808, according to Stephen Chapin “the 
Baptists have prevailed. Their success has inspired them with fresh zeal and confidence and 
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rendered them more cool toward your missionaries.” Maine families were happy, however, to 
accept the over a hundred pamphlets and bound volumes Chapin distributed.58  
Maine settlers could reject Congregational baptism or choose to ignore preaching. No 
one, however, could afford to turn down books or schools. Parents wanted education for their 
children, and this, according to Chapin, was how Congregationalists could maintain their 
influence: 
I think that it would be wise, if some missionaries were employed in teaching schools in 
the winter. We have little reason to expect a reform among those who have arrived to the 
meridian of life. Their opinions, habits, + prejudices are too deeply rooted to be 
eradicated. It is among the rising generation that we must look for a reformation.59 
 
In years to come, the society would hear similar reports from missionary after missionary. Even 
as they lost ground in terms of baptisms, they gained contributions for schools. Residents of 
Maine towns who would never have otherwise contributed to a Congregationalist gave money to 
the SPGNA to preserve their schools. And private donations in Massachusetts increased as well, 
as the society was able to tout its success educating the rising generation of Americans in the 
borderland. As the years went on, other missionary societies were founded in Massachusetts and 
joined the SPGNA mission in Maine, greatly increasing the money, manpower, and printed 
material circulating in the district. This development, which will be detailed in chapter four, led 
to the creation of still more schools in the smallest central and eastern Maine settlements, and the 
training of a small army of teachers to supply them. Increasingly, Maine’s borderland 
communities had not only a steady supply of books, but also an organized network of schools. 
The distinction between Maine and New Brunswick communities sharpened, as the American 
side of the borderland became more closely tied to this Boston-based Congregational network. 
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 The difference between the connections created in Maine by Congregationalists and 
Catholics, and those created in New Brunswick by Methodists and Anglicans, was stark. The 
Americans kept men and printed material flowing into the U.S. side of the borderland with the 
help of state funding. Their British rivals did not do the same. Throughout the decades discussed 
above, as the SPGNA sent minister after minister to eastern Maine, only two state sanctioned 
preachers served the nearby British settlements. Duncan McColl, a Methodist, resided in St. 
Stephen from the mid-1780s. Reverend Andrews, an Anglican, served in St. Andrews from 
roughly the same time. These men provided stable preaching, but they rarely traveled away from 
Passamaquoddy Bay, and visits from other British preachers were practically unheard of.  
Essentially, the fact that these men were ensconced in their communities meant that for Anglican 
and Methodist authorities, Charlotte County, New Brunswick was taken care of. It was not a 
cause for concern.  
 As a result, however, unlike their neighbors on the American side of the border, British 
subjects in Charlotte County remained disconnected from larger political or religious networks. 
This was ironic, since the population was higher and needs greater on the British side of the 
border. Because of loyalist refugees and other migrants looking to take advantage of Britain’s 
liberal land grants, almost two thousand settlers arrived on the eastern side of Passamaquoddy 
Bay over a two-year period in the 1780s.60 It would take years for the population of the Maine 
settlements on the western side to catch up. But while Congregationalists brought those 
settlements into their network almost immediately, no one did the same for New Brunswick. 
Itinerants did not arrive to deliver books and solicit donations. Families never had the 
                                                




opportunity to invest in the same sort of connection with Saint John or Halifax. They existed 
essentially on an island.  
 For years, Rev. Andrews provided the only connection Charlotte County families had 
with the Anglican Church. For most of each year he was in St. Andrews, but each autumn he 
would travel to settlements around the bay, preaching and performing baptisms. Many families 
needed his services. Rev. Andrews’s records indicate that he paid annual or biennial visits to at 
least five locations on the New Brunswick side of the bay: St. Georges, St. Stephens, St. Davids, 
Maguagadavic, and Digdeguash. He also visited Deer and Campobello Islands, which were still 
disputed territory, though under nominal British control. By September of most years there were 
quite a few new arrivals waiting for baptism. In 1787 he baptized at least twenty-four children; in 
1792 he baptized twenty-five. Considering the number of baptisms he performed, there must 
have been sizable crowds in the settlements around the bay for his preaching. Yet at no point in 
the late eighteenth or early nineteenth centuries did the Rev. Andrews receive help from other 
Anglicans.  
 The reason for this is clear in the papers of the Anglican Bishop of Nova Scotia, Charles 
Inglis. There was simply no manpower. Inglis found it difficult to secure ministers for even his 
most important positions, and when he could find available preachers, they tended to be 
Americans. This was an issue from the beginning of his tenure. Inglis arrived in Halifax in 1787, 
to find that the very first minister who called on him was there to announce his departure for 
New Hampshire. This was followed by the death of the resident minister in Saint John, the 
largest settlement in New Brunswick. Inglis chose the Rev. Mather Byles, a loyalist from Boston, 
for the job. The Anglican hierarchy apparently pushed back against the appointment, however, 
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leading Inglis to warn them that the congregation in Saint John was being led into division and 
confusion by unscrupulous “Methodist teachers who have no check to their career.”61  
 The authorities must have relented, because Byles soon assumed the position. Inglis was 
reminded, however, to “be wary of [holding out] too much encouragement and invitation to 
American-bred divines.” Inglis’s frustration was obvious in his letters back to England. The only 
available ministers were “American-bred divines.” They kept contacting Inglis and asking for 
work. The Reverends Bowden and Wright, of Connecticut and New York, respectively, 
volunteered their services while Inglis was trying to fill the Saint John position. Meanwhile a 
Rev. Cockran from New York simply arrived on Inglis’s doorstep, volunteering to be sent 
anywhere he was needed. And since most of the settlers in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick 
were from the “revolted colonies,” they often requested ministers from their previous homes. 
Parishioners in Saint John, in fact, had requested a Reverend Moore, from Hampsted, New York, 
and only agreed to the Rev. Byles when Moore declined.62 
 Even as Inglis was trying to fill vacant positions, some of his established ministers were 
also giving him trouble. Perhaps as a way of convincing his superiors to agree to install Byles, 
Inglis argued that effective ministers were in short supply. At that moment, in the winter of 1788, 
there were eleven men serving the province. “Of these,” Inglis wrote, only “four are diligent, 
useful clergymen,” while “three are indifferent, neither doing much good or harm, and as for the 
remaining four, it would be happy for the Church if they were not in her orders.”63 Weak, 
ineffective clergymen were a further problem because they would be unable to counter the 
efforts of other sects – not only the Methodists, but an even more troublesome group. “A set of 
                                                
61 Charles Inglis to Archbishop, 18 December 1788, MG1, Vol. 479, Charles Inglis Papers, Nova Scotia Archives 
(hereafter NSA), Halifax, Nova Scotia.   
62 Inglis to Archbishop, June 28, 1788; Inglis to Mr. Cumberland, 5 May 1790, Inglis Papers, NSA. 
63 Inglis to Archbishop, 18 December 1788, Inglis Papers, NSA.   
 
 148 
enthusiastic Anabaptists, called here…New Lights have got footing” in the town of Granville, 
Nova Scotia, Inglis wrote. Since Granville only saw an Anglican missionary a few Sundays a 
year, for the rest of the time they “can hear no other than those fanatics.”64  
 Inglis was pressured from all sides. American-bred ministers requesting positions, New 
Lights with no ordination infiltrating his congregations, and a mere trickle of approved, British 
educated ministers arriving in his provinces. And it was only going to get worse. John Wesley, 
Inglis noted, was appointing Methodist Bishops, with powers of ordination, in the American 
states. “A numerous clergy will be the certain consequence,” Inglis wrote, and “shoals of these 
clergymen and ministers will pour into the British colonies.” Meanwhile, loyal British subjects in 
Nova Scotia who wished to become ministers would be forced to go to school in the states 
themselves, where they would “imbibe principles that are unfriendly to the British 
constitution.”65 The only solution was to set up a college. Congregationalists could train 
ministers at colleges in New England. Inglis needed to be able to train his own Anglican 
ministers in Nova Scotia.  
The creation of King’s College, though eventually successful, was an arduous process. 
Inglis pressed for the school from the beginning of his tenure, mentioning it in letter after letter. 
Before it was even in operation, he began trying to collect students, noting that he “prevented 
three young men from going to college in one of the revolted colonies” in 1788.66 But it would 
take over a decade, until 1802, for the school to be chartered as a university.67 Throughout the 
1790s, it floundered. Inglis’s school developed a reputation as unreliable, and perhaps doomed. 
In a 1798 letter, the Anglican Bishop of Quebec wrote that he heard the Nova Scotia college had 
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only three students and was, effectively, a failure. Again, loyal subjects in British North America 
were faced with the necessity of sending their young men to the Americans – who, according to 
the bishop, still had “much of the old leaven among them.”68  
As the 1790s gave way to the 1800s, across the Gulf of Maine the SPGNA was using its 
annual state grant and increasing donations to hire more ministers, purchase more books, and 
expand its Maine network. Meanwhile, Bishop Inglis never had the money or manpower to build 
anything comparable in British North America. In fact, the only person capable of moving 
around the district, connecting communities to an Anglican network and distributing books, was 
Inglis himself. This was a daunting task. The District of Maine may have been large, but the 
Inglis’s diocese was gargantuan. New Brunswick alone is as large as Maine, and Inglis was also 
in charge of Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island (then St. John’s Island), and Newfoundland. For 
the first five years of his tenure Inglis was even responsible for Quebec, until a separate bishop 
of Canada was appointed in 1793.  
Even considering the massive size of his diocese, Inglis could likely have done more to 
connect it. Over the years he displayed a distinct reluctance to travel. He never bothered with a 
visit to Newfoundland, and only visited Cape Breton Island once. Prince Edward Island received 
one visit as well: in 1789 as Inglis embarked on his only visit to Quebec. Inglis visited New 
Brunswick, but there is no evidence that he ever included the Passamaquoddy Bay settlements in 
his travels. There were even some Nova Scotia communities, like Yarmouth at the far 
southwestern tip of the peninsula, which he ignored. 69 Furthermore, a visit from Inglis brought 
no guarantee of books, or even of preaching. During his one visit to Prince Edward Island, 
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settlers in Charlottetown asked him to preach in the “coffee and ball room,” because they had yet 
to build a church. This, they said, was the room they had been using for services. Inglis flatly 
refused, “that I might in the most pointed manner shew my disapprobation of the contempt 
thrown on Divine Worship by having it celebrated in so very improper a place.”70 This as Inglis’ 
rivals in Maine were preaching in any available space, and sometimes out in the open air.  
In the first years of the nineteenth century Congregationalists continued to funnel 
resources into Washington County, Maine, while Anglicans continued to ignore Charlotte 
County, New Brunswick. As a result, British subjects began to look over the border for help. In 
the mid-1810s, Rev. Daniel Lovejoy performed annual missions to the American settlements on 
Passamaquoddy Bay. His home base was Robbinstown, Maine, directly across the St. Croix 
River from St. Andrews. According to Lovejoy’s letters, in 1817, several people from St. 
Andrews attended his services in Robbinstown and asked him to come preach in their town on a 
regular basis. Feeling uncertain, Lovejoy met with the Rev. Andrews, who was then over eighty 
years old and could only preach once a month. Andrews “readily and cheerfully consented” to 
Lovejoy’s preaching, and so the American crossed over to preach “near every Sabbath” while he 
was simultaneously serving Robbinstown. Lovejoy was clearly conflicted, since he knew the 
SPGNA had not intended for him to preach in British territory. He did not bring any books to the 
New Brunswick communities. But St. Andrews was a large town, and Lovejoy got big crowds, 
“more hearers in this place than any other.” The people also took up a collection and contributed 
more than twenty dollars to the SPGNA, hoping they could continue this cross-border 
partnership.71  
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Still detached, after over thirty years, from their official state church and its networks, 
these British subjects responded to the only organized effort to reach Passamaquoddy Bay, even 
though it was American. Unfortunately for the parishioners of St. Andrews, their attempt to link 
themselves to Maine’s Congregational network did not work. The de facto border held. There is 
no evidence that Lovejoy was chastised for his transnational sermons, but there is also no 
evidence that the SPGNA did anything to foster this nascent connection to New Brunswick. 
Though donations to the SPGNA from communities in Maine kept the missionaries coming, the 
donation from St. Andrews did not have the same effect.  
The experience of Methodists in New Brunswick mirrored that of Anglicans. The church 
had one minister in Charlotte County, Duncan McColl. The man in charge, William Black, was 
in Halifax. And like his Anglican counterpart in St. Andrews, McColl was left to fend for 
himself. In 1804, he had been ministering to the town of St. Stephen for about two decades. In all 
that time, he wrote, he had received three visits from his “brethren,” and at least one of these was 
a visit from the American side of the border. In 1795 Jessie Lee, a Methodist serving in Maine, 
traveled to the Passamaquoddy Bay settlements. Then Lee and McColl together traveled 
westward, all the way to the annual New England Methodist conference in New London, 
Connecticut.72 There seems to have been no opportunity offered McColl to make a similar trip 
eastward to Halifax, and as time went on even the sixty miles to Saint John became too difficult. 
William Black, in the early 1800s, noted that McColl had been “nearly stationary for a number of 
years back.” He occasionally encouraged McColl to trade pulpits with the minister in Saint John, 
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but it is unclear whether the two men managed to accomplish this. In an 1815 letter, McColl 
expressed his happiness at being able to visit Saint John for the first time in years.73  
William Black could do little to help Duncan McColl because he had the same problems 
as Charles Inglis. Methodists in the Maritimes were chronically short of manpower, and even 
once positions were filled there was no guarantee they would stay that way. In the early 1800s, 
the committee in London repeatedly asked Black to make a trip to Bermuda, to assist in the work 
there. After he dodged the requests for years, the committee switched gears, asking that Black 
send the Rev. Marsden, from Saint John, New Brunswick. This was unacceptable, Black wrote. 
Saint John had over a hundred members in its Methodist society. They had a half-dozen classes 
and no competition except for the Anglicans. It would be terrible for that community to lose its 
preacher before a replacement could be secured. Meanwhile, he had a crisis in Prince Edward 
Island to deal with. The minister there, a Mr. Bulpitt, cut off all communication with his fellow 
Methodists, to the point that Black was forced to send one of his Nova Scotia ministers to 
investigate. He learned that Bulpitt had caused a schism in the island’s church community 
because of his heavy drinking. Black would have liked to get rid of his rogue minister to heal the 
schism, but Bulpitt and his wife refused to leave. Hannah Bulpitt had started a successful school 
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in Charlottetown, which provided the couple with income independent from the Methodist 
church.  
Black, then, had very little flexibility to manage his ministerial positions, and not much 
support from London. As a result, in New Brunswick, the status quo remained unchanged for 
decades. In 1812, William Bennett took over responsibility for the district from William Black. 
Over the following years, Bennett traveled all over his new jurisdiction, and in 1817 Charlotte 
County finally got a visit.74 In St. Stephen, Duncan McColl had also been serving for three 
decades, and he was still the only Methodist available for the entire British side of the bay. 
Bennett wrote to London that the community of St. David was large and still growing, and 
needed a missionary of its own. McColl could not effectively serve multiple communities any 
longer, and before long he would be gone and St. Stephen would be vacant too. In fact, McColl 
and Bennett spent some of the visit discussing the former’s plans to bequeath his property to the 
church upon his death.75   
The lack of a strong Anglican or Methodist network meant that resources, most notably 
books, were not delivered to New Brunswick communities in the same way they were delivered 
to Maine communities. It is not as if the British did not try at all. Both sides made efforts to 
distribute printed material. What is certain is that Congregationalists in Maine, and to a lesser 
extent Catholics, were far more organized and thorough in putting book distribution plans into 
action. As noted above, the SPGNA devoted hundreds of dollars annually to purchasing printed 
material. It divided Maine into districts and made sure someone in each district was assigned to 
organize the distribution. It demanded each missionary keep careful track of the numbers and 
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titles of books distributed. Nothing similar happened in the British Provinces. Bishop Inglis did 
distribute some printed material. In a letter sent the summer of 1788, soon after his arrival, he 
mentioned that he had supplied tracts to several communities around Halifax, in addition to 
sending all he could spare to St. John (Prince Edward) Island. At that point, however, all the 
books Inglis brought from England had been distributed.76 In his correspondence over the 
following years, Inglis mentions the perpetual need for books and his willingness to help secure 
them, without detailing a specific plan for doing so.  
As for the Methodists, Duncan McColl at least seems to have been in permanent need of 
books. He brought up the issue frequently in his letters. In 1804, he noted that the “want of books 
is much against us.” A year later he apologized for his lack of funds and inability to commission 
books, but hoped “well wishers in the cause of Christ” might send some. A decade later, he was 
still making requests. His church, McColl wrote, was thriving. He claims to have added a 
hundred people over the course of the year. But they were “in great need of books.” Even “the 
smallest number will be thankfully accepted” and would “attach [the people] more firmly to the 
cause.”77 Two years later, in 1817, McColl continued to make the same request.  
Neither the Anglicans nor the Methodists ever put in place a network that could ensure 
that books were distributed in an orderly fashion in the British side of the borderland. This 
divergence, between “horse loads” of books circulating in eastern Maine, and a perpetual want of 
books in New Brunswick, began to create a real difference between the two sides of the de facto 
border. Politically and economically, the boundary was still blurry. American citizens and British 
subjects still had much in common. Families still migrated easily over the border, and politicians 
from both sides avoided conflict in the interest of developing the entire borderland region. But 
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the Congregational and Catholic networks, both based in Boston, both subsidized by the state, 
were gradually creating an area in which the border mattered. And with the addition of new 
missionary societies, new fundraising techniques, and greater participation from women, this 










































 “Ladies Cent Societies” and the Expansion of Maine’s Congregational Network 
 
 
 For a little over a decade after its incorporation in 1787, the Society for Propagating the 
Gospel Among the Indians and Others in North America (SPGNA) had the District of Maine to 
itself. There were independent Baptist and Methodist preachers to compete with, but no other 
organized Congregational societies to help. Then suddenly, new missionary societies began to 
form at a rapid pace. At least six joined the effort in New England, and three of them – the 
Massachusetts, Evangelical, and Maine Missionary Societies – chose to focus on the settlers of 
Maine. These groups aimed to cooperate with the SPGNA rather than compete with it, so they 
set to work building on that society’s existing network.  
 These new societies did not get started with the help of state funding, as had the SPGNA. 
Instead, their initial growth came thanks to an innovation pioneered by the women of Boston: the 
Cent Institution, popularly known as the “ladies cent society.” Around 1800, just as the 
Massachusetts Missionary Society (MMS) was beginning to get organized, women around 
Boston began donating a penny per week for missionary work and pooling their individual gifts 
into large contributions. Cent society donations quickly made up a substantial percentage of the 
MMS treasury. The idea then spread, and as cent societies multiplied, Congregational leaders 
found they had a large pool of potential funds. Within just a few years, there was a blueprint for 
success. When the Maine Missionary Society (MEMS) formed, its first order of business was to 
call on women. At the inaugural meeting in 1808, members voted to address a letter “to the 
Ladies…soliciting contributions (as cent societies).” By 1810, women over southern and western 
Maine had contributed over two hundred dollars to the MEMS. By 1811, they made up well over 
 
 157 
half the total donation pool. From about a hundred dollars at its founding, the MEMS treasury 
grew tenfold in just three years, thanks largely to ladies cent societies.1  
 Almost as soon as they were founded, the MEMS and other new missionary societies 
were able to join with the SPGNA and help expand the Congregational network that was 
building a meaningful border in Maine. This was a crucial development. The SPGNA would not 
have made much of a difference alone. The District of Maine was too large, and supplying 
missionaries and books to the furthest eastern settlements meant that large swaths of the district 
were not well served. Once new missionary societies were born they could collaborate, 
organizing their mission fields to make sure that together they covered the whole region. This 
accelerated the re-orientation of the borderland, as eastern Maine communities that had been 
mostly connected to New Brunswick became increasingly better connected to Massachusetts. It 
was the funding provided by ladies cent societies, and the stimulus it gave to the domestic 
missionary movement in New England, that made all this possible.  
 
None of this would have happened without the changes in the Congregational mission in 
Maine that are described in the previous chapter. The process began with the 1790 grant from the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts to the SPGNA. After the infusion of state funds, the work of 
the SPGNA in Maine began to change. The society chose to redirect its fundraising efforts away 
from preaching, now covered by the state grant, and toward the distribution of books and the 
founding of schools. This partial secularization of the Congregational network opened up 
opportunities for the women of Maine that had not existed before. Women had always interacted 
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with SPGNA missionaries – in fact, since they made up the majority of churchgoers, women 
interacted with missionaries more often than men did. But women could not help build the 
network, because they could not serve as preachers. They could, however, serve as teachers. 
When the SPGNA began handing out teaching contracts, they went to men and women alike. As 
these teachers took positions along the edges of settlement in central and eastern Maine, the 
Congregational network became more and more extensive.  
This reconceived, partly secularized mission saw immediate success. Many Maine 
settlers who were suspicious of an overtly Congregational network were more accepting of one 
focused on books and schools. But the SPGNA alone could not keep up with demand. The 
population of the District of Maine was growing very quickly. In 1790 the district had about one 
hundred thousand residents. By 1810 that had more than doubled, and by 1820 it had tripled.2 
When it separated from Massachusetts in 1820, Maine became the largest New England state by 
area, and the second largest by population.3 As early as 1800 the SPGNA, even with a state 
grant, needed assistance. And so the new Congregational societies began to form. Because they 
wanted to cooperate rather than compete with the SPGNA, they copied its approach, focusing on 
distributing books and opening schools. By the War of 1812 the network was thriving, reaching 
into the furthest, most sparsely settled areas of eastern and central Maine.  
 Meanwhile, the multiplication of missionary societies in the northeast went hand-in-hand 
with the growth in women’s fundraising. Each fledgling Congregational society was faced with 
the same problem. Massachusetts was not going to extend a state grant to every new society. Not 
even the SPGNA grant was permanently guaranteed. The new societies had to find a way to 
                                                
2 Publius Research, “Population Since 1741,” Maine: An Encyclopedia, accessed June 18, 2019, 
https://maineanencyclopedia.com/population-since-1741/.  
3 Connecticut reclaimed the number two spot in population by 1890. Today Maine remains in third place behind 
Massachusetts and Connecticut, narrowly edging out New Hampshire.  
 
 159 
complement the work of the SPGNA without its state funding. The invention of the cent society 
provided the answer. Though typically women were not able to become official, dues-paying 
members, cent societies created a sort of subsidiary membership – a middle ground between full-
fledged membership and donor anonymity. Because cent societies pooled individual donations 
into large grants, they were prominently featured in the published papers of the missionary 
organizations. Women’s groups could see how much they were contributing relative to other 
women in neighboring towns, and relative to the dues-paying men. Women also began to 
assemble large enough donations to set conditions on their use. As this system grew, it created a 
blueprint for still more missionary societies. Ambitious ministers knew that they could create a 
donor base almost immediately by making an appeal to women. The organizations fed off each 
other: more organized giving led to new missionary societies, while new missionary societies led 
to more organized giving. By 1810 the Congregational network in Maine was thriving, thanks 
largely to ladies cent societies.  
 The shift from a focus on preaching to a focus on teaching, the opportunities that shift 
opened for women, and the symbiotic relationship between ladies cent societies and new 
missionary groups led to women becoming key players in the Congregational network in Maine. 
Women paid for a large portion of the printed material flooding into the district. Women also 
provided much of the funding for the training of schoolteachers, themselves mostly women, who 
built a network of schools in the remote communities of Maine. By contrast, just over the border 
in New Brunswick, British church networks remained exclusively masculine. It took years for 
Anglicans and Methodists to take advantage of women’s fundraising or enlist women as 
teachers. The result was a more haphazard state-building process, and a resulting divergence in 
available resources. No similar networks of book distribution or schools materialized. The lack 
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of teaching opportunities for women in New Brunswick effectively sealed the border to newly 
trained female teachers, bottling them up in Maine and accelerating the resource divergence. A 
surplus of teachers in far eastern Maine connected the borderland to Massachusetts even more 
strongly. Families in tiny settlements in Eastern Maine received not just Bibles and pamphlets, 
but actual schools, while families just a few miles away in New Brunswick did not. The 
integration of women into the Congregational network and Massachusetts’s state-building 
mission, therefore, was critically important – not just to the growth of the missionary movement 
in America, but also to the creation of a meaningful border in the northeast.  
 
One of the first groups that arose to complement the work of the SPGNA was the 
Massachusetts Missionary Society (MMS). This society was similarly born in Boston, and its 
founders positioned it as almost an exact replica of the SPGNA. The stated object of the new 
society was a clear echo of the established group: while the latter was dedicated to the 
propagation of the gospel to the Indians and others in North America, the MMS declared its 
object was to “diffuse the knowledge of the gospel among the heathen as well as other people in 
the remote parts of our country where it is seldom or never preached.” To prevent anyone 
thinking they intended to be competitors, however, the MMS founders made clear that they 
wished only to assist in the good work: “To exclude all misconstruction and prejudice,” they 
wrote, “we solemnly declare, that it is totally foreign from our views, to weaken the evangelical 
influence of any society of a similar complexion already existing.”4 
There were a few differences between the stated goals of the two societies. In the first 
place, the Massachusetts Missionary Society made clear from the start that its mission was to the 
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people of “our country.” In doing so, the MMS stated directly what was already a tacit 
understanding among Congregationalists: though the border may have been open for some, it 
was closed for their missionaries. At its own founding, the SPGNA had implied that its field 
encompassed all of North America. In practice, however, as described in chapter three, any 
border crossing for SPGNA ministers tapered off during the first decade or so of missionary 
work. By the end of the 1790s, the society had moved on from vague eastward missions to 
clearly delineated circuits that were limited to the District of Maine. It became clear that the 
name of the organization notwithstanding, the SPGNA saw its responsibility as limited to the 
citizens of the United States. By the turn of the century, the SPGNA was appealing for state 
funds by naming Mainers as “part of the nation” and “our brethren,” and drawing a contrast with 
those on the other side of the border, who were “people of a foreign province.”5 As new 
missionary organizations like the Massachusetts Missionary Society formed, they chose to adopt 
what had become the SPGNA’s de facto, more limited field.  
The MMS also learned from the SPGNA’s experience with ever more circumscribed 
mission fields. The older society had experienced several phases from the late 1780s through the 
early nineteenth century. While in the early years, missionaries were simply asked to travel 
“eastward,” as the 1790s progressed they were asked to limit their circuits to particular counties. 
Eventually these circuits shrank still further, with missionaries asked to base themselves in one 
or two primary communities. The MMS was founded just as this second shift was underway, and 
its founders were clear that missionaries’ circuits should be as limited as possible. Each minister 
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would be asked to remain in one or at most two towns the vast majority of the time, although 
they could travel further at their own discretion “if specially called in Providence.”6  
In their initial meetings, the founders of the MMS went into some detail about how they 
hoped the society would function. They would not have the state funding that was going to the 
SPGNA, so they intended their more limited funding to be used more carefully. Instead of 
repeatedly sending itinerants, they hoped to plant the seeds for settled ministers. By placing each 
man primarily in one community, the society hoped that community would feel “obligated to pay 
a certain proportion of his support.” As time went on these communities would take on more and 
more responsibility for paying the missionary, until eventually they paid his full salary and he 
became a settled minister. This was a clear departure from the SPGNA’s practice of simply 
requesting donations in every town along a lengthy circuit. The MMS founders believed this was 
inefficient. Maine settlers, they wrote, were not likely to feel comfortable giving much money to 
a man in transit, or a Boston-based society they knew little about. But if a minister was a local, 
familiar figure, and was able to “suit [his] discourses to their circumstances,” they might be more 
forthcoming.7 
There were other benefits to a smaller circuit. The MMS hoped that its missionaries could 
collaborate and consult with other ministers, both stationary and itinerant. It also hoped that this 
plan would allow for a more efficient distribution of books and pamphlets. It would give 
ministers a chance to seek out potential teachers who were “sound in the faith,” and assist in the 
founding of new schools. And perhaps most importantly, the founders hoped that their ministers 
would be able to form “societies for religious worship” in the communities surrounding their 
home bases. The MMS missionary would be responsible for visiting each of these societies 
                                                




several times a year, but he would also appoint a suitable person to lead each group in his 
absence. Hopefully, in time, these sub-group leaders “might…become missionaries 
themselves.”8  
Obviously, then, the new Massachusetts Missionary Society had ambitious plans. It did, 
however, have one major problem. It needed money. Its founders wanted to immediately send 
missionaries to Maine to begin the partnership with the SPGNA, while also possibly sending a 
few men west to evangelize the Yankee-settled towns of upstate New York. Yet embarrassingly, 
in its first year the MMS was only able to attract thirty-eight members, and could not afford to 
hire any missionaries at all. Something needed to be done to step up donations.9 
 By 1802, year three of operations, the situation had begun to improve. Increasing 
financial stability meant that the MMS could afford to hire four missionaries. Membership was 
up, but even more significantly, women began to appear on the donor rolls in substantial 
numbers. Two developments stand out in that year’s treasurer’s report. In the first place, women 
made up about a quarter of the individual donors listed, and likely accounted for many of the 
anonymous donations as well. It seems that a number of women around Boston had decided to 
donate to the society as if they were members, even though they would not be formally enrolled. 
At the same time, some women in the area began to experiment with pooling their donations. 
There were two sizable donations listed from the Reverend Daniel Hopkins in Salem: one from 
his society in general, totaling sixty-six dollars, and one from “a number of females of his 
society,” totaling twenty-three dollars. Another group, listed only as “Female Society, Boston,” 
gave forty dollars.10  
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 This “Female Society” was the Boston Female Society for Missionary Purposes, one of 
the first organized women’s benevolent organizations. Mary Webb, a particularly devout twenty-
one year old Bostonian, created it in 1800. Ms. Webb was a Baptist, but after hearing (or perhaps 
reading) a sermon delivered in the support of the MMS, she fell into a “passion for missions.” 
Though the MMS was Congregational, there was no Baptist missionary society for her to 
support, so she gathered some friends to raise funds for the Congregationalists.11  
 The Boston Female Society for Missionary Purposes did not play a long-term role in the 
Congregational missions in Maine. It soon disappeared from the MMS treasurer’s reports. But it 
is worth mentioning Ms. Webb’s society here for two reasons. First, it appears to have pioneered 
the practice of specifying that a donation be used for Bibles and other books. This was the only 
donation in the inaugural MMS trustees report that was listed with conditions: it was “to 
purchase books to be sent on by the missionaries.” This set a precedent. When the first cent 
society began its donations two years later, it made similar specifications. Second, Mrs. Webb 
decided that her missionary society would charge two dollars as annual dues, which was exactly 
the same amount the MMS charged its members. This was rather steep. Later Baptist women’s 
organizations charged fifty cents annually, and even the men’s Baptist societies only charged one 
dollar. Once cent societies were created, they asked for fifty-two cents per year. The most logical 
reason for Mary Webb to request a full two dollars was to imitate the MMS. Her society 
provided the first chance for women in Boston to contribute to missionary work as if they were 
full members of a missionary society.12  
 It was around this time, as women like Mary Webb were experimenting with fundraising, 
that the first of what would become a flood of ladies cent societies appeared. There are 
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conflicting stories about how the idea arose. One story, told decades later, placed the genesis at a 
dinner in Boston in 1799. A Mrs. McFarland, the first treasurer of the New Hampshire Cent 
Society, claimed that a group of ministers were drinking wine at her uncle’s home in Boston, 
when they had the thought to forgo one glass of wine each and donate that cent to missionary 
work. Somehow the ladies of Boston took up this idea, and Mrs. McFarland herself claimed 
credit for bringing the concept north to New Hampshire.13 A similar (and more likely) story 
gives credit to Mrs. Mehitable Simpkins, whose husband John was the treasurer of the 
Massachusetts Missionary Society. This story begins at an 1802 dinner party at the Simpkins 
home. Conversation at the party turned to the fundraising problems of the missionary society. 
Someone, inspired by the cost of a glass of wine, suggested the penny per week plan. Mrs. 
Simpkins decided to put the idea into practice, and the first cent society was born.14  
 One reason the cent society concept was able to spread so quickly was its obvious 
similarity to a well-known Bible passage: the story of the widow’s two mites. This story appears 
in two different gospels, Mark and Luke. In both gospels, Jesus is preaching near the treasury of 
the Temple in Jerusalem. He points out to his disciples that while many rich men are donating 
large sums to the treasury, one poor widow offers only “two mites.” In the version from the 
Gospel of Luke, Jesus says: 
of a truth I say unto you, that this poor widow hath cast in more than they all: for all these 
have of their abundance cast in unto the offerings of God: but she of her penury hath cast 
in all the living that she had.15 
 
Obviously, most of the women who chose to contribute to cent societies were not poor widows, 
and they were asked to donate fifty cents a year, not two. But the idea of a small sacrifice making 
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a big difference appealed to many people. And the parable provided an excellent selling point for 
the society: if a poor widow was willing to give her last few pennies for the church, then surely 
almost any woman in Boston could part with one penny per week.  
 The cent society idea was immediately successful. Mary Webb’s Boston Female Society 
for Missionary Purposes had managed to gather forty dollars for its first donation. Just one year 
later, Mehitable Simpkins and her fledgling “Cent Institution” presented the MMS with three 
hundred dollars and fifteen cents. This was the result of a subscription paper circulated by 
Simpkins “in Boston and various other towns.” Like Mary Webb’s society, the cent institution 
was limited to females, and specific about the use of its donation. Women had given their cent 
per week “to be laid out in bibles, primers, catechisms, Dr. Watt’s psalms and hymns, and divine 
songs for children.” The donation covered a massive amount of these books. Almost two 
hundred bibles and several hundred other books and pamphlets were provided to missionary 
Jotham Sewall in Maine, and there was enough money left over to supply a smaller amount of 
books to two other missionaries serving to the west.16   
 The cent society concept, almost overnight, became an indispensible part of missionary 
financing in Massachusetts. The MMS was doing rather well by 1804. Membership was growing 
fast, and around three hundred men were paying the two-dollar annual dues. Six hundred dollars 
annually was impressive, but Mrs. Simpkins and her donors had managed to produce fifty 
percent of that total on their first try. This one organization quickly made up a third of the MMS 
donor base, and its contributions would only increase. In 1805, Mrs. Simpkins made two separate 
gifts of around five hundred dollars to the MMS. By the following year, she had contributed 
almost two thousand dollars. Within five years Simpkins’s society was contributing over a 
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thousand dollars per year to the MMS. This purchased an enormous amount of books. Over a 
four-year period, from 1807 to 1810, cent society donations to the MMS from around the greater 
Boston area paid for almost four thousand books.17  
The quick success enjoyed by the Massachusetts Missionary Society was inspiring, and it 
occurred to Congregationalists around New England that the missionary industry still had room 
to grow. More societies began to appear, in Connecticut, New Hampshire, and elsewhere in 
Massachusetts. Two chose to focus almost all of their attention on Maine: the Evangelical 
Missionary Society and the Maine Missionary Society, both founded around 1808. By this point 
the Massachusetts Missionary Society had been around for a decade, and it had been four years 
since the first cent society donation. The playbook was becoming clear. Each new society knew 
it could quickly step into an auxiliary role in Maine, cooperating with the SPGNA and other 
societies. And each new society knew it could rely on women for funding. 
The Evangelical Missionary Society (EMS) was an effort by Congregationalists in central 
Massachusetts to get in on the action. Though the SPGNA and MMS envisioned themselves as 
statewide societies, they were based in and around Boston. Of the twenty-one men listed in the 
act of incorporation for the SPGNA, for example, sixteen lived in Boston, Brookline, or 
Cambridge.18 The initial membership base of the MMS was similar. The EMS, by contrast, was 
born out of Congregational associations in Worcester and Middlesex counties to the west. Its 
founding members were from the towns of Worcester, Concord, and Shrewsbury.19 The EMS 
founders were also aware that a shift from sermons to schools was taking place in the 
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Congregational network, as their mission statement made clear. The SPGNA, two decades 
earlier, vowed to “propagate the Gospel among the said Indians…and also among other people 
who through poverty or other circumstances are destitute of the means of religious instruction.” 
The EMS, recognizing the changes brought by state funding and cent society donations, went 
straight to books and schools. It intended to expand Christian knowledge through the 
“distribution of pious and religious books and tracts, [and] by aiding and supporting 
schoolmasters.”20 
In the summer of 1808, just as the MMS had a decade earlier, the EMS reached out to 
other societies in an effort to be allies rather than rivals. Both the SPGNA and the MMS 
responded warmly. Mission districts had not yet been set for the upcoming year, so it would be 
simple to harmonize their efforts.21 The general attitude held that the more funding streams 
applied to the District of Maine the better. And its funding stream, the EMS rapidly learned, 
would be coming from ladies cent societies. In the four years since the first cent society 
donation, the idea had clearly spread. The EMS’s inaugural treasurer’s report lists a contribution 
of over eleven dollars from “Sundry Young Ladies of Concord,” in addition to several sizable 
donations from individual women of the town. All told, the women of Concord donated over 
thirty dollars, outraising some entire communities. The following year, the same women 
officially identified themselves as the Ladies Cent Society of Concord, and donated close to 
twenty dollars.22  
This was the start of the dominance of cent societies in the finances of the EMS. Each 
year the Ladies Cent Society in Concord made its contribution, and each year more groups joined 
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in the giving. In 1811 the Ladies Cent Society of Watertown began contributing, and the 
following year so did a society in Waltham. In 1813 those three societies were joined by one in 
Ashburnham, and in 1815 by two more in Weston and Templeton. By the end of the decade the 
treasurer had to double up the listings to keep all the cent societies on the tally sheet. Salem, 
Worcester, Marlboro, and Burlington had all joined the effort. Cent society contributions 
increased to the point that they became the second most important source of funding for the 
EMS, after membership dues. The growth was remarkable, especially compared to other funding 
sources like the collection at the annual meeting. In 1813 the EMS made seventy-two dollars at 
its annual meeting, and received forty-six from the ladies cent societies. In 1814, the two sources 
were almost at parity: fifty-seven from the meeting, fifty-two from the cent societies. After that, 
the ladies rapidly outpaced the annual meeting. In 1815 the cent societies contributed one 
hundred seventy three dollars, almost three times the annual meeting collection, and the 
following year it was one hundred and fifty to forty seven. The various cent societies had made 
themselves indispensible to EMS finances.23   
 The Maine Missionary Society (MEMS), founded at roughly the same time as the EMS, 
provides the clearest illustration of the well-oiled machine that the Congregational missionary 
system had become. Its founders incorporated knowing they would get their society off the 
ground quickly, by calling on Maine women to provide the necessary funding. And they knew 
that all they needed to do was add their labor to an already successful network. The blueprint was 
clear, and all the Maine ministers had to do was follow it.  
The MEMS was essentially a rebranding of a previous organization, the Lincoln and 
Kennebec Religious Tract Society. This group had been in existence since 1802, and over five 
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years managed to distribute over 20,000 books and pamphlets in Maine. In 1807, the tract society 
“resolved themselves” into the missionary society, so as to broaden the mission to itinerant 
preachers and schools. At their first meeting after reorganizing, the MEMS made it clear that it 
would replicate the work of the SPGNA almost exactly. Those two groups were already in 
contact, and letters were being sent to the rest of the missionary societies. The goal was for the 
MEMS to act as an agent, “…for dispersing the books, for recommending suitable men in said 
district, [and] for pointing out the places where their services shall be most needed.”24 
 The next order of business was funding, and as noted above, the MEMS made its appeal 
to women. The women of Maine responded with alacrity. Though only four years had passed 
since the cent society concept was born, it appears to have taken New England by storm. The 
first treasurer’s report, one year after the appeal, shows contributions from cent societies in 
Minot, Bath, and Caratunk. A year later, in 1810, societies in Portland, Gorham, Hallowell, 
Winthrop, Yarmouth, and more joined in. At this point, the MEMS reported collecting a little 
less than two hundred dollars annually from membership dues and at the yearly meeting. Ladies 
cent societies far outdistanced that, contributing close to three hundred dollars. The following 
year they neared the three hundred dollar mark again. Cent societies appeared throughout the 
mid-coast region as far as Newcastle, and up the Kennebec River Valley as far as Norridgewock. 
The larger communities in southern Maine contributed huge sums: the society in Portland made a 
yearly donation of around eighty dollars, and two individual societies in Yarmouth contributed 
close to a hundred dollars a year combined. By 1811 the MEMS had gone from a hundred dollars 
in the bank to almost a thousand, and was carrying a surplus from year to year.25  
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 The MEMS began its mission, as its predecessors had, by supplementing the work of 
already established societies. At the SPGNA’s request, the Maine society directed an SPGNA 
missionary to the area around the Sandy River. Similarly, they directed a man from the 
Hampshire Missionary Society to the western border communities of Rumford and Lovell. At the 
same time, however, the infusion of cash from cent societies allowed the MEMS to carve out a 
place for itself. It began by dividing central and western Maine into mission “stands.” Within 
two years of the society’s incorporation, as hundreds of dollars flowed in from cent societies, the 
MEMS was able to begin sending its own missionaries to cover these stands. A few years later, 
the society was employing itinerants and supplementing the salaries of settled ministers in 
Pittston, Brewer, and other central and western Maine towns.26  
 One result of the MEMS’s arrival on the scene and immediate fundraising success was 
that it allowed the SPGNA to use more of its resources in far eastern Maine, near the border with 
New Brunswick. The eastern Maine settlements, especially the area around Passamaquoddy Bay, 
had always received particular attention from the SPGNA. The society was advised by several of 
its missionaries to focus on the region. In 1808, missionary Stephen Chapin identified Eastport 
and the surrounding area as the most important missionary field in Maine. When the new Maine 
Missionary Society began corresponding with the SPGNA a year or so later, the two groups 
collaborated in creating their map of mission stands. All of the MEMS stands were located west 
of the Penobscot River. The newer society would direct its resources to the mid-coast region 
around Bristol and Cushing, to the upper reaches of the Kennebec River near Norridgewock and 
Caratunk, and to Rumford, Lovell and other towns in the mountainous region bordering on New 
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Hampshire. The SPGNA, for its part, would cover eastern Maine. Eastport and the 
Passamaquoddy settlements were the very first stand on its list.27 
 As the Massachusetts, Evangelical, and then Maine Missionary Society formed, and 
resources flooded into the American side of the northeastern borderland, there was nothing 
officially preventing these societies from extending their assistance across the border into British 
North America. Indeed, at first glance, it is puzzling that they chose not to. The vast majority of 
the pre-loyalist settlers in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick were New England 
Congregationalists, and their churches did not simply vanish in the aftermath of the revolution. 
As the missionary network in Maine was growing in the 1790s and 1800s, there were 
Congregational communities in the provinces that were looking for support. Liverpool Nova 
Scotia and Sheffield New Brunswick, for example, were both trying to secure a trained 
Congregational minister, and residents of those towns wrote to New England asking for help.  
It would have been relatively simple and logical for the societies to create a borderless 
mission field in the northeast. The pioneer society, the SPGNA, had originally envisioned its 
mission as encompassing all of North America. The MMS did commit, in its founding 
documents, to serve the people of “our country,” but there was nothing in the founding 
documents of the EMS or MEMS limiting those societies to the boundaries of Maine or the 
United States in general. They relied largely on cent societies for funding, rather than a state 
grant, so they had no obligation to avoid spending state money outside the bounds of 
Massachusetts. The MEMS, moreover, was quite ambitious in its early years. Due to the “great 
objects which the society have in view,” it investigated the possibility of sending missionaries 
west to the Mississippi country, or even east to Africa. The stated goal of the society was to 
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“send the glorious gospel to those who are destitute of…religious instruction.” This description 
could apply to people just about anywhere.28  
The Maine Missionary Society, then, was the most likely candidate to cross the border, 
due to ambition and simple geographic proximity. And it did at least consider the possibility. In 
the summer of 1816 the MEMS made plans to send the Rev. Daniel Lovejoy to the Saint John 
River in New Brunswick, with an eye to assisting the town of Sheffield. Sheffield, mentioned 
above, was one of the communities asking for help. Its church dated back to the 1760s, and by 
the 1800s it was one of the only Congregational communities left in New Brunswick. By 1816 
Sheffield had been without a stable minister for over twenty years. And yet, for some reason, 
Lovejoy never took the trip. He may have simply declined. He continues to show up on the 
payroll, but only for missions in Maine. There is no record of any further attempt by the MEMS 
to aid New Brunswick. 29   
It appears that the collaborative nature of the Congregational mission in Maine played the 
most important role in keeping the network limited to the American side of the border. Each new 
society, in order to quickly begin operations, attached itself to the already existing network 
created by the SPGNA. That society limited itself to serving Massachusetts citizens, in part 
because it was forced to repeatedly justify its existence to the Massachusetts General Court as it 
requested the renewal of the state grant. The new societies, even though they did not receive a 
state grant, ended up acting as if they did. Over time, the idea that the border limited these 
societies came to be taken for granted. Decades later, in the 1830s, some remnant 
Congregationalists in the Maritime Provinces made a direct appeal to the Maine Missionary 
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Society for help. They were dismissed, because “the operations of the Society are restricted to 
the State.” According to its founding documents, this was not actually true, but it seems practice 
had solidified into policy by that point.30  
 By the second decade of the nineteenth century collaboration between the missionary 
societies of Maine had settled into a comfortable routine. Fueled by the rapid rise of the cent 
society phenomenon, and building horizontally off the original state-sponsored network of the 
SPGNA, they attempted to leave no part of Maine untouched. Working together, they were now 
reaching almost all of the district’s settlements, from the western border with New Hampshire 
and Lower Canada to the eastern border with New Brunswick. At this point, the affiliated 
societies began to use their resources to support organized networks of schools.  
As usual, the SPGNA pioneered the practice. Around the turn of the nineteenth century 
the society began to argue that it could “extend its usefulness” to Massachusetts by helping to 
establish and support schools in the “new towns” of the District of Maine. The argument was 
based explicitly on the contemporaneous openness of the northeastern borderland. The SPGNA 
pointed out that settlers departing Massachusetts proper had many options, including Upper and 
Lower Canada and the rest of British North America. A network of schools in the new 
settlements of the District of Maine might entice settlers to stay within the bounds of the 
Commonwealth. As new Congregational missionary societies attached themselves to the SPGNA 
network, they too promoted this new focus on schools. As noted above, neither of the two 
missionary societies founded in the eighteenth century – the SPGNA and MMS – mentioned 
schools in their founding documents. The two societies founded in the first decade of the 
nineteenth century both did. The state itself joined in, as it promoted settlement in the District of 
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Maine. In a public advertisement for Maine land, the Commonwealth Land Office reminded 
prospective settlers that if they chose the district “you will remain an integral part of 
Massachusetts, and…numerous associations…will diffuse the blessed tidings of the Gospel 
within your walls, and send public qualified teachers to…aid in instructing your offspring.”31 
This development opened the door for women use their labor to actively participate in 
extending the missionary system. Women had been interacting with the missionary societies 
since they first arrived in Maine, but not in active roles. The ministers who founded the 
missionary societies were all men, and the missionaries they sent to Maine were also all men. 
These missionaries, however, interacted with women. In fact, they interacted primarily with 
women. Often when an itinerant missionary arrived at a household, women and children were the 
only ones present, and so missionary journals and letters are filled with references to 
conversations with women. William MacLean, travelling in 1800, referred to the homes he 
stayed in by names of the male head-of-household, and yet he appears to have spoken almost 
exclusively with women:  
Lodged at Mr. Lawrence, whereof I spent the evening agreeably his wife being a serious 
woman…visited young Mr. Nickels, where I had some agreeable conversations with his 
wife a serious woman…when preaching an aged lady Mrs. Nickerson appeared to be 
uncommonly affected…she (Nickerson) shew’d me a letter she lately received from a son 
& daughter in Hampshire State giving an account of a remarkable revival of religion in 
the town where they live…32 
 
Later MacLean was asked to speak with a young woman who had apparently been preaching 
herself, and the two had a lengthy confrontation. The woman informed MacLean that she “found 
herself irresistibly constrained by the power of God to speak in public,” and he did his best to 
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dissuade her. He was relatively diplomatic, however; he apparently felt this woman was genuine 
in her faith, if a bit too enthusiastic for his taste. Obviously MacLean was leaning heavily on the 
hospitality of women in his travels, and he did not want to alienate anybody. He wanted women 
to participate in the mission without actually preaching.33 
 Things were much the same a few years later in Washington County. Alexander Maclean, 
moving from house to house in Calais, seems to have been referred from woman to woman: 
“Aug 13 – Visited Mrs. Brewers, whose sister Mrs. Goddard I had some agreeable conversation 
with the preceding evening at Mr. Down’s – After spending an hour with her, at her request I 
went…”34 And Jonathan Fisher’s trip around the mid-coast communities a few years after that 
was remarkably similar. Fisher noted the names of people he baptized, and they were almost 
entirely female. When he did baptize males, they tended to be the sons of the women who were 
seeking him out. At one point, for example, he baptized Peggy Douglas and two other women, 
and then a few days later he baptized Douglas’s four sons, in addition to two more women. 
Whenever Fisher mentioned calling on people in their homes, he always noted meeting either the 
woman of the house alone, or the husband and wife together. Speaking one on one with a man 
was exceedingly rare.35  
 Over and over again, whether in private homes, meetinghouses or churches, 
Congregational itinerants interacted with women. The evidence from their letters and journals is 
backed up by other studies, which show that during this time period women made up the 
majority of churchgoers. According to some estimates, in mid-eighteenth century southern New 
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England women made up a full seventy percent of Congregational Church members.36 Almost all 
of the settlers in late-eighteenth century Maine were migrants from southern New England. 
When we consider these facts alongside the practice of soliciting donations and book 
distribution, it is fair to conclude that women were donating money and receiving books. Since 
women were often the only adults present during home visits, this must have been relatively 
common. Furthermore, when it comes to book distribution there is at least some direct evidence 
linking women to the bibliographic network. Missionaries did not typically name individual 
book recipients in their letters or journals, but there was an exception. In 1806, Alfred Johnson 
included with his journal a list of names. He seems to have treated it as a sign-up sheet, asking 
anyone who took a book to sign his or her name. And several women did indeed sign the sheet: 
Mary Tufft, Sally Mathews, and Nancy Nesmith.37  
Obviously, then, Maine women provided a great deal of enthusiasm for the 
Congregational project, and an enormous potential labor pool. But though they could interact 
with itinerant ministers, donate money, and receive books, they could not build the network as 
workers. Women could not preach or baptize children. Though ladies cent societies began to 
provide the funding for a massive amount of printed material, male ministers continued to serve 
as the actual distributors. Once the focus shifted to schools, however, women began interacting 
with the missionary societies in a new way.  
Starting around 1804, the SPGNA began hiring both men and women for positions as 
teachers. At first, this was a bit haphazard, with contracts handed out seemingly at random.38 
Towns that needed a teacher contacted the society, and it tried to address their needs. As new 
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missionary societies were founded, however, they recognized an opportunity to work together to 
organize and rationalize the system. Societies tried to pool their resources to ensure they were 
serving as many communities as possible. The key figures in this process were a few ministers 
who were able to combine funding from multiple missionary societies, most notably John 
Sawyer and Peter Nurse.  
John Sawyer put his system together in the new communities north and northwest of 
Bangor. In letters to the missionary societies, he described an educational crisis in the region. 
Sawyer was at the frontier of settlement. He was surrounded by twenty-four relatively new 
communities, and within those communities he claimed to have over three thousand children 
who required schooling. He set up his first school near Dexter in 1815, and within a few years 
was using funding from three different societies to support a network of schools for both girls 
and boys. Combining resources from all three societies enabled Sawyer to offer teaching and 
preaching year round; over one year, for example, Sawyer was paid for four months by the 
SPGNA, four months by the MEMS, and three by the MMS. Those societies supplied him with 
hundreds of books as well, which he distributed throughout his network. It is unclear from his 
letters exactly who the teachers leading Sawyer’s schools were, but at one point he did mention 
the arrival of some teachers from the rest of Maine and points west. It seems likely that the 
missionary societies referred some teachers to Sawyer, while others were teachers he himself 
trained.39  
 At roughly the same time, Peter Nurse was taking charge of schools along the coast of 
Maine east of Penobscot Bay. Nurse later claimed to have personally educated nearly fifty men 
and women who subsequently took teaching jobs, and he took credit for spreading schools 
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throughout Hancock and Washington counties. The process began sometime around 1810, when 
Nurse was a missionary based in Ellsworth, Maine, and, like Sawyer, was collecting pay from 
multiple societies. Nurse was one of the first two men hired by the newly formed Evangelical 
Missionary Society in 1808. Within a year or so he had settled into a regular role in and around 
Ellsworth. He managed to secure additional funding from the SPGNA, which, added to his salary 
from the EMS and the donations he received from the Ellsworth community, enabled him to 
remain more or less permanently.40  
The people of Ellsworth and the surrounding towns were happy with Nurse’s preaching, 
but thrilled with the new schools. By 1811 Nurse had established a central school in Ellsworth 
that produced graduates who could assume responsibilities for schools of their own. The summer 
of 1811, Nurse reported that at least six young women who he had trained in Ellsworth had 
found teaching engagements.41 At the same time, a local committee was writing to the EMS 
praising Nurse and pledging to do whatever they could to raise local funds for his support. They 
hoped that the EMS would likewise continue to supply regular funding.  
we are also a divided people; though less so than we have been…Mr Nurse’s preaching, 
his manners and conversation and especially his schoolkeeping are producing gradually a 
great change in the feelings of those who have heretofore been displeased with such men. 
He is really doing wonders in school…His scholars, who are numerous and include many 
of the young men and women of our town, will not many of them be fond of hearing such 
ignorant preachers as have heretofore distracted this and most new settlements.42 
 
A number of Congregational ministers reported on this phenomenon – Maine settlers were either 
tepid or actively hostile, until the conversation shifted from preaching to schools. According to 
John Brewer, who like Nurse visited the area around Penobscot Bay, locals had “violent 
prejudices against ministers of education…I must use their expressive language, they don’t like 
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these ‘grand folks.’” 43 Nurse himself reported that there were several families in Ellsworth who 
only tolerated him for the sake of their children. The town committee in its reports to 
Massachusetts admitted that while practically everyone in town wanted Nurse as a schoolmaster, 
only about half would support him as a settled minister. 
 The schools received a lot of support in part because they were decidedly secular. It is 
difficult to determine exactly the extent to which Congregational principles entered into Nurse’s 
schools. In one letter, he mentions instructing local youths in “the English language and in the 
principles of Christianity.” But in another, more detailed letter, he describes his curriculum as 
consisting of reading, spelling, grammar, writing, arithmetic, geography, history, navigation, 
French, Latin, Greek, and rhetoric. Nurse mentioned with particular pride one class “of eight, 
headed by a young man about twenty-two years old and closed by a little girl not quite seven, 
which has been nearly through the Primer and has advanced about forty lines in Virgil.” John 
Sawyer’s schools further north were similar. He did mention distributing catechisms to his 
students, but claimed to be teaching reading, spelling, writing, grammar and arithmetic. This sort 
of program, as we will see, was decidedly different from what Anglican-affiliated schools 
offered on the British side of the border. Those schools ran into more resistance from the 
majority, non-Anglican population. Congregationalists realized that their secular approach to 
schools was keeping people happy, while allowing their missionaries more influence than they 
might otherwise have had.44  
 Accordingly, the SPGNA and EMS continued for years to support Nurse in spite of his 
letters making it clear that the preaching side of his duties was not going particularly well. In 
May 1817, Nurse bemoaned the fact that his church had no new members, and in fact was losing 
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congregants to the Baptists. The schools, however, were still coming along nicely. In the same 
letter, Nurse mentions seven men and eighteen women who he had educated and sent out to 
teach over a “tract of country more than 150 miles in length.” If this estimate was accurate, his 
students were spread through all of Maine between the Penobscot River and the border with New 
Brunswick. Nurse facilitated this distribution of teachers by creating a program that allowed for 
the rapid expansion of his network of schools. He decided to offer small villages a deal: if they 
would pay a teacher for ten weeks, then he would cover an additional five with missionary 
society funds. This way he could spread the money to as many communities as possible. 
According to Nurse’s 1818 update, his partial funding plan was so popular that he was carrying a 
surplus of funds from year to year, even as the number of schools grew. The SPGNA and EMS 
must have realized that Peter Nurse’s school network was a good investment.45  
 Nurse’s protégés included both male and female teachers, but the women outnumbered 
the men. As early as the summer of 1811, six women educated in Peter Nurse’s school in 
Ellsworth were employed teaching their own small schools. The numbers would only increase 
from there. By 1815 Nurse reported that he had fifteen women employed in the region, and two 
more in Ellsworth. And there were still more communities seeking teachers – the requests came 
in faster than Nurse could fill them. In addition to all the women, Nurse had two men teaching 
nearby, and two more who would be available soon. Even during the war years of 1813 and 
1814, when Nurse claimed, “the people are cut off from almost every means of making money,” 
he managed to find employment for five of his teachers, four women and one man.46 
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Even before Sawyer and Nurse set up their school networks, the horizontally integrated 
network of Congregational missionary societies had already created a distinction between the 
American and British sides of the northeastern borderland. The new societies adopted the 
SPGNA’s focus on serving Massachusetts residents exclusively, even though they were not 
explicitly limited by state funding. Each new society that joined the network added enough 
funding for hundreds, sometimes thousands, of additional books and pamphlets to be distributed 
in Maine communities. The new societies also allowed the SPGNA to invest heavily in serving 
the easternmost section of Maine, making sure that the Americans furthest from Boston, and 
closest to the British settlements, received a great deal of attention. The effect was a gradual re-
orientation of the American side of the borderland. Communities there were still closer 
economically to New Brunswick than they were to Massachusetts. But they were increasingly 
well connected to a Boston-based network. From afar – in negotiations between Washington and 
London – this still seemed like a shared zone, with a boundary that could be shifted by 
diplomacy or war. On the ground, however, this network was making Maine less a borderland 
and more an integral part of Massachusetts.   
 The burgeoning school networks accentuated this process, in part because of differences 
between New England and British North American attitudes toward schools. While women were 
immediately welcomed into the Congregational network in Maine as teachers, they could not 
pursue teaching opportunities in New Brunswick. This essentially bottled up the supply of 
female teachers, making it easier for even the smallest Maine settlement to organize a school, 
while larger communities close by in British territory went without.  
One reason for this was the secularization of the Congregational network in Maine. 
Maine schools, in an effort to appeal to all, essentially threw out anything that was explicitly 
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connected to Congregationalism. The earliest missions and mission-sponsored schools in the 
British provinces, by contrast, were supported by the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel 
in Foreign Parts, and were overtly Anglican. By 1800 there were fourteen of these SPG schools 
spread through New Brunswick. Often the SPG missionary himself served as the schoolmaster, 
but if an outside man was hired, he was required to conform to the Church of England and be 
willing to teach the Anglican catechism. The school program was devoted to Anglicanism first, 
and all else second. The Standing Orders of the Society were clear. Memorizing and 
understanding the Church catechism was the primary goal, and women were not permitted to 
serve as teachers.47  
The SPG’s stringent requirements and Anglicanism made it difficult for them to grow 
their school network in the way the Congregationalists grew theirs. As far back as the 1760s, 
when settlers began to stream into what would become Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, the 
SPG was trying to open more schools. Local agents of the society attempted to combine SPG 
funds with settler subscriptions, as Nurse did in Maine, but could not always find a willing 
teacher who fit their qualifications. A minister in Windsor, Nova Scotia complained in the mid 
1760s that he needed at least two teachers for that community, and could not find a qualified man 
willing to take the job for the money being offered. Moreover, only a few settlers were Anglican, 
and many objected to the “proselytizing character” of the SPG schools.48 Sometimes these 
dissenting settlers would pool their resources to hire an itinerant teacher, but this was a 
dangerous proposition. It was practically impossible to investigate the qualifications of such 
men, and they developed a reputation as unreliable drunkards. One prominent Maritime Baptist, 
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48 James Bingay, Public Education in Nova Scotia: A History and Commentary (Kingston, ON: The Jackson Press, 
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Edward Manning, complained later that the schools of his youth were “miserable.” His teachers 
“were commonly intemperate. The last four I had were all fond of stimulants…the whole 
population in rural districts suffered in like manner.”49 
It would certainly have been easier to secure a schoolteacher if the positions had been 
opened to women, but that move was delayed for decades. The first breakthrough came with the 
introduction of the so-called “Madras” schools. The Madras, or Monitorial system, was one in 
which more advanced students assisted the primary teacher in educating less advanced students. 
It was growing in popularity in the early nineteenth century British Empire. The system arrived 
in British North America in 1820 when a teacher training school opened in Halifax, and Madras 
schools began to appear in New Brunswick within a year or two. Slowly, women began to 
assume roles as teachers. But this was at least fifteen years after the SPGNA began to employ 
women in Maine, and a decade after Peter Nurse’s graduates began to spread eastward from 
Ellsworth. Furthermore, prejudices remained strong. It took until 1838 for Nova Scotia to pass an 
act authorizing female teachers for that province’s public schools. The gap is remarkable – 
Congregational missionary societies had begun hiring women to teach in state-subsidized 
schools in Maine over thirty years earlier.50  
Just as the British Provinces were slow to enlist women as teachers and expand 
educational options, Provincial church networks were also slow to call upon women as 
fundraisers. The feedback loop between ladies cent societies and missionary organizations is 
another phenomenon that might have overlapped and blurred the border, had the idea spread 
throughout the borderland early enough. However, it took about twenty years for British church 
networks to adopt the plan. This is a bit surprising. Communication between New England and 
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the Maritimes was frequent. Boston and New York newspapers frequently made their way to 
Halifax and Saint John, and papers in the latter communities reprinted American news regularly. 
Clearly Maritime residents were aware of the organizing that was going on to their south. Many 
of the independent congregations in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick were originally founded as 
Congregational churches. And the New England missionary societies were making some effort at 
trans-border communication. In its first years, the Massachusetts Missionary Society sent letters 
around the Atlantic world, requesting news of the state of religion in various places. At least one 
letter was sent to New Brunswick, because the MMS printed a response in its magazine.51  
Why then, the delay? There were several contributing factors. In the first place, 
Congregationalists in New England were far better equipped to create missionary societies than 
any non-Anglican group in British North America. The most likely candidates in New 
Brunswick and Nova Scotia were probably the Baptists, but Baptists had nowhere near the 
resources enjoyed by New England Congregationalists. Nor did they have a chance at the kind of 
state funding that enabled the pioneer Massachusetts society, the SPGNA, to get off the ground. 
Baptists also tended to be too independent and haphazard in their travels to form a missionary 
plan. These men, singly or in small groups, travelled wherever they believed they had been 
called by God to preach. They saw the whole unconverted world as their field. And they were 
not used to the idea of collecting official compensation. Baptists were supposed to simply go 
where the Lord directed, with faith that families along the way would provide assistance. 
Collecting a salary was something a “hireling ministry” would do; it was exactly the sort of 
materialism the Baptists had always used to attack representatives of the more established 
churches. One Nova Scotia preacher noted in the 1820s that he had spread the gospel for three 
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decades without “promise of pecuniary remuneration.” As Baptists began to consider setting up a 
system for compensating missionaries, this man agonized over the changes.52  
It took until 1814 – twenty-five years after the SPGNA began operations in Maine, ten 
years after the rise of cent societies – for the Baptist Association in the Maritimes to even begin 
to organize a domestic missionary network. Even then, the moment was so late in arriving that 
much of the energy was already taken up by foreign missions. In the first missionary excitement, 
after the 1814 Baptist Association meeting in Chester, Nova Scotia, the entire collection of over 
£8 was donated to foreign missions. It was almost as an afterthought that the Association 
members later appointed the first two domestic missionaries to itinerate locally, and vowed to 
raise the necessary funds. After that the missionary field grew year to year: in 1815 men were 
sent east of Halifax, in 1816 to the northeast coast of New Brunswick. By 1818 missionaries 
were being sent to these places plus the Saint John River settlements, the south bank of the St. 
Lawrence, and to Black Nova Scotian communities around Halifax.53  
Just as had been the case in New England two decades earlier, female societies rapidly 
assumed a role as the major donors for home missionaries. In the Maritimes, they were dubbed 
“mite societies” rather than cent societies, but the form and function seem to have been the same. 
The first appeared in New Brunswick in 1818, when the Female Mite Society of the City of Saint 
John donated £4, 17s to the Nova Scotia Association. This was a sizable donation, making up 
about one tenth of the association’s total yearly income.54 There was no sign of this mite society 
or others like it in earlier years, when the focus was on foreign missions, so there seems to have 
been a strong correlation between female fundraising and home missionary work specifically. It 
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also appears there was a bit of pent up demand for this kind of fundraising opportunity. Once 
home missions began to spread, women in communities across the Maritimes began to take 
action. Within two years, there were at least six more mite societies sending donations from 
around Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, and the importance of these donations would only 
grow. By the early 1820s, there were separate missionary organizations in Nova Scotia and New 
Brunswick, with the work in Prince Edward Island handled by the Nova Scotians. The principal 
support for all of these associations, at least through the 1820s, came from female mite 
societies.55  
In the 1820s, then, a system finally took shape in British North America that mirrored 
what had been successful in Maine for over two decades. Just as in Massachusetts, the middle 
and upper class women of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia rapidly organized their fundraising 
once they had a home missionary network to support. This support enabled the missionary 
societies to organize their efforts and provide more services to people on the ground. They were 
far behind their counterparts on the other side of the border, however. For example, the SPGNA 
first divided Maine into missionary districts sometime around the year 1800. Almost 
immediately it began funneling a substantial amount of resources into even the furthest district in 
eastern Maine.56 As more societies formed and the network grew, missionaries like Ephraim 
Abbott covered every conceivable settlement; Abbot even voyaged up the St. Croix River to 
preach to tiny crowds in half a dozen unnamed townships.57 The New Brunswick Association, by 
contrast, did not even divide that Province into districts until 1834. Even then, the districts only 
covered the southern half of the territory, from the border with Maine to the border with Nova 
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Scotia. It took three more years for missionaries to begin to attend to the northern half of New 
Brunswick.58  
 
For years, the British had maintained an open border, in the interest of developing their 
settlements. The boundary was rarely enforced, and officials accepted that Maine communities 
on the American side of the borderland were effectively part of the British economic sphere. 
Maine settlers could easily sell their goods in British markets, and those who wished to move to 
British territory were accommodated. Both British and Americans believed the border was 
flexible anyway, and might eventually be shifted in a way that would benefit their side.  
It was during the War of 1812 that the British first came to reconsider this open 
borderland, and one of the inspirations for this shift was the network of teachers and schools 
created by the Congregational missionary societies in Maine. When war broke out, authorities in 
New Brunswick decided to take stock of any recent arrivals from the United States. They did not 
intend to deport these people. The idea was simply to investigate how many Americans there 
might be in the province and whether any of them were in trouble with the law. In general, these 
new arrivals were asked to self-report, and most raised little concern. There were quite a few 
Maine loggers in the northeastern part of the province, and a substantial number of New 
England-born dockworkers in the city of Saint John. No one appeared to be objectionable.  
The only issue arose in the little town of Woodstock, just over the border from Maine. 
Woodstock resident John Bedell wrote to Fredericton listing nineteen different American men 
living around that community. “Some of these persons,” he wrote, were “offering themselves for 
school masters.” These men were the product of Peter Nurse’s efforts in Ellsworth, Maine, and 
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the Congregational network more generally. In an 1815 letter, Nurse specifically mentioned a 
male student of his who had been working for over a year as a teacher in New Brunswick.59 He 
also mentioned that during the war years, communities in Maine suffered financially. Women 
were not able to take teaching jobs in New Brunswick, but men were, and it makes sense that a 
few might look for possibilities on the British side of the border. John Bedell, for his part, did not 
know what to do. Schools were “much wanted,” and he did not want to discourage them. 
However, it was vital to “prevent as much as possible republican principles being disseminated 
amongst us- and the minds of our youth from receiving any improper bias or false principles of 
religion or government.”60  
The border had been left open for years, with the idea that the Maine part of the 
borderland was essentially part of the British economic sphere anyway. Now authorities began to 
recognize that there had been a change. Over the previous two decades, through church 
networks, both the government and private citizens in Massachusetts had invested an enormous 
amount of resources in eastern Maine. Communities just across the border from New Brunswick 
were now connected to southern Maine and Boston in a way that the British had not expected. 
And now, instead of British economic power spilling westward into the states, “republican 
principles” in the form of teachers were spilling eastward into the provinces.  





                                                
59 Nurse to Thayer, 26 September 1815, Box 1, Folder 7, EMS.  
60 Bedell to Odell, 18 June 1813, 9 November 1813, RS547, Naturalization Records, Folder 1, Provincial Archives 




Figure 2- Passamaquoddy & Machias with the large island of Grand Manan, B.R. Jones, 18161 
Chapter V: 
Testing the Limits of Sovereignty: The War of 1812 and its Aftermath 
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At no point in the thirty years between the end of the American Revolution and the start 
of the War of 1812 was there agreement on the exact boundary between the District of Maine 
and the colony of New Brunswick. Everyone, though, knew approximately where the border was 
supposed to be. It started in Passamaquoddy Bay, with the Americans in control of the western 
side of the bay and the British the eastern side. Then, according to the Treaty of Paris, the 
boundary ran along the St. Croix River, and then along “a line drawn due north from the source 
of St. Croix River to the highlands.” It followed the highlands “which divide those rivers that 
empty themselves into the river St. Lawrence, from those which fall into the Atlantic Ocean” 
until it hit the headwaters of the Connecticut River in northern New Hampshire.2 Then the line 
continued west.  
There were many problems with the boundary as laid out in the treaty. The one that 
caused the most controversy later in the nineteenth century was the exact location of the so-
called highlands. That question would not be finally resolved until the 1840s. However, early on 
there were hardly any settlers in the interior near any highlands; most English-speaking settlers 
lived along the coast. There too, though, the treaty had its problems. In the first place, it turned 
out that nobody in Passamaquoddy Bay called any of the local rivers the “St. Croix.” This was 
the name Samuel Champlain had given the river on which his expedition wintered in 1604. 
Champlain had made the name a feature of European maps, but the local Indians never used it, 
nor did the first English settlers of the bay. They called the two main rivers in the area the 
Schoodic and the Magaguadavic.  
So the first order of business was determining which of those two rivers was the proper 
boundary. It took almost fifteen years of both interviews with locals and archeological 
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excavation before commissioners finally agreed that the Schoodic was Champlain’s river. This 
did not, however, put an end to the negotiations. There remained the question of islands. 
Passamaquoddy Bay includes dozens of islands, and the Treaty of Paris was not exactly precise 
in tracing the line through them. The treaty awarded the United States “all islands within twenty 
leagues of [its]…shores,” while noting that this did not include “such islands as…heretofore 
have been within the limits of…Nova Scotia.”3 Americans argued that at least the westernmost 
islands in the bay were properly part of Maine. The British held that all the Passamaquoddy 
islands belonged to New Brunswick.4 
The British and Americans spent years negotiating – first about the rivers, then about the 
islands. In 1807, just a few years before the start of the War of 1812, the two sides were still 
accusing each other of promoting dubious claims. Much of this was prolonged by the British, 
who still believed they might one day push the border all the way to the Penobscot River, thus 
taking the eastern third of Maine and rendering the question of Passamaquoddy Islands 
irrelevant. It was also prolonged by a desire on both sides to keep the economy of the whole 
borderland humming. Settlements in New Brunswick were growing, settlements in Maine were 
too, and trade was moving back and forth. The Americans knew this trade mostly depended on 
British authorities’ hands off approach to trade restrictions, so they did not want to antagonize 
their neighbors by pushing too hard for border concessions. The British did not want to disrupt 
trade either, and wanted to preserve harmonious relations with the American settlers on the 
western side of the bay who might one day return to British subjecthood. They also continued to 
cultivate the Passamaquoddy Indian community – with small land reserves in New Brunswick, 
                                                
3 Ibid. 
4 For the long history of British/American arguments over the border, see Francis M. Carroll, A Good and Wise 




and by placing resident priests a short distance away among the Maliseet on the St. John River. 
Maintaining the connection between Passamaquoddy and Maliseet communities was important. 
When the time came to secure a more advantageous border, the British knew it would help to 
have Passamaquoddy support.  
And so, throughout these decades of diplomacy, the British and Americans continued to 
treat the border as negotiable. On the ground, however, the church networks detailed in chapters 
three and four operated differently. Beginning in the 1790s, and increasingly in the 1800s, both 
Congregationalists and Catholics treated the de facto border as a settled border. The British may 
have claimed Moose Island, but it was held by Americans, and so was included in the 
Congregational network. The Americans claimed Grand Manan Island, but Congregational 
missionaries avoided it because they understood Grand Manan to be British. Methodists and 
Anglicans in border communities in New Brunswick might have kept borders blurry by serving 
Maine settlers, but they were not even provided the resources to properly cover British territory. 
Meanwhile the Boston Catholic Church, beginning in 1798, drew the Passamaquoddy into its 
network in Maine. This distanced the Passamaquoddy from the Maliseet, connecting them more 
directly with the Penobscot, with whom they were now sharing a priest. Though Passamaquoddy 
identity may have still seemed flexible to British authorities, the actual people living in the 
community were increasingly oriented westward.  
During the War of 1812, the British decided to make their attempt to enlarge New 
Brunswick.5 British forces took the land they wanted, first on the western side of Passamaquoddy 
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Bay, and then all the way to the Penobscot River. The crown assumed that at the very least all 
the Passamaquoddy islands were now permanently part of New Brunswick, and all men residing 
there were forced to take an oath of allegiance. In the rest of the zone the occupying forces were 
a bit more cautious, offering privileges to Maine residents who took the opportunity to return to 
subjecthood. Few did, however. Most people carried on with their lives as before. And even 
though the British threatened apprehension and court martial for anyone “found sojourning…or 
passing or repassing” within the occupied zone, both Congregationalists and Catholics made a 
point of ignoring the order.6 Ministers and priests continued to serve their networks throughout 
the region without pause. Well within British lines in Ellsworth, Peter Nurse continued to collect 
his pay from Boston and help his pupils secure teaching positions. In Boston, Father Cheverus 
assured his parishioners that he would be completing his circuit as if nothing had changed.  
Church networks had built and maintained the connections between the easternmost 
settlements in Maine and the rest of Massachusetts. Now those connections paid off. The British 
ended up returning most of the occupied territory to the United States in the Treaty of Ghent. 
They tried to preserve at least some of their gains by keeping the Passamaquoddy islands, but 
after three more years even those were returned. The border, which appeared temporary and 
negotiable before the war, turned out to be immovable. And as the British learned this lesson, 
they discovered another troubling reality. Their own lax enforcement of a border they believed to 
be flexible had allowed American teachers to cross over and take positions educating young 
British subjects. This was a development authorities had not considered. Loggers and fishermen 
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were not thought to be dangerous sources of republican principles, but teachers were a different 
story. Officials in Fredericton began to take another look at the families who had crossed over 
the previous decade. Who were these people, after all? Before the war few distinctions had been 
made. Migrants were simply looking for opportunity in the borderland – which, after all, was 
mainly under British economic control. Now, people from the Maine side of the line seemed less 
like apolitical opportunists and more like foreigners.  
What followed was a rapid reevaluation of the border and migration from the United 
States. Just a few years earlier, Maine residents who requested land in New Brunswick had been 
treated as lapsed British subjects. Even when they petitioned alongside British veterans – even if 
they had carried arms against the crown – they were simply handed land as if there was no 
political distinction to be made. Now, almost overnight, Maine residents were re-classified as 
“foreign Protestants.” The change in thinking even applied to some who had already arrived in 
New Brunswick. During the years of the porous border, there had been no appeals to loyalty. The 
authorities expressed little interest in why New Englanders wished to relocate to British North 
America, they were simply happy to welcome them when they did. Now retroactive complaints 
began to be made: these people were only interested in land, and had no love for the King or the 
Empire. The authorities dusted off their old procedures for naturalizing foreign Protestants, and 
began to read land petitions more closely. Attitudes had changed in the northeastern borderland.  
 
The decades-long debate over the fate of the Passamaquoddy Bay islands provides one of 
the clearest examples of a de facto border becoming inflexible before politicians understood or 
expected it. There are dozens of islands in and around the bay, but only a few mattered to both 
sides. These were Moose Island, which is very close to Pleasant Point, Maine; Campobello 
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Island, which is even closer to Maine than Moose Island; and Grand Manan, the most distant and 
largest of the three. After the Treaty of Paris in 1783, the Americans managed to hold Moose 
Island, while the British held Campobello and Grand Manan. The British had the better deal 
when it came to land, the Americans when it came to people. Campobello Island is about fifteen 
square miles, and Grand Manan is fifty. Moose Island is the smallest of the three, but contained 
Eastport, the largest community. The British were determined to hold both Campobello and 
Grand Manan, though they worried their legal claim to the latter was shaky. Ironically they had a 
better claim to Moose Island, but the Americans were equally determined to retain that.  
Throughout the period from 1783 to 1812, the two powers made efforts to determine the 
rightful possession of each of these islands. British negotiators tended to reach as far back into 
the past as possible to buttress their claims. In 1621, James I of England had granted Sir William 
Alexander a giant tract of land, consisting of what is today Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and 
much of eastern Quebec. The grant specifically included all islands within six leagues of the 
boundary line. This grant, according to the British, attached all the islands in question to New 
Brunswick. The Americans pointed to a much more recent document, drawn up at the close of 
the French and Indian War. In the aftermath of victory over the French, no one had found it 
pressing to determine which British colony received which islands. The Royal Commission in 
1763, therefore, had simply drawn a line dividing Massachusetts from Nova Scotia, “from Cape 
Sable across the entrance of the Bay of Fundy to the mouth of the River St. Croix.” Grand 
Manan was clearly west of this line, which barely grazed its northern tip. The Royal Commission 
of 1763, Americans argued, obviously superseded a two century-old land grant. Therefore, 
Grand Manan was properly part of Maine.7  
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 The issue for the Americans came down to logic and jurisdiction. All three islands are 
much closer to mainland Maine than they are to mainland New Brunswick. Logically, they 
would be more easily administered from the United States. Moose Island is so close to Maine 
that it is no longer an island – it was linked to the mainland by a causeway in the 1930s. And 
today, though Campobello is part of New Brunswick, most visitors arrive over a bridge from the 
town of Lubec, Maine. In 1803, the US Minister to Great Britain pointed out that “to avoid 
questions of interfering jurisdiction arising from its being to the westward of a suitable boundary 
line, [Campobello] should belong to Massachusetts.” He acknowledged that the settlers on the 
island had received title from British authorities, but felt that it would be no problem to transfer 
the titles.8  
 A few years later, Secretary of State James Madison made a similar point about Grand 
Manan in a letter to the US Ministers to Great Britain. That island is not quite as conveniently 
situated as is Campobello, but the question of jurisdiction was similar. Grand Manan is about 
seven miles off the coast of Maine, but eighteen miles from New Brunswick. As noted above, the 
vast majority of the island lies west of a straight line drawn according to the treaty stipulations. 
Thusly, according to Madison, the island was “clearly within the general limits of the United 
States” and “no just title can…be alleged on the British side.” His correspondents agreed, noting 
that even if the British wished to give themselves the entirety of Passamaquoddy Bay, by 
pushing the borderline all the way to the U.S. mainland, Grand Manan would still be on the 
American side of that line. The American claim to the island seemed strong.9  
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 The British, for their part, always believed that Moose Island and the town of Eastport by 
rights belonged to them. All the Passamaquoddy Bay islands, they claimed, were properly part of 
New Brunswick. There was no logical reason for the border to shift eastward just for the 
purposes of delivering one island to the United States. Besides, their agreeing to such a shift 
would strengthen the American claim on Campobello and Grand Manan Islands, and be a major 
impediment to any future effort to move the border even further west. And so, throughout the 
interwar period, the British never let go of their claim to Moose Island. In the 1780s, officials in 
New Brunswick even tried a few times to collect taxes from settlers in Eastport, though they 
were always rebuffed.10 Moose Island settlers insisted that they were under the jurisdiction of the 
United States. It is not hard to understand why. As the easternmost settlement in Maine, Eastport 
was in a lucrative position to benefit from both licit and illicit trade. If Moose Island became one 
of many New Brunswick islands, Eastport would cease to be the easternmost port, and would 
lose its special position to Lubec, Robbinston, or another settlement on the mainland.11   
 The U.S. and Britain found themselves at a decades-long impasse over these islands. But 
in the years after the revolution both sides were invested in maintaining the region as a 
borderland. This meant keeping the border permeable and encouraging trade and migration, so as 
to promote development of the whole region. Neither side wanted to start a fight over 
sovereignty, because that risked dividing the region and curbing development. The British 
always had the power to simply take Moose Island, but such an action would anger Americans 
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and disrupt the trade on which so many British subjects depended. And both sides were 
optimistic that eventually they would get the border they wanted.12 
The Americans felt like a fight over the border would hurt U.S. interests more than it 
would British interests. According to James Madison, commerce with the Maritimes was “more 
beneficial to the United States than to those colonies.” The most important item of that 
commerce was gypsum. At that time, the US estimated that it was importing somewhere between 
thirty and fifty tons of gypsum per year from the Maritime colonies to use as fertilizer. Some 
British estimates put the trade much higher. This was not entirely a legal trade, so it was hard to 
pin down exact numbers. The gypsum was brought to Maine first, where American ships then 
moved it to New York, Philadelphia, and the Chesapeake. Every summer more than fifty 
American vessels anchored in Passamaquoddy Bay to take on gypsum. And this was just one 
element of the trading relationship. There was also a trade in fish, from the colonies to Boston 
and then to points south. If the United States did something to anger the British, all of this could 
fall apart. The extensive gypsum trade, Madison pointed out, depended on some selective 
enforcement of trade restrictions on the British side: it “is the result of a connivance in 
practice…which may possibly be withdrawn.”13 In 1807, Madison advised his ministers in 
Britain to postpone the question of Grand Manan and other islands “for future decision,” while 
sweetening things a bit by suggesting that “British vessels shall not be restrained from carrying” 
gypsum anywhere in the United States.14 
 Meanwhile, the residents of British North America would not necessarily have agreed 
with Madison that trade was more beneficial to Americans than it was to them. As noted in 
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chapter two, authorities in New Brunswick regularly backed down from threats to enforce trade 
restrictions, often at the urging of locals. Everyone around Passamaquoddy Bay had an interest in 
the trans-border trading zone continuing to function without interference. Furthermore, the 
gypsum trade was a bit of a free for all, particularly in Nova Scotia. Technically, anyone in Nova 
Scotia wishing to ship goods outside the province was required to register with the naval officer 
in Halifax. The requirement applied not only to shipping to Maine, but also to shipping across 
the bay to the sister province of New Brunswick. This was tremendously inconvenient for Nova 
Scotians who lived on the north side of the peninsula. Instead of simply making a forty-mile trip 
across the bay, they were asked to first make a three hundred mile trip to Halifax for the 
registration, and then retrace that same route to get back to where they wished to begin their 
voyage in the first place.15  
 The result of this policy was that no one on the northern shore of Nova Scotia bothered to 
comply with it. Trade in the bay operated independently, with little oversight. So while fifty 
boats were arriving from the United States to take on the gypsum, hundreds of small British 
vessels were involved in collecting and delivering it. By 1800, the British believed at least 
100,000 tons had been shipped, and a great many families in both Nova Scotia and New 
Brunswick relied on the trade. They also depended on the goods they were receiving from the 
Americans, most prominently flour. The Maritimes had become increasingly dependent on bread 
and flour from the United States over the years. By 1790 they were importing 40,000 barrels of 
bread and meal and 80,000 bushels of grain annually, and by the time of the War of 1812 the 
provinces were paying the Americans roughly £100,000 annually for food. Farmers in the 
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provinces could not compete with the American grain, so they went into lumbering or entered 
into the flourishing gypsum trade.16  
 The upshot of all this was that neither side felt like disrupting what had become a very 
complex and extensive trading relationship by fighting over a few islands.17 So they decided to 
delay a final decision and, in the short term, simply exchange one poor claim for another. In 
negotiations in London, ministers Monroe and Pinkney “argued in vain” for the American claim 
to Grand Manan Island. The British announced that they were in possession of the island, and 
had been for years, and “possession…was a reasonable ground upon which to presume 
everything which constituted title.” The American ministers pointed out that this ignored the 
actual stipulations of the treaty of peace. The British “retorted” that the American claim to 
Moose Island, as well as the smaller Dudley and Frederick Islands, was also “very questionable.” 
If they were expected to go along with a questionable claim to three islands, the Americans 
should happily go along with a questionable claim to one. Monroe and Pinkney maintained that 
the American claim to the three islands in question was perfectly fine, but in the interest of 
compromise, they would agree to “leave the case of Grand Manan for future adjustment.” There 
the negotiations ended for the time being, with a profitable trading relationship preserved.18 
 During all of these negotiations, as the Americans and British devoted a great deal of 
time to maintaining their trading relationship, neither side seem to have given a lot of thought to 
other elements of life in Passamaquoddy Bay. Had they looked beyond trade, at the other 
networks operating in the region, they might have discovered a way of strengthening their 
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negotiating position. Because while negotiators were arguing about the wording of seventeenth 
century land grants and decades-old commissions, Congregational missionaries in Maine were 
building a Boston-based network that included Moose Island, and excluded Campobello and 
Grand Manan. Ministers traveled the region practically every year during the first two decades of 
the nineteenth century. Had they been asked to visit all the islands in question, they surely would 
have. Itinerants made long journeys to visit settlers in the interior of Maine, up rivers and over 
terrible, sometimes non-existent roads. A quick visit to Grand Manan would have been much 
easier than visiting almost any inland settlement. Furthermore, most of the Grand Manan settlers 
were originally from Maine. And yet, though the missionary network was partially funded by 
Massachusetts, and the missionary societies invested a great deal of time and energy in the 
Passamaquoddy region, no one seems to have thought to use the network to expand the de facto 
border.  
The Society for Propagating the Gospel Among the Indians and Others in North America 
received its first state grant in 1791. Even at this early date, the society was already beginning to 
send missionaries to the furthest eastern settlements in Maine.  In the fall of 1791, missionary 
James Lyon wrote from Machias that he was prepared to embark for three full months of work in 
the Passamaquoddy settlements. A year later, he made a similar trip, this time for just one month. 
Lyon gave eight sermons, visited three-dozen families, and baptized almost a hundred people 
over the course of that month. Daniel Oliver similarly visited Passamaquoddy Bay for years, 
itinerating almost every year from 1804 to 1809. Oliver clearly saw Eastport and Moose Island 
as his responsibility. He even made a special note of the needs of the island, recommending 
during his first trip in 1804 that the SPGNA send a missionary to concentrate purely on Moose 
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Island. “There ought to be a missionary upon this island three or six months,” Oliver wrote, 
which “would open a door for the settlement of a [permanent] congregational minister.”19 
Oliver distributed books throughout the area, noting a particular need in Washington 
County. He even crossed the border a few times, to give sermons in St. Andrews and St. Stephen, 
New Brunswick. But Oliver never mentioned visiting Campobello Island or Grand Manan 
Island. They are odd omissions. Campobello had a small but growing community of settlers. 
Many were loyalist refugees, but the same could be said for St. Andrews, where Oliver did 
choose to preach. And Oliver visited the area around Lubec, which as noted above, is adjacent to 
Campobello. Grand Manan would have been visible to anyone traveling in the bay – prominent 
on the horizon, just a few miles away. Oliver was being quite thorough in his travels. But of all 
the disputed islands in the region, Moose Island was the only one on his list.  
Stephen Chapin was a contemporary of Daniel Oliver. He also took specific note of 
Eastport while ignoring the other disputed settlements. Over the course of 1808, Chapin reported 
travelling nearly one thousand miles, delivering forty-two sermons, visiting one hundred 
families, ten schools, and distributing well over a hundred pieces of literature. As mentioned in 
chapter three, Chapin was a strong proponent of schools, arguing that Congregational 
missionaries would make more progress in Maine by spending a greater proportion of their time 
teaching the “rising generation.” Chapin noted in his journal that Eastport was an outlier along 
the Maine coast. The settlers east of the Penobscot River, he wrote, tended to be from eastern 
Massachusetts. Mostly they were from south of Boston, though there were a few from the 
longer-settled parts of Maine, like Casco Bay. Eastport, however, was different: “Its inhabitants 
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are from various parts. They are principally adventurers.” In Chapin’s opinion, Eastport was 
more than a promising location for missionary work; it was one of the most important spots in 
Maine. The SPGNA ought, he wrote, to divide up Maine into missionary fields and place one 
missionary at the center of each. Eastport headed his list of fields.20  
The SPGNA seems to have taken this advice to heart. It was considering the idea at the 
same time the Maine Missionary Society and the Evangelical Missionary Society were arriving 
on the scene, and this new assistance brought the promise of covering more ground. In 
conversation with the Maine Missionary Society, the SPGNA considered dividing the District of 
Maine into thirty sections and asking each missionary to cover one or two sections. This way all 
settlements in the district could receive at least nominal coverage, with only fifteen missionaries 
divided between the payrolls of the various societies. The societies made a preliminary attempt 
to divide the district, and Eastport and its surrounding settlements were the very first towns on 
the list. Clearly, the SPGNA was prioritizing the area.21  
In 1811 and 1812, Ephraim Abbott made the SPGNA’s most comprehensive mission 
trips to the Passamaquoddy region. Abbott preached everywhere. He spent a full month in 
Robbinston, almost a month in Eastport, and a month and a half in Calais. He visited Lubec and 
Denneysville. He traveled up the St. Croix River to reach settlements that did not yet have 
names; Abbot specifically mentions reaching Townships One, Three, Six, Seven, Twelve, and 
Seventeen. During the first part of his visit, Abbott noticed the need for books, so he collected as 
many as he could from the various societies operating in Maine. By 1812 he claimed to have 
supplied nearly every family or school in the area, though Eastport was so populous that he 
failed to reach every household there. Abbott even spent some time visiting the Passamaquoddy 
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Indian community, though they had no use for him, since their priest was in residence most of 
the year. In all his travels, however, Abbott never seems to have bothered with Campobello or 
Grand Manan Islands. According to his notes, he saw his field as consisting of the entire country 
“East of Machias…40 miles from North to South & 20 from East to West.” Only Moose Island, 
of the disputed islands, was considered part of that field.22  
The British, too, had opportunities to use church networks to their advantage from the 
New Brunswick side of the border. Their failure to do so is puzzling, particularly in the case of 
Eastport. As established above, the British believed throughout the entire interwar era – from 
1783 to 1812 – that Moose Island and Eastport were part of New Brunswick and would one day 
revert to British control. They even tried to collect taxes from Moose Island settlers. 
Simultaneously, and again throughout the entire era, the Anglican Reverend Samuel Andrews 
was serving the British settlements of Passamaquoddy Bay. Reverend Andrews made a circuit of 
the bay every year. He regularly visited both Deer and Campobello Islands. These two islands 
are each barely a mile from Eastport. And the community had an obvious need for religious 
services. As Congregational ministers frequently mentioned, Eastport was one of the most 
populous settlements in the region. When Ephraim Abbott tried to supply all the settlers in the 
area in 1812, the only place he could not completely serve was Eastport. An occasional friendly 
visit from the Reverend Andrews might have made the people of Moose Island a little more 
receptive to British overtures, and he surely would have visited if instructed to do so. But no one 
in Fredericton or Halifax intervened in the reverend’s routine.23  
In fact, as mentioned in chapter three, the only border crossing happened from the other 
side. In 1817 a number of people from St. Andrews met with Daniel Lovejoy, the Congregational 
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missionary stationed in Robbinstown, Maine, and asked him to visit their community. Lovejoy 
made sure to ask the permission of the Reverend Andrews, who was happy to consent. At that 
point Andrews was over eighty and unable to preach every week, and had not received much 
assistance from the Anglican hierarchy based in Halifax. The Reverend Lovejoy preached 
regularly in St. Andrews for a few weeks, and the people there even took up a collection to try 
and cultivate this connection to Maine’s Congregational missionary network. Lovejoy’s border 
crossing happened at the same time that Britain was trying to retain Moose Island, which it had 
seized during the War of 1812 and refused to return afterwards. Here was another missed 
opportunity – and the last one, since the British finally abandoned their claim to Moose Island in 
1818. British forces controlled the island for four full years. They might have encouraged the 
Anglican Bishop in Halifax, Charles Inglis, to provide more resources to the area. This would 
have had the double benefit of providing religious services to the occupied territory, and much 
needed assistance to the elderly Reverend Andrews. But neither political nor Anglican officials 
chose to act. American church networks remained the only ones active in the borderland. 
 
In the case of the Passamaquoddy Indians, it was the Catholics who quietly solidified the 
border before the British realized it was happening. The status of the Passamaquoddy created a 
great deal of confusion in the years after the American Revolution. For decades, authorities in 
New Brunswick and the rest of British North America were unsure whether the Passamaquoddy 
were “British” or “American” Indians. In many ways the Passamaquoddy lived a trans-border 
life, and so did not fit neatly into either category. But as noted in chapter three, during the 1790s 
Massachusetts authorities attempted to win the “interest and friendship” of the community by 
putting a priest on the state payroll. This decision connected the Passamaquoddy to a Catholic 
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network based in Boston, and created a social boundary between them and the rest of New 
Brunswick. Even though technically their community continued to overlap the political border, 
Passamaquoddy life was increasingly oriented toward the Americans. The British, in their hopes 
to shift the border west, did not anticipate any opposition from an Indian community that was 
geographically as British as it was American. They failed to understand what the Catholic 
network in Maine had accomplished until it was too late.  
The British in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia had a long history with the Indians living 
around Passamaquoddy Bay. There were efforts as early as the 1760s to use priests stationed on 
the St. John River to draw the Passamaquoddy people more firmly into a British sphere. It was 
well known in both Boston and Halifax that the Passamaquoddy and the Maliseet community on 
the St. John were essentially the same people. They were often mentioned as belonging to the 
same nation, and the Passamaquoddy only began negotiating as a separate group in the mid-
1700s. So it was easy to orient the community eastward if the closest available priest was on the 
St. John. During the American Revolution, this played out exactly the way the British wanted. 
After the Passamaquoddy declared their support for the Americans and assisted them in attacking 
Nova Scotia, the British responded by paying a priest to settle among the Maliseet. Almost 
immediately, the Passamaquoddy stopped aiding the Americans and began spending more time 
in British territory.24   
After the war the boundary may have been a bit uncertain and negotiable, but it was 
obvious that it passed through the middle of Passamaquoddy territory. The goal for the British, 
then, was to keep the community straddling the border. Maintaining at least some land for the 
Passamaquoddy in New Brunswick would ensure that the border remained an abstraction for 
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them, or so the British believed. It would also make it possible to continue the old strategy of 
drawing Passamaquoddy attention eastward with a priest on the St. John. And so, in the earliest 
maps laying out loyalist grants in and around the bay, there always appears a block of land east 
of the St. Croix River marked as “Land reserved by Order of His Excellency Governor Parr for 
Indians.”25 This was a two hundred acre section reserved from a much larger tract of land 
referred to in the Provincial records as “Indian Lands.” When the time came to settle loyalist 
refugees in the area, officials decided to give away most, but not all, of the Indian lands. Those 
two hundred acres would preserve a place for the Passamaquoddy in British territory. 
The so-called Indian lands had been a center of Passamaquoddy life for centuries. Samuel 
Champlain took note of Indians living and fishing each summer on what was almost certainly the 
same land, near the falls of the St. Croix. These were some of the best lands in the river valley, 
so as the loyalists arrived they became a frequent point of contention. First, the “Indian Lands at 
the falls of the Schoodic [St. Croix] River,” a tract of over four thousand acres, was reserved to 
the officers and men of the loyalist 74th Regiment and North Carolina Highlanders. Officers were 
allotted two hundred acres, and enlisted men one hundred. As that group was arriving, they 
found themselves in conflict with another settler named William Anstruther, who petitioned for 
the same lands. Anstruther wrote that he and his associates wished to settle immediately on the 
east side of the St. Croix River, and needed two hundred acres apiece. Their first choice was the 
lands “called Indian Lands…including an old Indian Camp Ground.”26 Then, complicating 
things still further, a third association made a claim for the same lands.   
The New Brunswick authorities tried to distribute most of the land in an equitable 
fashion. But they refused to distribute all of it. The two hundred acre parcel was retained for the 
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Passamaquoddy. The Lt. Governor declared that those lands were “reserved for the future 
consideration of government.” Anstruther was the most frustrated of the petitioners. He wrote 
back claiming that the Indian Lands were the only decent lands left in the area, and reminding 
the Lt. Governor of his four years of loyal service during the war. But his pleas had little affect. 
Loyal service notwithstanding, Anstruther was forced to petition for a completely different tract, 
this time many miles to the north on a tributary of the St. John.27 The Passamaquoddy, it should 
be remembered, had not been loyalists. They had actually partnered with the Americans in 
attacking Nova Scotia. But as the eastern side of the bay filled up with refugees, the British were 
willing to anger some loyalists to ensure the Passamaquoddy retained their small piece of land.  
This continued to be an unpopular decision among the white settlers of Charlotte County, 
New Brunswick. The two hundred acres may have been a small plot, but it was well located, in 
what was apparently “the best fishing place.” Periodically more requests were made for the plot 
of land, to no avail. One group protested that they had been “much threatened” by the Indians 
and by “old inhabitants” of the area, but had persevered, making improvements “at the risk of 
our lives.” There was no reason not to grant them the tract, they wrote, since “the Savages 
thought proper to quit this place and settled themselves within the states.” The response, 
however, was that the “Indian Lands are not to be granted.”28 Six years later, in 1791, the 
inhabitants of St. Stephen wrote to Fredericton complaining of their lack of an Anglican church. 
They had grown into a sizable community, and felt they deserved a preacher and schoolmaster. 
The Indian lands, they thought, would make the perfect glebe. The land office, however, chose to 
ignore the request.29  
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A decade later the parcel of land was still sitting there, and the inhabitants of St. Stephen 
enlisted the Reverend Andrews to plead once again for a church. Andrews wrote to Fredericton 
in 1800, noting that he visited St. Stephen a few times every year to preach and always drew big 
crowds. The town needed its own church and settled Anglican minister, but he knew that could 
not happen without a securing a glebe. The Indian reserve was ideal. It was centrally located, 
right on the river, mostly cleared, and Andrews claimed the Passamaquoddy were not doing 
anything with it. Soon after Andrews’s letter, a group of local men wrote to Fredericton to back 
him up. They claimed that no one had seen Indians on the plot of land for years. The 
Passamaquoddy preferred the American side of the river, and if they were crossing into British 
territory they were doing it far upstream. It would seem like the perfect opportunity to dispose of 
this plot of land, especially considering that the Reverend Andrews had for years been the sole 
representative of the established church in the whole of Charlotte County. And yet, the 
government in Fredericton still would not grant the land. The most they would do was 
recommend to the petitioners that they speak to the Passamaquoddy about possibly purchasing 
it.30  
The two hundred acres at the falls of the St. Croix was not the only land saved for the 
Passamaquoddy in New Brunswick. There was another plot of one hundred acres, sometimes 
referred to as a fishing reserve, located further up the river. This was near the junction of the 
Canoose Stream with the St. Croix, about twenty miles up the river from St. Stephen. The British 
government appears to have granted the Canoose reserve soon after the war and then forgotten 
about it. Few loyalist settlers ventured that far up the river and so no one else petitioned for it. It 
was frequently omitted in early nineteenth century lists of New Brunswick Indian reserves, even 
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though a few Passamaquoddy families lived there. There were unofficial Passamaquoddy lands 
as well. At least some families lived in and around St. Andrews at areas that were not official 
reserves, but were “designated as Indian encampments.” The Passamaquoddy visited Grand 
Manan Island each year as well, and had camps that were more or less permanent, even if they 
were only used for part of the year. Visits to Grand Manan were so frequent that some New 
Brunswick authorities believed that there was an official Passamaquoddy reserve on the island, 
though one had never been officially granted.31  
The attitude in New Brunswick toward the Passamaquoddy was similar to the attitude 
toward the borderland as a whole. British officials were optimistic that one day they would be 
able to shift the border westward. At that future point all Passamaquoddy territory would fall 
within British North America. In the meantime, it was important to maintain an open borderland 
and a flexible border. Both white settlers and Indians could move about freely, the whole region 
would prosper, and the boundary could be settled at a later date.  
Just as was the case with the islands, however, the British should have paid more 
attention to church networks on the ground and their affect on the de facto border. Because in 
1798, after decades of allowing the British to draw Maine Indians eastward with priests on the 
St. John River, the Americans finally countered. The Massachusetts Legislature hired Father 
James Romagne to serve both the Penobscot and Passamaquoddy communities, for a salary of 
two hundred dollars per year. This upped the ante in the borderland. Massachusetts did not place 
Father Romagne on the Penobscot and try to draw the Passamaquoddy Indians westward. They 
made sure the priest actually lived for part of the year in the communities on Passamaquoddy 
Bay. This time it was the British who failed to counter. They maintained their strategy 
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unchanged, supporting their priest on the St. John but not installing anyone on their side of the 
bay.  
Massachusetts’s decision to hire Father Romagne changed everything. Passamaquoddy 
lives continued to overlap the border, and the community may have seemed to a casual observer 
as British as they were American. But Massachusetts was now directly supplying their church. 
And Father Romagne took his duties beyond preaching and baptism. He aided the community in 
petitioning for more land. He put a vaccination program in place. His annual travels connected 
the community directly with Boston, ensuring better communication and more regular visits 
from Boston-based priests like Father Cheverus. While the British were attempting to passively 
preserve a trans-border identity for the Passamaquoddy, the Catholic network in Maine was 
actively strengthening their attachment to New England. Before long, the barrier this created 
between the Passamaquoddy and New Brunswick would prove rather solid.  
 
During the War of 1812, the British decided the time had come to create the border they 
had always wanted. In the spring of 1814, the Legislative Assembly of New Brunswick sent a 
petition to London, requesting that measures be taken to “alter the boundary between [Maine] 
and this Province.” Their agent in London pressed the issue, noting that the Penobscot River was 
“a natural boundary and would obviate most of the inconveniences to which the British Colonies 
are now subjected.” Governor Sherbrooke of Nova Scotia chimed in as well, claiming the 
Penobscot as “the old frontier of the State of Massachusetts,” and requesting that British forces 
“take that river…as our boundary.” British officials also remembered that during the Revolution, 
in 1779, they had successfully attacked and occupied Penobscot Bay. Their occupation even led 
to a controversial petition, created by representatives from a few eastern Maine towns, that 
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eastern Maine be considered a neutral zone.32 Though this petition ultimately failed, surely some 
of the same sentiment lingered thirty years later. The appeals for invasion were successful. Lord 
Bathurst, the Secretary for War and the Colonies, sent orders to Nova Scotia to “rectify” the 
boundary by occupying “as far as its occupation is practicable, that part of the District of Maine 
which at present intercepts the communication between Halifax and Quebec.”33  
These plans were no secret – in letters home, American diplomats repeatedly mentioned 
the British desire to shift boundaries in North America. In June 1814, two ministers reported to 
Secretary of State James Monroe that the British aimed for the “curtailment of [American] 
boundaries,” and even the “dismemberment” of parts of the union.34  When ministers for the two 
warring nations sat down officially in August the British were even more explicit, even though 
they had not yet completed their occupation of eastern Maine. The boundary line, they 
announced, would be revised. “That portion of the District of Maine…which intervenes between 
New Brunswick and Quebec” would have to be ceded to British North America. All islands in 
Passamaquoddy Bay would obviously be included, regardless of prior possession, once New 
Brunswick controlled the entire region.35  
The operation to effect this border adjustment began with the seizure of Moose Island and 
the city of Eastport on July 11, 1814. The British invasion caught the community completely off 
guard. American Captain Jacob Varnum reported that he was enjoying the morning breeze on a 
piazza, when “suddenly the reach or strait inside of Grand Manan became whitened by the 
canvas of a large fleet of vessels making directly for our harbor. It was a beautiful sight but 
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rather ominous." American forces on the island were outnumbered about fifteen to one, and 
surrendered immediately. U.S. soldiers were taken prisoner and transported to Halifax, and the 
male civilians on the island were required to swear an oath of allegiance to the crown. A month 
later, at the end of August, an invasion force left Eastport for Penobscot Bay. It captured Castine 
on September 1st, then sailed up the Penobscot River and fought an engagement with American 
militia forces at Hampden on the 2nd. The British won, occupied Bangor the next day, and at that 
point controlled the eastern third of the District of Maine.36  
The British did not administer the rest of eastern Maine in exactly the same way they 
administered Moose Island. All men on Moose Island were required to swear an oath of 
allegiance to the King. Men in the rest of eastern Maine were given a choice: they could swear 
an oath of allegiance to the King, or a different oath that pledged them only to behave “peaceably 
and quietly,” and refrain from carrying arms. There appears to have been an understanding from 
the start that while Moose Island would likely be permanently British, the status of the rest of 
eastern Maine had yet to be determined. According to a proclamation by the Lt. Governor of 
Nova Scotia, John Sherbrooke, a final decision would have to wait “until His Majesty’s pleasure 
shall be known,” and “orders and regulations” be established “for the permanent Government of 
that Country.” The British were, however, laying the groundwork for potentially shifting the 
border to the Penobscot permanently. Advantages were offered, in Sherbrooke’s proclamation, to 
those willing to take the loyalty oath. They would receive a coasting license, and so would have 
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permission to trade throughout the region. They would also be able to import goods from Great 
Britain and its other colonies.37  
In the same proclamation, Governor Sherbooke warned New Englanders against exactly 
the kind of movement that had characterized church networks in Maine for the previous twenty-
five years. Any person who was not an inhabitant of eastern Maine at the time of occupation was 
prohibited from visiting the occupied zone, or “passing or repassing” the boundary, without a 
license from a senior British official. Violation was punishable by arrest, court martial, and 
banishment from the zone.38 This would seem to be a blanket prohibition, applicable to the 
Congregational missionaries working for any of the four missionary societies operating in 
Maine, and the Catholic Father Cheverus, who traveled throughout Maine every summer.  
By the time war and invasion arrived, however, the networks created by the 
Congregational and Catholic churches in the District of Maine were deeply entrenched. No one 
seems to have considered altering the routine. And though they had not created a specific 
exception in the proclamation, the authorities apparently did nothing to stop religious itinerants. 
The Catholic network carried on as if nothing had changed. Father Romagne was with the 
Passamaquoddy when the invasion began, but reported being treated well. When the rest of the 
coast to the Penobscot was taken in 1814, he happened to be in that community, and so his 
residence was occupied twice. But Romagne carried on with his annual travel plans. He 
completed his typical circuit that winter, from the Indian communities within the occupation 
zone to Newcastle and the other mid-coast towns that were still held by Americans. Father 
Cheverus did the same, starting in Boston and crossing and recrossing the line. His circuit now 
consisted of well over a dozen communities, from Portsmouth, New Hampshire and Portland, 
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Maine, all the way to Bangor and the Indian communities within the occupation zone. Cheverus 
was adamant that, war or no war, he would keep to his schedule. “Otherwise,” he wrote, “it 
would be said here…that fear had caused me to leave…for the people here really believe 
themselves very exposed to the enemy.”39 
Meanwhile, the Congregationalists continued to maintain their missionary network as 
well. Jonathan Fisher, the resident minister in Blue Hill, Maine, had engaged in a great deal of 
missionary work over the years. He traveled the country east of Penobscot Bay on his own in the 
late 1790s, and over the first two decades of the nineteenth century he worked regularly for the 
missionary societies, especially the SPGNA. In 1814 Fisher found himself right in the middle of 
the invasion. On September 3rd, during the Battle of Hampden, he wrote in his diary: “cannons 
[are] heard plainly at Blue Hill.” He spent the next few weeks describing his and his neighbors 
increasing anxiety over finding themselves in occupied territory. The British, Fisher wrote, “have 
declared by proclamation their determination to hold possession of the territory between the 
Penobscot River and Passamaquoddy Bay.” On September 6th residents of Blue Hill met and 
signed articles of capitulation, and were required to hand over their guns, though those guns were 
restored days later to anyone who signed an agreement not to participate in the fighting. On the 
eighth, Fisher wrote, he “felt to-day somewhat dejected under a view of our situation as fallen 
into the hands of the British.”40  
And yet, though dejected and in the hands of the British, Fisher continued his work in the 
Congregational network. Just as he had been doing for years, Fisher preached in various places 
throughout the Penobscot River valley. In the winter of 1814/1815 he travelled from Blue Hill, in 
the occupied zone, to Bangor to preach there. Then he carried on into the American-held towns 
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to the northwest, visiting Garland, Corinth, and other communities. This passing of the border 
appears to have raised no alarms. At roughly the same time, in the fall of 1814, another 
missionary traveling around Penobscot Bay was encouraging even more engagement with the 
war zone. In a letter to Boston, Alfred Johnson noted that while the region had been “starv’d” for 
preaching, it was beginning to revive with the occupation. The British were stimulating trade, 
and attracting “a multitude of strangers.” Johnson seemed to believe that the war provided more 
opportunity for the Congregationalists, not less.41  
Most striking in its implications for the border was the fact that the British occupation 
had no effect on Peter Nurse and his network of teachers in eastern Maine. Nurse was based in 
Ellsworth, within the occupied zone, but his work was not independent. He was essentially an 
employee of two Massachusetts-based missionary societies simultaneously, the SPGNA and the 
Evangelical Missionary Society. Nurse continued to collect his pay and keep the societies 
apprised of his work throughout the war. Essentially, the British were allowing Congregational 
organizations to continue to maintain their influence across the whole District of Maine by 
funneling money and literature into Nurse’s schools. This decision had repercussions. Only one 
year earlier, local officials in New Brunswick had begun to complain about young men from 
Maine “offering themselves for school masters,” and potentially carrying “republican principles” 
over the border. Peter Nurse knew about this phenomenon, writing just after the war ended that 
at least one student of his had been teaching in New Brunswick for over a year.42 So just as the 
British were trying to create a new border, they began losing control of the old one. As they were 
ostensibly trying to protect their new boundary at the Penobscot, they were doing nothing to 
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address the missionary networks that overlapped that boundary and funded Maine teachers. This 
allowed those teachers, and potentially their republican principles, to spread into New Brunswick 
proper. 
 At the same time, the Catholic network in Maine was ensuring Passamaquoddy support 
for the Americans. The British had for years allowed for a transnational Passamaquoddy 
community partly in anticipation of this military adjustment of the border, but their strategy was 
a failure. At the outbreak of war, the Passamaquoddy community at Pleasant Point made it clear 
that they felt no attachment to the British. Some apparently asked for a notice to be posted in 
their chapel, “forbidding all British subjects” from doing “any injury whatever” to the building 
or the Passamaquoddy community. Chief Francis Joseph Neptune called a meeting with 
Americans in Eastport, where he made clear the Passamaquoddy “attachment to our American 
Brothers, and…desire and inclination to live in peace and amity with all our neighbors, 
particularly our American Brothers.”43 Father Matignon in Boston noted happily that these 
Indians, “whom Mr. Ciquart [sic] formerly governed have declared themselves neutral.” Ciquard 
was the priest who had been poached by New Brunswick, and who had drawn the 
Passamaquoddy toward the British interest until Massachusetts agreed to hire Father Romagne in 
1798.44  
The 1814 invasion of eastern Maine was exactly the situation that John Allen had warned 
Massachusetts about twenty years earlier, and the reason the state chose to hire Father Romagne. 
The British, Allen wrote in 1793, were trying to secure the Passamaquoddy interest in case of 
“any rupture...with this country.” It was imperative to prevent that community from getting 
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“settled down & attached solely to the other Government.” Allen had even dismissed concerns 
about borders. It did not matter whether the individual Passamaquoddy communities resided on 
the British or the American side of the de facto border. What mattered was securing their “amity 
& interest,” and the way to do that was to provide them with a priest. Now, in 1814, events 
played out just as Allen had predicted. For sixteen years, the Passamaquoddy had been well 
served by a priest paid for by Massachusetts. Father Romagne lived alongside the Indians, 
preached, baptized, assisted with petitions and vaccinations. Though their community straddled 
the border, the Passamaquoddy relied on Boston for everything and Fredericton for nothing. And 
so when the British army arrived to take eastern Maine and looked for their acquiescence, they 
were disappointed. The Passamaquoddy were not inclined to do anything that might shift the 
border westward. They wanted to remain part of Massachusetts and the Diocese of Boston.45  
 
The post-War of 1812 period brought changes to the way British authorities understood 
the borderland. In the previous decades, during the borderland boom of the 1790s and 1800s, the 
whole region had been open. Like their counterparts in other parts of the northeast – the Canadas, 
Vermont – New Brunswick authorities chose to keep people and goods moving freely within the 
space. Migrants from the United States were welcome. Americans moved over the border 
unimpeded, conducted their affairs with no trouble, and when they asked for grants of land they 
got them. Actions that might get in the way of the spirit of openness and free trade – like Colin 
Campbell’s seizure of the American ship Sally in the St. Croix River – were quickly reversed.46 
When the U.S. tried to enforce its 1807 Embargo Act along the northeastern border, British 
authorities actively encouraged Maine residents to skirt the laws. Then, during the early years of 
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the War of 1812, the same authorities tacitly allowed many instances of collusive capture, in 
which an American captain would intentionally allow an “enemy” privateer to seize his ship, 
thereby illegally trading his cargo.47  
All of this activity, however, took place during a time when the British believed that the 
border would still be adjusted, and unofficial colonial policy was to treat U.S. citizens as lapsed 
British subjects. Across the northeast British authorities were soliciting Americans settlers for 
the borderland. Proclamations in both Upper and Lower Canada offered whole townships to 
anyone who wished to petition for them.  Both private land speculators and public entities – like 
the Executive Council of Upper Canada itself – took out ads in American newspapers to draw 
families north. Anyone could relocate to British North American territory for any reason, at any 
time. These people, after all – people who were adults between 1783-1812 – had been British 
subjects at birth. Even the men who had taken up arms in the rebel cause were lumped in with all 
the rest. A quick informal oath was all that was necessary to reenter the fold, and sometimes 
even the oath could be ignored.48  
The war years began to shift the thinking in New Brunswick. The outbreak of hostilities, 
the invasion and subsequent withdrawal from eastern Maine, and the peace process finally 
showed British authorities that their earlier optimistic assessment of borderland possibilities was 
flawed. They were not going to get the generous border they had envisioned. And beyond that, 
the people of Maine had changed. This was a surprise. In the earlier years the settlers rushing 
into the borderland all seemed the same, like apolitical opportunists. It did not matter whether 
they chose the British or the American side of the borderland, because all they were interested in 
was good, connected land. And economically, they would all be dependent on British trade 
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anyway. They did not seem like dangerous republicans, because geographically and 
economically they were closer to their neighboring British subjects than they were to the heart of 
New England.  
Therefore, what the British expected to find in eastern Maine at the outset of the War of 
1812 was a remote outpost, still apolitical and estranged from faraway Boston – the sort of place 
that might favor collaboration, or at least neutrality, as it had in 1779. What they found instead 
was a region that had been rapidly integrated with the rest of the state, and was in constant 
contact with Boston. The Congregational and Catholic networks in Maine created that 
connection – and created it quickly, thanks to state funding, and in the case of the 
Congregationalists, the rise of ladies cent societies. Both networks, moreover, devoted a 
disproportionate amount of resources to the far eastern corner of the District of Maine. 
Settlements there received a wealth of books and schools, and soon produced a surplus of 
schoolteachers. These borderland opportunists were suddenly republicans. That de facto border 
that the British thought was flexible had quietly become inflexible. New Brunswick needed to 
reevaluate its border policy. 
The first changes happened early in the war. When the fighting began, officials began to 
consider that a category of people that could be labeled “Americans” lived in their province, and 
that they probably should gather some information about them. There was no push to round 
anyone up for deportation. The Jay Treaty of 1794 had made clear that in the event of a war, 
there would be no such deportations from either country, so long as resident aliens continued to 
“behave peaceably and commit no offence against the Laws.”49 Authorities decided, however, to 
at least take stock of the resident Americans. Though they would likely not be deported, it was 
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important to ensure that they were, indeed, behaving peaceably and committing no offence. 
Attention to the issue varied among the cities and counties of the province. Officials in some 
places simply issued proclamations, waited for Americans to come forward and report 
themselves, and then noted their names. Others with the same task, for instance in the busy port 
of Saint John, did a little investigating.  
 All told, the province discovered quite a few American residents. Almost all of these 
people were from Maine or the rest of Massachusetts, and they were living all over New 
Brunswick. Most raised little alarm. A letter from one settlement on the Miramichi River noted 
that a handful of Americans had been cutting timber there for about three years. A more 
comprehensive survey from the same region, this time covering all of Northumberland County, 
found just over a hundred American workers. Some authorities tried to differentiate between 
Americans who were temporary laborers and others who had relocated to the province with a 
family. Walter Bates, the sheriff of Kings County, submitted a list of ten Americans. He noted, 
however, that at least four of these men had families in New Brunswick and “consider[ed] 
themselves as subjects.” Authorities in Saint John forwarded a list of twenty-seven men who had 
“come from the United States…to reside and settle” in Saint John over the past few years, and 
had taken oaths of allegiance. A handful of the men had brought families along, and all of them 
had been living in Massachusetts/Maine before crossing the border. The Saint John authorities 
noted “no instance of seditious practice, or symptoms of danger” amongst the Americans.50 
 All together, New Brunswick discovered that it had a little over two hundred Americans 
in residence during the War of 1812, most from Maine. This was remarkably similar to the 
number of British aliens discovered in Maine by the Americans, who were conducting a similar 
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survey. Just as in New Brunswick, authorities issued proclamations in various places and relied 
on those concerned to self-report. A wide variety of British-born people chose to announce 
themselves: from newcomers to Portland who had arrived only days earlier, to families who had 
been resident in Maine for more than thirty years. The records did not differentiate between 
aliens from the British Isles and British North America, so it is impossible to determine how 
many had crossed the Maine/New Brunswick border. But many people on the list lived in the 
eastern section of Maine. Over fifty declared that they were residents of Eastport, Castine, or 
other towns east of the Penobscot River.51  
 The discovery of over fifty British aliens living in the region of Maine most exposed to 
the British did not, apparently, raise alarms. Nor did the discoveries in any other states. But New 
Brunswick authorities had a different reaction to their findings. Though most of the Americans 
they uncovered seemed innocuous, there were some who were potentially problematic. As noted 
in chapter four, John Bedell, of Woodstock, New Brunswick, identified nineteen resident 
Americans in his community. Most of them had reported themselves, as requested, and seemed 
to pose little threat. But, Bedell noted, “there are some of these persons from the States offering 
themselves for school masters.” Schools were important, and teachers were in high demand, but 
Bedell believed it was vital to “prevent as much as possible republican principles being 
disseminated amongst us – and the minds of our youth from receiving any improper bias or false 
principles of religion or government…”52 This was the first complication in the prevailing New 
Brunswick view of the borderland. Lumbermen on the Miramichi, dockworkers in Saint John, 
farm families looking for improved land – these were the sorts of people the British expected to 
find in the borderland. They were the kind of apolitical migrants that a colony needed to grow, 
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and they were the reason the border had not been enforced. Teachers, though, seemed different. 
How could they be apolitical? They had been educated in Massachusetts and were now bringing 
their republican education into British territory. Perhaps the open border was ill advised.  
These concerns only deepened after the failed occupation of eastern Maine and the end of 
the war. The people on the other side of the border were supposed to have been essentially the 
same as their British North American counterparts. That proved not to be the case. Though 
everyone knew Washington County, Maine, was economically entwined with New Brunswick, 
politically it seemed to have shifted. It had always seemed unnecessary to quibble about who 
counted as a “real” British subject, but now maybe a distinction made sense. Plus, after thirty 
years, a new generation was coming of age. These people were native to New Brunswick. 
Shouldn’t they have more rights and privileges than newly arrived Americans? Requiring only a 
short oath from migrants now seemed insufficient.  
An 1817 letter to the government in Fredericton summarizes the changes in post-war 
thinking. This letter, by Robert Pagan, commissioner of Charlotte County, was mentioned in 
chapter two. Pagan was reporting the number of arrivals from the United States that he had 
personally dealt with over the previous seven years. He listed ninety-two men, almost all from 
Maine, the majority with families. These were not the kind of people who had ever raised 
concerns before; in fact, these were the immigrants the British had been seeking for years. The 
majority were farmers, and most of the others were traders or craftsmen of some sort. Pagan, 
however, saw the whole lot as simply a flood of newcomers. He complained that the influx “bids 
fair to exceed the Loyal Population of our original settlers and their children,” and mentioned 
several “serious disputes” between new arrivals and “original settlers.”53  
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 Pagan went on to complain less about sheer numbers, and more about procedure. The 
arrivals, he thought, were able to take the appropriate oaths far too easily. Most of them were 
looking for permanent land and “privileges,” and he had “discovered in very few of them proofs, 
that Loyalty to the King and a Preference to the British Constitution were the main inducements 
to the change of their Allegiance.” Pagan claimed that he had attempted to keep things proper, 
trying in “almost every instance” to get a reference from at least one or two trustworthy locals. 
But sometimes no reference was available, and Pagan apparently felt he couldn’t reject someone 
solely on that basis. “It certainly will be necessary,” he wrote, “that some restriction or regulation 
be adopted to make it more difficult” for immigrants to take the oaths.54  
 It is worth stepping back here and noting the difference between Pagan’s view of this 
migration in 1817 and the way American migrants to British territory had been treated for 
decades. First, there is the category he created for “original settlers.” Thirty years earlier, after 
the arrival of the loyalist refugees in New Brunswick, original settlers would have referred to the 
families who moved to the Saint John River valley or Passamaquoddy Bay in the 1760s. 
Ironically, most of these people were from the District of Maine or the rest of Massachusetts. To 
them, the loyalist arrivals of 1783 were the newcomers. Furthermore, some of the 1783 arrivals, 
like the Cape Ann Association, were non-loyalist migrants from Massachusetts. Now all of these 
people – pre-Revolutionary New England migrants, loyalist refugees, non-loyalist settlers of the 
first decade or so – were thrown together into the category of “original settlers.” Meanwhile 
migrants arriving from the same places for many of the same reasons, but after the turn of the 
century, were now classified as new.  




Second, it had not previously been important that either loyalty to the King, or preference 
for the British Constitution, be the reasons for migration north or east. In fact, throughout British 
North America, those trying to solicit settlers had explicitly centered their pitch on the quality 
and affordability of the land, and marginalized any consideration of political allegiance. 
Government officials in the Canadas placed advertisements directly into American newspapers, 
trying to interest readers in Canadian land opportunities. These same government officials 
granted Canadian land to men who had carried arms against the British government, to little 
controversy. Speculators in Lower Canada made targeted pitches to Vermont settlers, touting 
access to Montreal and the St. Lawrence River to try and lure them just a few more miles beyond 
the border. Americans who asked for land in New Brunswick – the Cape Ann Association in the 
1780s, or the Grand Manan settlers in the 1800s – were simply given the land they asked for. 
Even when settlers with actual loyalist credentials explicitly challenged the policy, nothing 
changed.55  
 By 1817, though, many people in New Brunswick were thinking like Robert Pagan. For 
years Americans had received land grants with no trouble, but now some petitioners found their 
claims rejected. Previously overlooked distinctions between petitioners began to be emphasized. 
In 1818 a man named Reubin Brockway and another named Solomon Stone filed nearly identical 
requests for land. These men were living on the Magaguadavic River, which begins in central 
New Brunswick and flows southwest, emptying into Passamaquoddy Bay at the town of St. 
George. Brockway was forty-three and married, and admitted being born in New Hampshire. He 
claimed to have been in New Brunswick for fourteen years, and to have taken an oath of 
allegiance in 1811, seven years before his petition. He wrote that he “considers himself a British 
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subject.” He had “always” been on the Magaguadavic River, he claimed, and now he wanted to 
make it official; he asked for 300 acres to be granted on the west side of the river. New 
Brunswick officials approved the grant, and noted on his paperwork: “Recommended – born 
before the American rebellion.”56  
 Solomon Stone, however, had not been born before the rebellion. Stone and Brockway 
knew each other because Brockway specified in his petition that he was requesting the land just 
below the parcel requested by Stone. Stone might have believed that he had an even better case 
for approval than Brockway. He had been a New Brunswick resident for a full eighteen years, 
and had arrived as a child of eight. He too, wrote that the “considers himself a British subject.” 
However, he was only twenty-six. He had been born in Machias, Maine a full decade after the 
end of the American Revolution. And having arrived as a child, he had apparently never been 
administered any oaths. This now mattered. Stone’s petition was rejected, and a note attached 
made it clear that he would have to be naturalized.57 
 But what would that naturalization look like? Should Americans now naturalize as if they 
had never been subjects? Or could they still reclaim all the privileges of natural born 
subjecthood? Conveniently, a legal matter had just been debated in Fredericton that pointed a 
way forward. In 1815, Aaron Upton of St. Stephen New Brunswick petitioned the government to 
register his newly built ship as British owned. Upton pointed out that he had been born in the 
United States, but in 1777, “before the independence of those states was acknowledged by His 
Majesty.” In 1800, at the age of 23, he moved to New Brunswick with his family and they had 
been there ever since. He noted that he paid taxes and served on juries, was enrolled in the 
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militia, and considered himself a British subject. “He never took the Oath of Allegiance to the 
United States, nor held any office” there. Should he not be considered a “natural born” subject?58  
 Advocate General Ward Chipman was torn. That Upton was a British subject seemed 
obvious, but it was difficult to say whether he was “naturalized” or “natural born.” Chipman 
wrote that registering the boat did not pose a problem, as there was plenty of precedent for 
“granting registers to such vessels as are taken under His Majesty’s protection” – for example in 
times of war, when warships capitulate and sailors take oaths of allegiance to the crown. But the 
larger question of natural-born subjecthood was a problem. Chipman had doubts about the idea 
that Upton was a “natural-born subject from having been born within the United States before 
the acknowledgement of their independence.” It seemed as though he was a naturalized subject. 
He could, though, be considered natural born if he followed the stipulations of the Plantation Act 
of 1740, “An Act for Naturalizing such foreign Protestants and others therein mentioned, as are 
settled or shall settle in any of His Majesty's Colonies in America.” That act had been passed to 
enable non-British migrants in the colonies a chance to fully participate in political life, by 
providing a set of steps that would grant status as “one of His Majesty’s natural-born subjects.” It 
had not been used of late in New Brunswick, but it could be revived.59  
Chipman’s decision on the Upton case happened to coincide with the rising debate on 
how to handle American migrants. The Plantation Act of 1740 seemed to provide an easy 
solution. And so beginning in 1817, New Brunswick reclassified migrants from the United States 
as foreign Protestants. From that point on, petitioners were required to attain a certificate of 
naturalization, which once approved would grant them the status of a natural-born subject. For 
approval, they now had to have been residents of New Brunswick for seven years, without 
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having left for more than a period of two months. They had to find two witnesses to testify to 
their residence in the Province, and their good character. And they had to have a minister certify 
that they had recently partaken of the Lord’s Supper, in a local Protestant church. Only after 
these qualifications were met would the applicant be allowed to take the appropriate oaths and be 
considered a natural born British subject. 
The new process worked just as intended, and drastically reduced the number of people 
applying for naturalization. Pagan’s letter of 1817 listed ninety-two people who took the oaths 
over an eight-year period, just in Charlotte County. The New Brunswick Record Book of 
Naturalization covered the entire province, and for the subsequent seventeen years it lists only 
sixty-five names. Little had changed about the demographics of applicants – almost eighty 
percent of the men taking the oaths were from northern New England.60 But the new 
requirements made for a slower, more deliberate process. Before, any man freshly over the 
border could expect to be welcomed into subjecthood freely and immediately. Now, one had to 
prove oneself. The boundaries of New Brunswick were becoming more clearly defined. 
There was no similar call to re-evaluate immigration on the American side of the border, 
during or after the war. Neither Massachusetts nor the United States as a whole chose to do 
anything to alter the naturalization laws that were already in place. There had been some political 
battles over those laws in the late eighteenth century, but those had more to do with party politics 
than with protecting the border. In the very first years after independence Massachusetts had 
been very liberal with naturalization. The state was even willing to re-naturalize loyalist 
returnees who had been banished by name during the war. The first federal law, in 1790, was 
liberal too. It required immigrants to reside in the U.S. for only two years prior to naturalization, 
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and to take an oath. This law lasted five years, before the French Revolution and increasing 
enmity between Federalists and anti-Federalists led to its revision. The 1795 naturalization act 
increased the residency period to five years, and required potential citizens to provide three years 
notice before taking the required oaths. During the worst of the partisan fighting three years later 
the waiting period was briefly extended, but that law was soon repealed and U.S. returned to the 
requirements of 1795.61 And there the requirements stayed, through the upcoming war with 
Britain and into the later nineteenth century.  
 
In the post-revolution years, there had been practically no impediment to naturalization 
on either side of the northeastern border. The region was truly a borderland, jointly shared by the 
two powers, in which communities blended into each other. As the 1790s and 1800s progressed, 
it was the British who maintained that status for the region. While the Americans argued over 
their laws, and made it slightly more onerous to migrate to the states, British authorities did 
nothing to close the borderland. Politically, the boundary did not matter yet. Flexibility was 
good. The British North American colonies had effective economic sovereignty over the region, 
and that was enough.  
And then, the experience of the War of 1812 and its peace process led to a reversal. The 
boundary was not flexible after all. While the borderland appeared economically blended, church 
networks in Maine had quietly defined the limits of sovereignty. The far side of the line was now 
a foreign country, and had to be treated as such. New naturalization restrictions solidified the 
border for alien Americans, and the former borderland became legally bordered. 
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You Will Remain an Integral Part of Massachusetts: The End of the Shared Borderland  
 
 
 After the War of 1812 and a failed attempt to annex eastern Maine, the British in New 
Brunswick were forced to come to terms with their unexpected weakness in the borderland. For 
Americans in the District of Maine, however, it was just the opposite. Their grip on the region 
turned out to be unexpectedly strong. Maine had experienced invasion and occupation, and in the 
end the border had not budged an inch. The remote settlements of the east and northeast, 
economically and geographically so close to the British, were American after all. The border 
would not be shifting to the west.  
 But perhaps it could be pushed to the east or north? As the British moved to a defensive 
posture, altering naturalization laws to ward off American influence, New Englanders began to 
think offensively. There was no reason to fear the British anymore. Congregational missionaries 
and Catholic priests had succeeded in making the easternmost white communities – and, 
crucially, the Penobscot and Passamaquoddy people – permanently part of Maine. It was time to 
take advantage of what those networks had accomplished. With ambitious investment and 
attention to the borderland, Maine might end up with very expansive boundaries indeed.  
 This attitude steadily increased tensions with New Brunswick, and eventually came close 
to producing yet another war. The primary point of contention became the exact location of the 
highlands, which, according to the 1783 Treaty of Paris, were supposed to divide the rivers 
flowing south into the Atlantic from the rivers flowing north into the St. Lawrence. Maine 
contended that the highlands in question were north of the Saint John River, which empties into 
the Bay of Fundy. Britain claimed that the treaty was not meant to include the Saint John, and the 
 
 232 
highlands were much further south, near the headwaters of the Penobscot River. In 1831 the two 
nations placed the matter before an impartial arbiter, the King of the Netherlands, who made the 
Saint John River the boundary. The Maine Legislature rejected this compromise. Lumbermen 
and settlers from both sides began to move into the disputed region; a Maine census taker was 
arrested in New Brunswick, a New Brunswick official was arrested in Maine. Relations even 
became tense in Passamaquoddy Bay, where Mainers had perhaps not given up entirely on 
taking Grand Manan and Campobello Islands. In 1839 both New Brunswick and Maine sent 
soldiers to the disputed zone, only to have the federal government in Washington step in before 
fighting could break out. A temporary truce took hold, and in 1842 the Webster-Ashburton 
Treaty finally settled (almost) the entire border.1  
 The expansive ambition that led to this border crisis began in the first years after the War 
of 1812, when Maine was still part of Massachusetts. That state created a commission to deal 
with Maine lands, and began to increase investment in the region. For the first time, plans were 
made to build a road north of Bangor to reach Houlton and the other townships on the eastern 
borderline. Another road was planned from the headwaters of the Kennebec northwest toward 
Quebec. Had such roads been built earlier, the commission claimed, “many respectable 
settlements would have been made [already]…and many useful citizens would have been located 
there.” Those settlers would also help prevent British subjects from either New Brunswick or 
                                                
1 Francis Carroll, A Good and Wise Measure: The Search for the Canadian-American Boundary, 1783-1842 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001); Richard Judd, “The Aroostook War and the Northeast Border,” Maine 
History Online, accessed May 27, 2019, https://www.mainememory.net/sitebuilder/site/781/page/1190/display; 
Owen to Sir John Harvey, 1837-1840, S225 F526, W.F. Ganong fonds, New Brunswick Museum, Saint John, New 
Brunswick. Remarkably, almost two centuries later, tiny Machias Seal Island remains in dispute. It mainly has to do 
with lobstering rights. See Nik DeCosta-Klipa, “The long, strange history of the Machias Seal Island border 




Quebec from cutting timber on American territory. These roads were crucial, for “the agriculture 
and commerce of the State, convenience of the citizens, and…intercourse between two nations.”2  
 The commission then began to solicit settlers for the northern reaches of Maine. The 
specifics of these solicitations make clear that since the 1790s and 1800s, the borderland had 
fundamentally changed. Proximity to British North America was no longer part of the pitch. 
Instead the commissioners chose to emphasize the networks, steadily built by Congregational 
missionary societies over the previous decades, which linked Maine communities to the rest of 
Massachusetts. “The expense of removing a family to Maine is inconsiderable,” commissioners 
asserted, and “the advantages there are many.” And what were those advantages?  
Remember, if you remove there you will remain an integral part of Massachusetts, and 
that the numerous associations, and well directed institutions within the state to 
ameliorate the condition of Man, will diffuse the blessed tidings of the Gospel within 
your walls, and send public qualified teachers to expound its consoling doctrines to your 
very threshold, and aid in instructing your offspring, till you are of sufficient ability to 
provide for yourselves…3 
 
This was not an empty promise. The following year, in 1818, the town of Houlton received its 
first Congregational missionary: Rev. Seth Winslow of the Evangelical Missionary Society. The 
town assembled an eighty-dollar donation for the EMS, and that society promised more 
missionary support as soon as the new Bangor-Houlton road was constructed.4  
This new strategy for settlement in the north country, inaugurated by Massachusetts and 
soon to be adopted by the independent state of Maine, clearly illustrates the changes that are the 
subject of this study. For decades, northern New England had been a borderland, and it was 
marketed as such. It was appealing because it was shared – the border was an abstraction, and the 
                                                
2 Commissioners Reports, 28 May 1817 and 11 June 1817, Location 2120-0103, Books about the Commission for 
the Sale and Settlement of the Public Lands in the District of Maine, Maine State Archives (hereafter MSA), 
Augusta, Maine.  
3 Advertisement to the People, 7 July 1817, Ibid.  
4 Old Pioneer, History of the Town of Houlton (Haverhill, MA: Morse and Son, 1884), 36-46.  
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whole region had strong connections to British North America. For example, when the Houlton 
grant was awarded in 1797, the grantees realized that they had an opportunity to build a town 
that was technically in Massachusetts, but was a de facto part of New Brunswick. Twenty years 
later, there had been a fundamental reorientation. Eastern Maine was no longer attached to New 
Brunswick, but rather integral to Massachusetts. The borderland had been bordered.  
 
 Some of the first people to feel the impact of this bordering were the Penobscot and 
Passamaquoddy. Just as the border with the British solidified in the northeast, these communities 
were dismayed to find another border arise in the southwest. This one, established by Maine’s 
statehood, separated them from Massachusetts and the funding they had come to rely on for a 
resident priest. The events of the following years – as these two communities lost and then 
ultimately regained state support for their Catholic Church – provide a revealing conclusion to 
this study. They demonstrate not only the new realities of a solid border in Maine, but also the 
continued relevance of the church networks that helped to build that border.  
 In March of 1820, Maine finally broke from Massachusetts to become an independent 
state. The move was a long time coming, and in the end was driven mostly by party politics. 
There had never been widespread popular support for independence. Proponents of separation 
began holding statehood conventions in the 1780s, but had a terrible time convincing people to 
attend. Most residents of the well-settled towns along the coast were very happy to be part of 
Massachusetts. The only people strongly in favor of separation were a small group of elite men 
from the Portland area who were hoping to dominate the new state government, and backcountry 
squatters who were hoping statehood would interfere with the claims of wealthy landowners. 
These two groups were not natural allies, and as they squabbled the Massachusetts Legislature 
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lowered taxes in the district, created a few more counties (resulting in more government jobs), 
and successfully neutralized some of the separation support. In subsequent years separation 
enthusiasts occasionally managed to put statehood to a vote, but it was always rejected. The 
movement picked up momentum after the War of 1812, when the Democratic-Republican Party 
made it a part of their efforts to take control of Maine from the Federalist Party. The Federalists 
were still quite strong in Boston, and the Democratic-Republicans hoped to dominate the 
government of an independent Maine. A successful vote finally came in 1819, and statehood the 
following year.5  
 In 1821, just one year later, Reverend Elijah Kellogg recognized that separation had 
created a potential opportunity. Kellogg had just accepted a mission from the Massachusetts 
Missionary Society to serve in the easternmost communities of Maine, on the shores of 
Passamaquoddy Bay. In recent decades, missionaries from the Congregational network had 
ignored the Catholic Passamaquoddy Indians, who were served by Father Romagne, the priest 
paid for by Massachusetts. But just before Maine’s statehood, Father Romagne returned to 
France. The Maine government then chose to discontinue the funding that would have provided 
the Passamaquoddy and Penobscot people with a new resident priest. These communities were 
newly vulnerable.  
Reverend Kellogg wondered if, in their current state, he might make some inroads with 
the Passamaquoddy and thereby collect more money. The new state border, after all, did not 
really affect his Congregational network. The various Congregational missionary societies were 
supported by their membership and ladies cent societies, and no longer required funding from the 
                                                
5 For the story of Maine’s split from Massachusetts, see James Leamon, “Revolution and Separation: Maine’s First 
Efforts at Statehood,” in Maine in the Early Republic: From Revolution to Statehood, ed. Charles Clark et al 
(Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1988), and Ronald Banks, Maine Becomes a State: The Movement 
to Separate Maine from Massachusetts, 1785-1820 (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1970). 
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states of Massachusetts or Maine. Kellogg knew the Society for Propagating the Gospel Among 
the Indians and Others in North America had a special fund, the Alford fund, used to support 
Indian missions. It had never been used in Maine, but perhaps now was the time? Kellogg could 
try to convince the Passamaquoddy that their situation had changed, and they might choose to be 
more receptive. Then he could collect pay from two societies, not just one.  
The Reverend Kellogg was optimistic about his chances. Yes, he was working for the 
same missionary organizations that had failed for generations to make progress with Maine 
Indians. But it was a new day – Maine was an independent state, with a firm eastern border. 
Kellogg had a newly empowered state government behind him, which had made clear that while 
there would be some continuity in its relationship with the Penobscot and Passamaquoddy, there 
would also be changes. Though the state would assume “all the duties and obligations of the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts toward the said Indians,” this apparently did not extend to 
continued state funding for the Catholic Church. It was an understandable decision. The 1798 
decision to put a priest on the state payroll was inspired by fear of British influence from the 
east, and a desire to secure the “interest and friendship” of the Passamaquoddy and facilitate 
“settlement of the Eastern Country.” Now the region was well settled, and no one was fearful of 
British influence. The British had their chance at the eastern country during the War of 1812, and 
failed. The Passamaquoddy had the opportunity to help them, and chose not to. Now they were 
permanent residents of the State of Maine.6  
Kellogg wrote to the SPGNA before leaving for Passamaquoddy Bay, and made his 
proposal to collect money from the Alford fund. The SPGNA was skeptical. They had received 
                                                
6 Release of Claims between Maine and Penobscot Tribe, 17 August 1820, Digital Maine Repository, Maine State 
Archives, accessed May 24, 2019, https://digitalmaine.com/native_tribal_docs/18/; “Col. Allen’s Report on the 
Indian Tribes, in 1793,” in Frederic Kidder, Military Operations in Eastern Maine and Nova Scotia During the 
American Revolution (Albany, NY: Joel Munsell, 1867), 305-318. 
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the same reports for years: outreach to Maine’s Indian communities was useless.  Missionary 
Hezekiah May, in 1810, told them not to bother with the Penobscot, who had no interest in 
Congregationalists and prided themselves on their Catholicism: “they think they have a more 
universal and prevalent religion.” Ephriam Abbott echoed May’s sentiments a year later in 
regard to the Passamaquoddy, who, he said, were already more solemn and devout than their 
white neighbors and quite attached to their priest.7 There seemed little reason to believe that 
Kellogg would be successful where every other missionary had failed. Ultimately, the SPGNA 
decided to approve thirty dollars from the Alford fund for a few weeks work, with an asterisk 
attached. The pay was conditional on Kellogg demonstrating that he had accomplished 
something. No one else in the records received a similar asterisk. Even months later, when the 
time came to issue the funds, the SPGNA was reticent. The society voted to give Kellogg the 
funds because it “appear[ed] by his letter” that he “has rendered services.” They hoped, however, 
for a “fuller account in his journal.”8  
The payment from the Alford fund ultimately went through, because it turned out that the 
Reverend Kellogg was making progress. When he first started visiting the Passamaquoddy, 
Kellogg received the usual protestations about their attachment to Catholicism and the French 
language, and their lack of interest in Protestant preaching or schools. Kellogg persisted, 
however, reminding community leaders that the new Maine government was eager for them to 
learn English, so that they might understand “the laws they were under.” This might have been a 
hard sell if Kellogg had to negotiate with a priest paid for by Massachusetts. But in 1821 there 
                                                
7 Ephraim Abbott letters, Box 1, Folder 1; Hezekiah May letters, Box 3, Folder 9, MSS 48, Society for Propagating 
the Gospel Among the Indians and Others in North America records (hereafter SPGNA), Phillips Library (hereafter 
PL), Rowley, Massachusetts. 
8 Notes, May 1821 and Notes, October 1821, Ms. N-176, Box 2, Folder 1, Society for Propagating the Gospel 
Among the Indians and Others in North America records (hereafter SPGNA), Massachusetts Historical Society 
(hereafter MHS), Boston, Massachusetts.  
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was no priest in residence, and Kellogg found himself dealing mostly with Deacon Sockabasin, a 
leader in the community and its unofficial interpreter. Sockabasin, it turned out, was inclined to 
make a deal. He had been trying, without success, to get the state to purchase the 
Passamaquoddy a wood lot. Kellogg was willing to help, and soon did manage to secure a four 
hundred dollar grant for a wood lot. Before long, the Reverend Kellogg had permission to open a 
small school in the Passamaquoddy community.9  
Kellogg soon found a way to augment his funding still further, this time with federal 
money. In 1819, the federal government had passed the Indian Civilization Act, which created 
something popularly known as the Civilization Fund. This fund was intended to supply grants to 
teachers who set up schools in Indian communities “adjoining the frontier settlements of the 
United States.”10 Kellogg, with the apparent assistance of Deacon Sockabasin, convinced the 
authorities in Washington that his school deserved money from the Civilization Fund.11 This 
almost immediately raised alarms with the Diocese of Boston. Irish Catholics living in Eastport 
began warning the Passamaquoddy that Bishop Fenwick disliked the new school. The Bishop, 
however, did not have the ability to immediately counter with a priest and school of his own. All 
the he could do in the short term was write a strongly worded letter. If Kellogg was only teaching 
reading and writing, Fenwick wrote, the school was fine. He suspected though, that the minister 
might be “instilling his religious principles into the minds of [Passamaquoddy] children.” This 
was unacceptable.12  
                                                
9 Elijah Kellogg Journal, 1821, M100.4, Box 4, Folder 75, Kellogg Collection, Special Collections and Archives, 
Hawthorne-Longfellow Library, Bowdoin College, Brunswick, Maine.  
10 Indian Civilization Act of 1819, Federal Education Policy History, accessed June 1, 2019, 
https://federaleducationpolicy.wordpress.com/2015/09/09/indian-civilization-act-of-1819/.  
11 It is unclear to what extent Sockabasin helped with this plan. In the letters referenced below, Edward Kavanagh 
implies that Kellogg and Sockabasin worked together to defraud the government, and presumably shared the money 
from the Civilization Fund. I do not have any other sources that confirm this, however.   
12 Kellogg Journal, 1826-1827, Ms. N-176, Box 2, Folder 1, SPGNA, MHS.  
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Bishop Fenwick, in Massachusetts, did not have the power to eliminate Kellogg’s 
Congregational school and return Catholic services to a Catholic community. Fortunately, there 
were prominent Catholics in Maine who did have that power. In 1831, Edward Kavanagh of 
Newcastle became the first Catholic elected to the U.S. Congress from New England. As a child, 
Kavanagh and his family had interacted with both Cheverus and Romagne on their annual trips 
through Maine. He almost certainly met members of Maine’s Catholic Indian communities as 
well, as they occasionally traveled with the priests. Kavanagh entered Congress determined to 
eliminate Kellogg’s funding and return Catholic schools to the Penobscot and Passamaquoddy. 
Most people in those communities were still firmly Catholic, and there was no reason for the 
federal government to be funneling their money to a Congregationalist. “Kellogg and Saco-
beson,” Kavanagh wrote to Bishop Fenwick, “have really defrauded the government in the basest 
manner.”13 
In 1833 Kavanagh managed to have the Civilization Fund money withdrawn from 
Kellogg and allocated to Catholic schools. Though federal authorities initially designated the full 
grant of three hundred dollars solely for the Passamaquoddy, they soon agreed for it to be shared 
with the Penobscot. The Reverend Kellogg traveled to Washington to complain, but without 
success. In 1835 the grant was increased to reflect the fact that it was going to two communities, 
and in subsequent years it increased still more.14 The Congregationalist attempt to use Maine’s 
new boundaries to assert control over the Passamaquoddy went down in defeat. In the end, 
funding for Catholic priests and schools returned, thanks to the old network built thirty years 
earlier by Fathers Cheverus and Romagne and subsidized by the state of Massachusetts. What 
                                                
13 Kavanagh to Fenwick, 15 January 1833, 101.B, Box 2, Folder 24, Fenwick Papers, Archdiocese of Boston 
Archives, Braintree, Massachusetts.   
14 Kavanagh to Fenwick, 21 January 1833, May 1835, Ibid.   
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began as an effort to control a chaotic and open borderland remained a potent force in Maine far 
after the border had been settled for good.  
 
A line on a map means very little, especially if the people it divides choose to ignore it. 
When those people begin to respect it, and build networks that abide by it, the line becomes 
meaningful. In his study of European borderlands, Peter Sahlins contends that border building 
and state formation are almost always two-way processes. Centers may try, but they cannot 
simply impose boundaries on their peripheries. Politics and war may draw lines on maps, but the 
“shape and significance” of boundaries is “constructed out of local social relations in the 
borderland.” The people who live in borderlands, in other words, do the work of border 
building.15  
In 1783, American and British negotiators in Paris drew a line on a map separating New 
England from British North America. Both sides knew the line to be an approximation. Both 
sides aimed to develop their settlements in the region, and looked forward to adjusting the border 
from a position of strength. When the time came to effect that adjustment, however, the dueling 
centers found that at least one part of the periphery had changed. The border between Maine and 
New Brunswick was built. The people living in the borderland – with some assistance from 
others in the northeast – did the work.  
Many groups contributed to the process, each driven by its own motivations. The 
Penobscot and Passamaquoddy made their contribution through their decades-long determination 
to secure a resident priest. Their steady pressure, applied in negotiation after negotiation, finally 
paid off. This allowed Fathers Romagne and Cheverus to play their part, as they built a strong, 
                                                
15 Peter Sahlins, Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees (Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press, 1989), 8.  
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stable network that connected Catholics across the District of Maine to each other and to Boston. 
Meanwhile, the Congregational missionaries of the SPGNA did similar work, distributing books 
and pamphlets throughout the district, taking donations, and most importantly, collecting the data 
that allowed their society and other missionary societies to more effectively serve Maine 
settlements. Men like John Sawyer and Peter Nurse built the border by combining the resources 
of multiple missionary societies to create networks of schools, and by training the teachers who 
staffed them. Young women contributed by taking these jobs, expanding the reach of a network 
that had previously employed only trained male ministers. And finally, the women of 
Massachusetts played perhaps the most important role, by creating an effective way of 
assembling resources and moving those resources into the borderland. Through the ladies cent 
societies, the women of southern New England invested in northern New England. They 
connected eastern Maine to the rest of Massachusetts, which made the border with New 
Brunswick increasingly meaningful. It was their work that allowed Massachusetts, in 1817, to 
brag of the “well directed institutions” that made Maine an “integral” part of the Commonwealth. 
Thought they may not have planned or even recognized their collaboration, all these people – 
men and women, Catholics and Congregationalists, schoolteachers and Passamaquoddy 
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